Corporate Benefits without Corporate Taxation: Limited Liability Company and Limited Partnership Solutions to the Choice of Entity Dilemma by Parker, Richard L.
San Diego Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 3 Article 3
8-1-1992
Corporate Benefits without Corporate Taxation:
Limited Liability Company and Limited
Partnership Solutions to the Choice of Entity
Dilemma
Richard L. Parker
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law
Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Parker, Corporate Benefits without Corporate Taxation: Limited Liability Company and Limited Partnership Solutions to the
Choice of Entity Dilemma, 29 San Diego L. Rev. 399 (1992).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol29/iss3/3
Corporate Benefits Without Corporate
Taxation: Limited Liability Company
and Limited Partnership Solutions
to the Choice of Entity Dilemma
RICHARD L. PARKER*
Many businesses confront a common dilemma in selecting a
proper entity for the conduct of their business-the desire to in-
corporate for state law purposes, but to avoid the more onerous
taxation imposed on corporate income. The options for dealing
with this dilemma have changed significantly in recent years. One
solution, the S corporation, has become less attractive. On the
other hand, limited partnerships and limited liability companies
may now permit new businesses to enjoy the best of both
worlds-to have corporate benefits without corporate taxation.
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INTRODUCTION
New businesses faced with the task of selecting the most appropri-
ate form of business organization are often presented with a di-
lemma. Corporations have served the needs of business very
successfully for the past century and are generally the preferred
form of organization for business purposes. However, the use of a
corporate form subjects the income earned by the business to double
taxation. Thus, the dilemma is whether to satisfy the business goals
through incorporation' or reduce taxation through the use of a non-
corporate form.2
There is a simple and obvious solution to this choice of entity di-
lemma. Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) permits
a business to incorporate and elect to have its income passed through
to the shareholders in a fashion resembling the taxation of income
earned through a partnership. 3 Unfortunately, not all businesses can
or should rely on subchapter S for several reasons. First, the right to
make an S election is narrowly limited.4 Second, while taxation of
the income earned through an S corporation resembles the taxation
of income earned through a partnership, it differs in ways that could
cause a materially greater tax liability to be imposed on the share-
holders of an S corporation than would be incurred by partners in
like circumstances. 5
Businesses unable to resolve the choice of entity dilemma by
means of the subchapter S election have two alternatives: either they
incorporate and take steps to ameliorate the more onerous tax bur-
den imposed on corporate income or they organize as a partnership
and endeavor to address state law issues as best they can without
incorporation.
The incorporation alternative has probably been the most common
solution for taxpayers not able to resort to the S election, and much
time and attention has been devoted to developing techniques for re-
ducing the tax burden. This approach is, at best, an accommodation
1. See infra text accompanying notes 25-72.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 73-98.
3. I.R.C. §§ 1361-78 (1986).
4. I.R.C. §§ 1361(a), (b) (1986). See also infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 104-67.
to the competing concerns.6
The use of a noncorporate form to avoid double taxation while
endeavoring to otherwise adequately address state law issues has
been more problematic. The difficulty in using noncorporate forms
has two sources. First, there has been reason to question whether a
truly corporate-like relationship could be created in a noncorporate
form of organization. In particular, concerns have existed as to
whether owners who were active in the management and control of
the business could shield themselves from personal liability.7 Second,
even if taxpayers could find a means to create corporate-like rela-
tionships without incorporation, it is incumbent on them not to be
too successful in this effort. The Code imposes corporate income tax-
ation not only on corporations, but also on any other unincorporated
associations in which the relationships too closely resemble those typ-
ically present in a corporation.8
The ability to use noncorporate forms to achieve corporate-like re-
lationships without also incurring corporate taxation has changed
dramatically in recent years. The ability under state law to create
noncorporate relationships closely resembling those typical of the
corporate form has been greatly enhanced by a significant legislative
trend in the states to limit the potential for owner liability. In addi-
tion, in 1988 the Treasury finally completed a long period of study
regarding the tax rules for entity characterization and announced its
conclusion that these rules should not be modified. In particular, the
Treasury also confirmed that arrangements providing owners with
limited liability would not, for that reason alone, be subject to corpo-
rate income taxation.10 This conclusion was immediately reflected in
Revenue Ruling 88-76,11 which held that a Wyoming "limited liabil-
ity company" would be treated as a partnership for federal income
tax purposes notwithstanding the fact that the owners were statuto-
rily protected from personal liability. 2
This Article examines some of the history of business organiza-
tions and the changes affecting choice of entity summarized above.
It concludes that the recent changes affecting noncorporate forms
have created significant new opportunities to fully solve the choice of
6. See infra text accompanying notes 168-74.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 264-78.
8. See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(2), (3) (1986). See also infra text accompanying notes
176-263.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 279-94.
10. I.R.S. ANN. 88-118, 1988-38 I.R.B. 25. See also infra text accompanying
notes 295-306.
11. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Limited liability companies are hereafter
referred to as "LLCs."
12. See infra text accompanying notes 296-306.
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entity dilemma. Either a limited liability company or a limited part-
nership with a corporate general partner can now be utilized to pro-
vide owners with all of the principal benefits of incorporation without
subjecting the income of the business to corporate income taxation.1 3
Given that corporate-like relationships can now be established for
all practical purposes without subjecting businesses to corporate in-
come taxation, this Article further concludes that corporate income
taxation must now be viewed as an entirely voluntary and elective
regime for all new nonpublic businesses. In light of this conclusion,
the interests of certainty, uniformity, fairness, and efficiency demand
that Congress act quickly either to make the election expressly avail-
able under the Code or to impose a business tax in a nonelective
fashion.14
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The corporate form emerged during the nineteenth century in or-
der to meet the changing needs of business after economic activity
had shifted from small proprietorships, guilds, and agriculture into
that of the industrialized era.15 The need of business enterprises to
organize efficiently and retain capital and labor created significant
pressures to develop a form of business organization that would per-
mit investors to provide capital without risking their entire personal
wealth, that vested management in representatives knowledgeable
about the business, that assured that the capital, once organized,
would continue to be productive notwithstanding changes in owner-
ship, and that allowed investors the opportunity to realize the benefit
of their investment without causing dissolution and liquidation of the
organization.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 312-98.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 399-401.
15. For a brief history of the emergence of general corporation laws in the nine-
teenth century, including some of the turmoil that attended their early development, see
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 446-63 (1973). Professor
Friedman notes that while pre-twentieth century law is often thought of as "unfolding in
slow patterns ... nothing could be more startling than the difference one century made
in the law of the business corporation. In 1800, corporation law mostly dealt with munic-
ipalities, charities, and churches.... By 1870 corporations had a commanding position in
the economy." Id. at 446. During its early history, the corporate form was fraught with
many uncertainties and provided the unscrupulous with many opportunities for fraud.
Thus, legislators and the courts alike devoted considerable attention to corporate issues,
ranging from antitrust laws to securities laws to fiduciary duties. As a result, by the end
of the nineteenth century, the law of business corporations was well-developed, accessi-
ble, and rather generally understood.
The corporate form was not the only entity competing to meet the
needs of business. The historical roots of the modern corporation lay
in the franchises and monopolies available only through special char-
ter from the sovereign authority,"6 and the need to obtain this special
charter continued into the nineteenth century. Thus, businesses en-
deavored to establish the needed relationships not only by seeking
corporate charters from the sovereign, but also by endeavoring to
adapt trusts, partnerships, and other forms to the same ends. 17
Early on it could not have been certain that the corporate form
would emerge as the common form of business organization. How-
ever, over time the ability to obtain a special charter in the United
States from the various state legislatures came to be fairly routine.
This process finally led by the mid- to late-nineteenth century to rec-
ognition of the need to eliminate the requirement of obtaining the
consent of the state to incorporate, lest the state legislatures be over-
whelmed. The devised solution was to replace the special charter sys-
tem with general corporation laws under which a charter would be
automatically granted to any person satisfying the statutory
requirements.
Once general corporation laws had become widely adopted and
well understood, it is hard to discern why a business permitted to
incorporate would have chosen any other form of organization. Ab-
sent tax considerations, it remains difficult today to posit a situation
in which a person permitted to incorporate would be led to choose
any other form of organization. Indeed, absent tax considerations,
other business forms may well have developed into highly specialized
vehicles, if not mere footnotes of legal history.
As interesting as it may be to speculate about life without income
taxation, the reality is that income tax considerations loom very
large. The twentieth century expansion of income taxation is perhaps
as significant to business as the nineteenth century's acceptance of
the corporation. Since 1909, the use of the corporate form has en-
tailed an additional income tax burden that is not necessarily im-
posed on other forms of organization.' 8 As a result, taxpayers
16. See generally WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
377-80 (2d ed. 1932).
17. Alternatives that competed with the corporate form in an effort to meet the
needs of business included joint stock companies, business trusts, limited partnerships,
and partnership associations. For an early twentieth century overview of the alternatives
to incorporation, see generally EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITH-
OUT INCORPORATION (1929).
18. A corporate income tax has been imposed on corporations continuously since
the adoption of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER &
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
S 1.01 (5th ed. 1987). See also generally EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A
STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND
ABROAD (1914) (providing a history of income taxation in the United States through the
[VOL 29: 399, 1992] Limited Liability Companies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
desiring to avoid more onerous taxation have continued to seek alter-
native means of relieving those very pressures that led to the adop-
tion of general corporation laws, but to do so in a fashion that does
not give rise to the corporate taxation.
Most of the alternative forms of organization that had competed
with the corporate form did not long survive the renewed effort to
create a hospitable form of business organization for the simple rea-
son that those alternative forms so closely resembled corporations
that corporate income taxation was imposed. 19
The partnership has survived as the principal alternative to incor-
poration for the simple reason that it is the only alternative form of
business organization recognized under the Code. 20 As a result, the
partnership form has come to be utilized in surprising situations that
would astound a nineteenth century lawyer.21 Indeed, in the early
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment).
19. Joint stock companies have been expressly included within the definition of a
corporation for income tax purposes since 1909. See Corporation Tax Law of 1909, 36
Stat. 112 (1909). Similarly, it was probably the partnership association that originally
prompted the inclusion of "associations" in the definition of a corporation. But cf. Eliot v.
Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 187 (1911) (holding that the corporate tax was intended to
apply to organizations created by statute or which "derive from that source some quality,
or benefit not existing at the common law"). However, the use of so-called business trusts
successfully avoided corporate taxation in the early part of this century. Id. See also
Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919). The success was short lived and corporate taxa-
tion was extended to such business trusts in 1924. See Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144
(1924) (applying corporate income tax to the same trust which had escaped taxation in
Crocker). See also Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (approv-
ing the imposition of corporate income taxation on a Texas organization in which the
capital was represented by transferable interests, the assets were vested in trustees having
no authority to bind the individual beneficial owners, and which was apparently a part-
nership under the laws of the state of Texas). Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935), is regarded as having first articulated the test currently applicable in determining
whether any particular organization is an association taxable as a corporation. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983). Generally, the test is based on whether
the arrangement provides the benefits typical of incorporation. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 176-252 for a more detailed discussion of the corporate resemblance test.
20. See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(2), (3) (1986). The combination of these definitions is
to treat any organization engaged in the conduct of a business for the purpose of generat-
ing a joint profit as either a corporation or a partnership. See also Treas. Reg.§§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1983), 301.7701-4 (as amended in 1986). It is not clear
precisely why limited partnerships escaped corporate taxation under early authorities. In
Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178 (1911), the inclusion of associations in the definition of
corporations was held to contemplate any organization arising from statute or deriving a
benefit from statute that did not exist at common law. This formulation would certainly
seem to comprehend limited partnerships that are entirely a creature of statutory crea-
tion unknown to the common law.
21. Notwithstanding that limited partnership statutes had been widely adopted
throughout the United States by 1929, Professor Warren noted that "[t]he lurking dan-
ger that a special partner might be exposed to unlimited liability has seriously restricted
1980s the partnership form reached its zenith when a significant
number of partnerships had interests traded on the New York Stock
Exchange.22 While the utility of using the partnership form for pub-
licly traded businesses was eliminated in 1987 by legislation impos-
ing corporate taxation on most publicly traded organizations,23
efforts of nonpublic companies to find a means by which corporate
benefits can be obtained without corporate taxation continue.
24
II. THE CHOICE OF ENTITY DILEMMA
A. The Goal of Pass-Through Taxation
1. The Benefits of Pass-Through Taxation
The income of most businesses to which capital is a contributing
factor would be subject to a lower tax burden by use of an entity
that permits income to be passed through to its owners rather than
to be subject to corporate income taxation.25 This assertion stems
from the simple fact that the single level of tax on income earned
through a partnership or an S corporation, imposed at the partner or
shareholder level, should be lower than the double taxation imposed
on income earned through a corporation. 28 This conclusion is further
supported by the fact that since 1986 the maximum rate of tax im-
posed on the income of individuals has been lower than that imposed
the use of the limited partnership statutes." WARREN, supra note 17, at 306.
22. It is reported that the first publicly traded limited partnership appeared in
1981 and that there were between 100 and 125 such partnerships in existence by 1988.
See Willard B. Taylor, Master Limited Partnerships, 46 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 28.01,
at 28-2 (1988).
23. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330-403. This
legislative change was in direct response to the fear that the growth of publicly traded
limited partnerships would jeopardize the corporate tax base. See H.R. REP. No. 100-
391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1987).
24. A report to Congress of a joint study conducted by the Treasury and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (Service) with respect to the tax treatment of large partnerships did
not recommend extending corporate taxation to such organizations. TREAs. DEP'T,
WIDELY HELD PARTNERSHIPS: COMPLIANCE AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES, REPORT SUB-
MITTED TO CONGRESS (March 30, 1990), reprinted in [Mar.-Apr.] Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 64, at L-1 (Apr. 3, 1990). Recommendations have been made in the past to
treat partnerships with more than a certain number of partners as corporations for tax
purposes. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAx., 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF
THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX REDUCTION AND REFORM PROPOSALS 6 (1978). Apparently
sentiments about large partnerships have changed. See H.R. 4287, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
4301-05 (1992) (providing "simplified" rules for flow-through, audit, and compliance of
partnerships with more than 250 partners or, at the election of the partnership, 100
partners).
25. This conclusion should not be applicable to a business in which the income is
attributable to services simply because deductible salaries should be able to eliminate
virtually all corporate taxable income.
26. See I.R.C. §§ 701, 1363(a) (1986) (exempting partnerships and S corpora-
tions from entity level taxation). Compare these sections with I.R.C. § 11 (1986)..
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on the income of corporations.17 Thus, even before taking into ac-
count the impact of the second tax, the initial tax on business profits
will often be reduced under a pass-through tax regime. When the
impact of the second tax is added, even if the second tax is deferred
through accumulations of corporate income, the tax burden of incor-
poration increases.28
2. Exception for Income Splitting Situations
As with most other generalizations about taxation, there are situa-
tions in which the presumptive benefit of pass-through taxation will
not exist. One such exception may involve small businesses owned by
persons who are individually subject to the maximum tax rate. A tax
benefit could result from incorporation of such a business because of
the graduated tax rates imposed on the first $75,000 of corporate
income.29 Setting aside for the moment the impact of the second tax,
business income passed through to the owners will be subject to a
thirty-one percent maximum federal tax.30 With the graduated rates
imposed on the first $75,000 of corporate income, the corporate tax
liability will not exceed 31 % of taxable income until the income
reaches approximately $210,000.31
Whether there is a significant tax savings possible from the use of
27. Compare I.R.C. § I with § 11 (1986). The imposition of a higher rate of tax
on the income of corporations than on the income of individuals had not previously ex-
isted at any time since the individual income tax was first imposed under the Sixteenth
Amendment.
28. The second level of taxation on income earned through a corporation will be
imposed when the shareholders realize the benefit of the income earned by the corpora-
tion either in the form of dividends or as gain from the sale or other disposition of the
stock.
Into the 1980s, the so-called General Utilities doctrine allowed the corporate level tax
on the appreciation in the value of property to be avoided by the distribution of the asset
in kind (see I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 333, 336 (1954)), or when the gain was realized by a sale
incident to a 12-month plan of complete liquidation (see I.R.C. § 337 (1954)). See Gen-
eral Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), which gave its name to
the non-recognition rules even though the Court had refused to rule on the issue of corpo-
rate gain recognition. The General Utilities doctrine, which had begun to erode years
earlier, was finally eliminated by legislation in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 331, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
has removed all possibilities for avoiding the imposition of tax on corporate level gains.
29. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (1986). Such a situation is often created by splitting the
income between the owners and the corporation.
30. I.R.C. § 1 (West 1992).
31. Once corporate income has exceeded $100,000, an additional 5% tax is im-
posed until the benefit of the progressive rates has been eliminated. I.R.C. § 1 1(b)(West
1992). The higher corporate rate on income over $75,000, combined with the 5%
surcharge, will result in a blended corporate rate in excess of 31 % when the taxable
the progressive corporate rate structure by small businesses is some-
what speculative. The eventual second tax must be balanced against
the immediate tax savings possible under the graduated corporate
rate structure. The current tax savings achieved by having access to
graduated corporate tax rates on small amounts of income will have
to exceed the present value of the deferred second tax. To illustrate,
with income of $100,000, the tax on the corporation will be
$22,250.2 Had the income passed through to individual owners tax-
able at the maximum individual rate, the tax on the individual own-
ers would have been $31,000.33 The use of the corporation thus
produces an initial tax savings of $8,750. However, there also exists
a deferred tax liability of at least $21,770.," The use of the corpora-
tion is beneficial if this future tax liability is, in present value terms,
less than the current $8,750 tax savings. Even at a ten percent per
annum discount, the deferral would have to continue for nearly ten
years to offset the effect of the second tax. 5
In evaluating the benefit of utilizing the progressive corporate rate
structure, it must be held in mind that unlimited accumulations of
corporate income are not permitted under the Code. Rather, an on-
erous surcharge is imposed on income accumulated in excess of the
reasonable needs of the business.3 6 To avoid this surcharge, distribu-
tions of excess funds must be made and such distributions will result
in imposition of the second tax. Further, even where accumulations
can be justified by the reasonable needs of the business, the business
must typically be one that is expanding. With an expanding busi-
ness, the income could quickly reach the level at which the effective
corporate tax rate is not sufficiently less than the individual tax rate
to justify the second tax regardless of the length of time the second
tax may be deferred, and, at some point, the initial tax on business
income reaches slightly under $210,000. The combined rate of tax will reach 34% over-
all at $335,000 of taxable income and the tax rate will thereafter be a flat 34%.
32. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (West 1992).
33. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 1992). This illustration disregards the impact of state
income taxation, which simplifies the illustration at the expense of ignoring some of the
real economic significance of the choice.
34. The net after-tax income of the corporation is $77,750 and presumably in-
creases the value of the corporation by a like amount. If this increase in value is recog-
nized in the form of a long-term capital gain at the time the stock is sold, the federal
income tax at 28% would be $21,770. If the income is distributed and taxed as a divi-
dend, the applicable tax rate would be 31% and produce a larger deferred tax liability.
35. This comparison also fails to take into account the more restricted use of any
excess funds necessitated by retention within the corporation and the double taxation
imposed on the income derived from the use of the funds within the corporation during
the period of the deferral.
36. I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1986). Generally, corporations will be able to accumulate
up to $250,000 of income without any independent showing that the income accumulated
is needed in the business. See I.R.C. § 535(c)(2)(A) (1986). Accumulations in excess of
this amount will be subject to the accumulated earnings tax unless the business can es-
tablish the business need for further accumulations.
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profits will become more onerous for having adopted the corporate
form. The second tax, whenever incurred, will merely add to the cost
of having incorporated.
It is often suggested that the double taxation of corporate income
will be avoided by the retention of the stock until the death of the
owner.3 7 At death, all property of the decedent, including stock, will
pass to the heirs or legatees with a basis equal to fair market value
and thus will permit the avoidance of the second tax by means of a
sale of the shares or liquidation of the corporation. 8
The fair market value basis arising on death of the shareholder
will permit the deceased shareholder's successor to avoid the second
tax on accumulated income through a sale of the stock, but it does
not necessarily eliminate the tax cost of having incorporated. The
date of death basis step-up will not avoid the double tax on future
income if the business is continued. Further, if the business continues
to operate and there is a desire to remove excess cash from the busi-
ness through distributions, the date of death basis step-up will not
efficiently eliminate the second tax because the stepped-up basis does
not eliminate the corporate earnings and profits.39 Finally, incorpora-
tion will significantly diminish the benefit of the stepped-up basis on
death if the business has any built-in gain.40 The basis step-up ap-
plies only to the stock, not to the basis of the corporate assets. The
built-in gain in a corporation is subject to a potential double tax, and
the basis step-up will eliminate only the shareholder level tax on the
built-in gain. The other level of tax, the corporate tax, is not
avoided.41
In contrast, the date of death basis step-up in the partnership con-
text applies not only to the basis of the decedent's partnership inter-
est, but may also result in an increase in the basis of the assets to the
partnership.42 Thus, in a partnership, there is only a single level of
37. See WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 2-8 (2d ed. 1990).
38. I.R.C. § 1014 (1986). With a fair-market-value basis in the stock, there
should be no gain or loss realized on the disposition of the shares. See I.R.C. § 1001
(1986).
39. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 316(a) (1986).
40. "Built-in gain" refers to the excess of the value of an asset at any particular
time over the adjusted basis of that asset. Obviously, built-in gain can arise either from
changes in value or adjustments to basis.
41. Prior to 1986 the General Utilities doctrine provided numerous opportunities
under the Code for corporations to avoid the recognition of gain on appreciated assets,
and thus made the inability to step-up the basis of the assets in the hands of the corpora-
tion less significant. All such provisions were eliminated in 1986. See supra note 28.
42. See I.R.C. §§ 743(b), 754 (1986).
tax and that tax is eliminated by the stepped-up basis at death. 3
3. Public Trading Exception
With respect to publicly traded businesses, while pass-through
taxation might still be preferable, it is not possible. The emergence
of publicly traded limited partnerships in the early 1980s led to leg-
islation in 1987 requiring all businesses with publicly traded interests
to be taxed as corporations regardless of the form of organization
employed." It may also be true that any business desiring to become
publicly tiaded will find little merit in pass-through taxation during
the prepublic period.45
4. Identity of Investors Exceptions
The identity of investors may militate against pass-through taxa-
tion. Specifically, tax-exempt and nonresident alien investors may
desire to avoid investment in a pass-through entity that is engaging
in an active business.
43. At one time it was thought that optional adjustments to the basis of partner-
ship assets involved so much complexity as to make it an undesirable election. See gener-
ally McKEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 1 24.10[5] (stating that "continuing partners may
well decide that the benefits of the election ... [will be] more than outweighed by the
potential long-term detriments to themselves, in the form of recordkeeping headaches
and possible future basis decreases as to their interests"). The coming of the computer
age hopefully has overcome most of the reluctance to make this election. Indeed, most of
the publicly traded limited partnerships formed in the 1980s made the 754 election not-
withstanding that the daily trading at differing prices made the administration of this
election far more difficult than would be the case with a nonpublic company. See Taylor,
supra note 22, § 28.07, at 28-24.
44. I.R.C. § 7704 (1987). For a discussion of the limited exceptions to the imposi-
tion of corporate taxation on publicly traded organizations, see McKEE, ET AL., supra
note 37, at 3-85.
45. There is no necessity that businesses incorporate during their prepublic period.
However, there is added complexity in explaining and in accounting for the prepublic
period at the time of the public offering if a pass-through organization was employed. It
is probable that businesses that desire to gain access to public markets would desire the
simplicity of the corporate form. The tax consequences during a prepublic period are
likely to be nominal in relation to the expected profitability that the prepublic sharehold-
ers expect to realize from going public.
If a significant capital gains preference were to return to the tax law, the situation
might change. The ability to have ordinary losses pass through to owners, which will be
deductible against ordinary income not later than the year in which the interest in the
company is disposed of (see I.R.C. § 469(g) (1992)), and which will be recovered as
capital gains on the sale of stock, could produce significant tax benefits. This may be
particularly attractive given that it may be difficult for net operating losses in early years
to survive repeated financing under I.R.C. § 382 (1992). See Richard L. Parker, The
Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking, 9 VA. TAX REv. 625 (1990). Of
course, the presence of tax-exempt and non-resident investors who would typically not be
in a position to use any losses passed through to owners might militate against such a
plan.
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a. Tax-Exempt Investors
For tax-exempt investors, there will be a single level of tax regard-
less of whether the entity is a corporation or a partnership. If a cor-
poration is used, the corporation will incur tax liability on all of its
income. However, the tax-exempt investor will be exempt from taxa-
tion when it realizes the benefit of its share of the income, regardless
of whether realized in the form of dividends or gain from a sale or
exchange of the stock. 46 If the business had organized as a partner-
ship, there would be no entity level taxation, but the tax-exempt in-
vestor would be treated as engaged in an unrelated trade or
business47 and would be taxed on its share of the business profits.48
While there could be some benefit from being subject to pass-
through taxation, either through reduced taxation49 or increased
cash flow, 50 the potential benefits generally have not been viewed as
sufficient to overcome the increased administrative burden entailed
in reporting and paying tax on unrelated business income. 51
46. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(c)-I (1960).
48. I.R.C. §§ 501(b), 511-14 (1986).
49. The potential tax savings could arise from the ability of the taxexempt to use
the progressive tax rates with respect to its share of income. See I.R.C. §§ 511 (a), 11 (b)
(1986). This will obviously not be meaningful to sizable tax-exempt investors. An addi-
tional tax savings is possible to the extent that the business, if incorporated, would accu-
mulate income and generate passive income thereon in order to avoid the second tax that
would otherwise be imposed on non-tax-exempt investors. When a corporation is used,
the tax-exempt shareholder's share of the investment income attributable to the accumu-
lation will be subject to the corporate-level tax. Similar investment income on accumula-
tions in a partnership allocated to the tax-exempt investor would not be subject to tax as
unrelated business income.
If there were numerous partnership investments in the tax-exempt organization's port-
folio, some of which were producing losses, a tax savings would be possible from the
ability of the losses from one organization to be used to offset the profits of another.
50. It seems evident that the use of the corporate form must result in greater
accumulations than would otherwise be the case. If a business generates $100 of excess
after-tax income, the shareholder will presumably desire to employ the funds in the most
efficient manner possible. The choices are to leave the funds in the corporation, in which
case the full $100 is available for investment, or to distribute the funds for individual
investment. Because the distribution would result in a dividend and a tax of up to $31,
only $69 would be left to invest. Obviously, the more efficient use of the funds is to retain
them in the corporation. In effect, the benefit to the shareholder is an interest-free loan
from the government conditioned on retention of the excess funds in the corporation.
Given the incentive to accumulate income to defer the second tax, it must be reasoned
that excess accumulations occur. See William S. McKee, Master Limited Partnerships,
45 INST. ON FED. TAX'N §§ 23.01, 23.03, at 23-9 (1987) (suggesting that this "lock-in
effect" is one of the chief tax policy problems with the corporate income tax).
51. See id. at 23-9 to 23-10.
b. Nonresident Alien Investors
The situation of the nonresident alien investor is similar to that of
the tax-exempt investor. For nonresident alien investors, their share
of income earned through a corporation will be taxed at the corpo-
rate level. In addition, the nonresident alien will be taxed a second
time, through withholding, on that income when the benefit of that
income is realized in the form of a dividend."' The United States
generally does not impose a second level of tax on the nonresident
alien when the benefit of the income is realized in the form of gains
from the sale of the stock.5 3 Thus, double taxation may be at least
partially avoided. However, the real economic impact of any United
States tax is likely to be largely or entirely eliminated by the allow-
ance of tax credits in the nonresident aliens country of residence.!4
In contrast to income earned through corporations, the active busi-
ness income which a nonresident alien earns through a partnership is
treated as income effectively connected with the conduct of a United
States trade or business55 and is taxed to the nonresident alien in the
same way such income would be taxed to any United States citizen
or resident.56 The income earned by a nonresident alien through a
partnership is not subject to a second tax when distributed. 57 Again,
any United States tax should be creditable against tax due in the
country of residence.58 Thus, there may be no economic impact to
the nonresident alien from the choice of entity.
While the choice of entity may have little economic impact, a non-
resident alien investing in an active business partnership will be re-
quired to file a return and otherwise comply with United States tax
law. This is an obligation which nonresident aliens understandably
are not anxious to accept.
52. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (1986). The tax imposed on dividends paid to a non-
resident alien is 30% under the Code, id., but by treaty, it is widely reduced to as little
as 5%. See, e.g., Convention Modifying the Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, Dec. 30, 1965, U.S.-Neth., art. 5, 17 U.S.T. 896, 900-01 (reducing the tax
rate on dividends to 5% for large shareholders and 15% for all others).
53. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) (1986). United States-sourced capital gains of nonresi-
dent aliens which are not effectively connected to a United States trade or business are
subject to United States taxation only if the nonresident is present in the United States
for at least 183 days during the year in which the gains are realized. Id.
54. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (1986) (allowing foreign tax credits in the United
States).
55. I.R.C. § 875(1) (1986).
56. I.R.C. § 871(b) (1986).
57. But see I.R.C. § 897 (1986) (effectively treating a foreign corporation's share
of income from a United States partnership as income from a United States branch
operation and imposing a so-called dividend equivalent tax on such profits).
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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c. Potential Benefits of the Corporate Tax Regime
In addition to the fundamental difference between the double tax-
ation of corporate income and the pass-through taxation of partner-
ship income, there are other significant differences in the tax
regimes.5 9 One disadvantage of the partnership form often presented
is that partnerships may not be acquired in a tax-free reorganiza-
tion. 0 It is unquestionably true that partnerships may not be ac-
quired in a tax-free reorganization, 6' but it is less clear that this is a
significant disadvantage. Partnerships are subject to only a single
level of tax, and that tax generally cannot be deferred by means of a
59. For a nonjudgmental and relatively complete topic by topic comparison of the
tax rules governing corporations and partnerships, see Elliot Tannenbaum, The Business
Entity: C Corp. v. S Corp. v. Partnership, 45 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 6.01 (1987).
60. I.R.C. § 368(a) (West 1992) defines a reorganization as a transaction involv-
ing corporations. The partnership and the partners can engage in reorganization-like
transactions only if they qualify for nonrecognition under I.R.C' § 351. See infra note
61. S corporations can be acquired in a tax-free reorganization. See I.R.C. § 1371(a)
(1986).
The ability to engage in a tax-free transaction is most significant when the only consid-
eration available is the purchaser's stock and that stock cannot be readily converted into
cash, at least to the extent necessary to meet any current tax liability. This is usually the
case when the purchaser is not a publicly traded corporation. On the other hand, if the
purchaser had adopted a form that qualified as a partnership for tax purposes (see infra
text accompanying notes 312-98), any acquisition could be structured to defer gain under
I.R.C. § 721 without the burden of qualifying under the baroque rules of I.R.C. § 368.
It is possible that this section of this Article could have been organized as a discussion of
the ease of acquistions by partnerships rather than as a discussion of the difficulty part-
nerships have in being acquired by corporations.
61. A leading treatise notes that the inability to engage in reorganizations is a
disadvantage of the partnership form, but adds the tantalizing qualification that partner-
ships can with "[ec]areful planning ... overcome this limitation." McKEE ET AL., supra
note 37, at 2-13. There is no suggestion whatsoever as to what planning the authors
envision in this respect. Possibly they contemplate incorporation as a precursor to the
reorganization. If the partnership can incorporate on a tax-free basis and then after in-
corporation engage in a reorganization, there is little significance to their inability to
engage in a reorganization while still a partnership. However, for the incorporation to be
tax-free, it must not be considered to be a step in the overall transaction by which the
partners disposed of the business. See Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73 (an incorpora-
tion followed by a planned disposition of the stock received held a taxable exchange).
Alternatively, they may contemplate a transfer to the acquiring corporation qualifying
for nonrecognition under I.R.C. § 351 because of contemporaneous and related transfers
by existing shareholders. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1967). An-
other possibility would be a transfer by the partners to a new corporation with the share-
holders of the acquiring corporation making contemporaneous transfers of the stock of
their corporation, which would thereafter be a subsidiary. I.R.C. § 351 should provide
both the partners and the shareholders with nonrecognition of their gains, at least where
the old corporation continues to exist as a subsidiary. Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-349, 1968-2 C.B.
143 (transferee corporation treated as a continuation of transferor corporation where
transferor was liquidated pursuant to the plan, resulting in other transferors failing to
qualify for nonrecognition under I.R.C. § 351).
tax-free reorganization. Thus, whatever gain exists in the partnership
must be recognized at the time of the disposition of the partnership.
On the other hand, income previously earned will already have been
taxed completely and will not, whether or not it has been distributed,
result in any additional tax burden when the business is sold.
When corporations are reorganized, shareholder gain or loss is not
recognized to the extent that the consideration received is stock of
the acquiring corporation. 2 The tax burden on the built-in gain is
not forgiven; it is deferred. The shareholder-level gain is transferred
to the stock received through an exchanged basis and thus will be
subject to tax when disposition of that stock occurs.63 It is this abil-
ity to defer the owner-level tax which makes a reorganization
beneficial.
While reorganizations permit deferral of gain, it should be
remembered that the gain deferred will include gain attributable to
both accumulated income and to built-in gain. In addition to the
shareholder level deferred gain, there will also be deferred corporate
level tax on the built-in gains.6 4 The acquired corporation or its suc-
cessor in the acquisition will continue to hold the assets at their pre-
acquisition basis. It will therefore recognize any built-in gain and
incur a tax liability at the corporate level either upon the disposition
of those assets or through their use in the business. It will do so
without depreciation allowances which reflect their economic cost in
the acquisition. Because the purchaser is assuming the tax liability
associated with low basis assets, it must, at least in theory, reduce
the purchase price it is willing to pay in order to reflect this assumed
liability in the same way it would reduce the purchase price for any
other liabilities assumed.65
In light of the above, whether the ability to engage in reorganiza-
tion transactions is a benefit militating in favor of the corporate form
depends upon whether the immediate single level tax imposed on the
built-in gain in a partnership will be greater than the sum of (1) the
present value of the deferred double taxation on the built-in gain of
the corporation, (2) the deferred shareholder-level tax on accumu-
lated income, and (3) the double tax cost already incurred on income
previously earned and distributed. In view of this balancing, it may
be more accurate to consider the reorganization provisions as a
62. I.R.C. §§ 354, 356 (1986).
63. I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1986).
64. Corporate-level gain is deferred but is not eliminated through a tax-free reor-
ganization. See I.R.C. §§ 361, 362(b) (1986).
65. It is probably true in most large acquisitions that the tax liability associated
with any built-in gains may not become the subject of direct negotiations. This does not
necessarily mean that tax liability is not factored into the analysis.
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means by which to ameliorate the more onerous tax burden other-
wise associated with the corporate form than to characterize the
ability to participate in a reorganization transaction as a benefit of
the corporate form.
Depending upon whether the corporate or a pass-through form is
adopted, there is some difference in the ability to provide nontaxable
fringe benefits to active owners. But most of the significant dispari-
ties have been eliminated by the equalization of treatment of quali-
fied plans.66 Only a limited number of differences remain, and these
differences are generally not very substantial.67
d. Other Differences
Further differences between corporations and partnerships for tax
purposes involve the taxation of admissions of new members in ex-
change for contributions of appreciated property,68 the taxation of
redemptions, 9 and the taxation of distributions inkind.70 In each
case, the partnership regime permits rearrangements of the business
relationship without significant tax liability at the time of the trans-
action, whereas a similar transaction in the corporate context would
result in recognition of gain.7 '
e. Summary
In summary, there are situations in which corporate taxation may
be either necessary or desirable. However, in the absence of such
situations, businesses will find that avoidance of corporate income
taxation will result in a significant tax savings. 2
B. Preference for Incorporation for Business Purposes
The principal reasons that businesses will generally prefer to in-
corporate for non-tax purposes are that the corporate form provides
66. See generally Jerome E. Harris, Parity in Employee Benefit Plans and Fringe
Benefits for the Self-Employed after TEFRA and TRA '84, 62 TAXES 529 (1984).
67. See generally, McKEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 2-16 to 2-18.
68. Compare I.R.C. § 351 with I.R.C. § 721.
69. Compare I.R.C. § 302 and § 311 with I.R.C. § 731.
70. Compare I.R.C. § 301 and § 311 with I.R.C. § 731.
71. See generally Tannenbaum, supra note 59.
72. See McKEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 2-12, in which this conclusion is stated
with far less equivocation. The authors state that the "tax advantages of the partnership
form are so substantial that, in most situations, they will outweigh the tax and business
disadvantages." Id.
statutory protection to the owners against personal liability for the
obligations of the business 3 and that a corporation has a potentially
perpetual existence. 4 In contrast, the partnership form, at least in
theory, requires that one or more owners have personal liability for
the obligations of the business5 and that changes in the ownership of
the partnership will cause its dissolution."'
1. Owner Liability
That owners of a business prefer to avoid personal liability is obvi-
ous. Of course, there are situations in which countervailing consider-
ations, including tax considerations, could be of overriding
significance. When countervailing considerations exist, a decision not
to incorporate may be further justified by the fact that the unlimited
liability of partners and the limited liability provided shareholders
are not absolute. Most obviously, partnerships may be formed in
which limited partners do not have any personal liability unless they
participate in the management and control of the business.77 Of
course every limited partnership must have at least one general part-
ner who will have unlimited personal liability.78
The practical exposure of general partners to liability can be ame-
liorated in several ways. With respect to tort and certain other kinds
of liability, the general partner's practical risk can be greatly re-
duced through appropriate insurance. The general partner's risk for
contractual liabilities can be avoided simply by obtaining the agree-
ment of the creditor to limit its recourse to the assets of the partner-
ship. Indeed, if a creditor would be willing to extend credit to a
comparably capitalized corporation without guarantees from share-
holders, they should be as willing to extend credit to a partnership
with recourse limited to partnership assets. In addition, the personal
liability of the ultimate individual owners can often be avoided
through the use of a corporation to act as general partner.79
Just as partners need not necessarily discharge all partnership ob-
ligations personally, the corporate form does not necessarily protect
73. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (MODEL CORPORATION AT) § 6.22
(1984).
74. MODEL CORPORATION ACT § 14.02.
75. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AT (UPA) § 15 (1914); REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AcT (RULPA) § 403(b) (1976) (amended 1985). Unless otherwise indi-
cated, references to the RULPA are to the act as amended in 1985. When necessary to
distinguish between the RULPA before and after the 1985 amendments, the pre-1985
RULPA is referred to as RULPA (1976) and the RULPA with the 1985 amendments as
RULPA (1985).
76. UPA §§ 29, 30; RULPA § 801.
77. RULPA § 303. See infra text accompanying notes 272-86.
78. RULPA §§ 101(7), 403(b).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 279-86.
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the shareholders in all events. Creditors will often extend credit to a
corporation only with guarantees from shareholders. Further, the
corporation will be an effective shield against liability only if the
creditor is not permitted to "pierce the corporate veil""0 or to pro-
ceed against the shareholder under theories sounding in agency,
fraud, or estoppel."'
That partners may take steps to ameliorate their personal risk and
that shareholders may be required to answer for the obligations of
the corporation in some circumstances does not alter the facts that
personal liability is often the paramount concern of persons investing
or participating in a business and that the most direct protection
against personal liability has been incorporation.
2. Organizational Continuity
The potentially perpetual existence of a corporation is also a sig-
nificant consideration which favors the corporate form, at least when
the organization has significant capital. It would simply be unaccept-
able if any owner could force the winding up of the business or, al-
ternatively, demand redemption at any time. If a corporation is used,
shareholders have no right to withdraw and thus cannot unilaterally
cause the winding up of the corporation or withdraw and demand
redemption. In the partnership context, general partners have the
right to withdraw at any time unless there is a contrary agreement, 2
and any withdrawal by a general partner will at least potentially
cause the dissolution of the organization and lead to the winding up
of the partnership. 3 Even with a contrary agreement, the general
partners retain the power, though not the right, to withdraw. 4 A
general partner exercising the power to withdraw in contravention of
the agreement will have to respond for damages, if any. Neverthe-
less, such partner will have the right to a distribution subject to the
80. See generally Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate
Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEm'v. U. L. REV. 1 (1978) (endeavoring to identify the
standards and the variations in the standards used to find shareholder liability).
81. For a discussion of the various theories for finding shareholder liability which
are not based on piercing the corporate veil, see Krendl & Krendl, supra note 80, at 2.
See also Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1123-25 (1958).
82. UPA § 31(1)(b); RULPA § 602.
83. See UPA § 31 (dissolution results on any withdrawal of a partner from a gen-
eral partnership); RULPA § 801(4) (dissolution results on the withdrawal of a general
partner unless a remaining or new general partner continues the business in accordance
with the partnership agreement).
84. UPA § 31(2); RULPA § 602.
agreement of the partners and to offset it by any damages. 85 While
something approaching corporate-like continuity of life can be ac-
complished by agreement, continued existence is of great importance
and is most clearly and simply achieved through adoption of the cor-
porate form.
3. Other Business Considerations
Other fundamental differences between the corporate and partner-
ship form include disparate rules regarding management,8" transfer-
ability of interests,87 and organizational flexibility.88 While it can be
generally stated that limited liability and organizational continuity
will militate in favor of incorporation in most businesses, generaliza-
tion as to the impact of these additional considerations is not possi-
ble. Whether centralized, representational management or the ability
to transfer interests are desirable will depend on the needs of the
specific business. When such characteristics are desirable, the prefer-
ence for incorporation should be strengthened because these attrib-
utes are typical of corporations. On the other hand, even if the
owners desire a more flexible management structure and restrictions
on transferability, attributes typical of partnerships, these facts alone
should seldom lead a business to avoid incorporation.
While free transferability of corporate shares will exist in the ab-
sence of a contrary agreement, all that is necessary to restrict trans-
ferability is an agreement between the shareholders.8 Any such
85. See UPA § 38(2); RULPA § 604.
86. General corporation laws vest management in a board of directors elected by
the shareholders. See MODEL CORPORATION AcT § 8.01(b). But see MODEL CORPORA-
TION ACT § 8.01(c) (permitting corporations 'with fewer than 50 shareholders to estab-
lish a management structure that does not involve a board of directors); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASs'Ns §§ 4-302, 4-303 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (permitting a flexible manage-
ment structure in a so-called close corporation). In contrast, partnerships are directly
owner managed by the general partners unless the partners have agreed to the contrary.
See UPA §§ 18(e), (h); RULPA § 403(a).
87. Compare MODEL CORPORATIONS ACT § 6.27 (providing that shares of stock
are, in general, freely transferable) with UPA § 27 and RULPA § 702 (generally pro-
viding that partners may not assign their rights as a partner and cause the assignee to be
substituted in their place).
88. The relationship between partners is fundamentally contractual. Thus, while
the UPA provides the terms of the contract, which will be controlling in lieu of a con-
trary agreement, the partnership acts expressly recognize the right of the partners to
agree otherwise. Thus, for example, management can be vested equally in all partners or
restricted to one person, whether or not a member and profits, losses, and distributions
can be made per capita, in proportion to contributions, or in any other manner the
human mind can conceive. See UPA § 18. The corporate form is more rigid. Generally,
absent the applicability of a unique state law statute or qualification as a close corpora-
tion, management is necessarily vested in a board of directors. Voting rights and eco-
nomic rights are held in proportion to the ownership of shares and any desire to have
varying rights must be accomplished by the creation of a different class or series of
shares.
89. MODEL CORPORATION ACT § 6.27(a). But see MODEL CORPORATION ACT
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agreement can be enforced against purchasers simply by disclosing
the existence of any restrictive agreement by a legend on the share
certificates.90 A flexible management structure may be more difficult
to create in a corporation, 91 but the constraints on the management
form by themselves will seldom be sufficient to lead the owners to
forego limited liability or organizational continuity. 92
An additional factor which may, at least in the past, have strongly
militated in favor of incorporation has been the fact that corporate
law is better developed, more certain, and generally more familiar to
investors and the bar alike.9" How significant any such ,disparity re-
ally has been, and whether it will continue, are entirely speculative.94
It also seems reasonable to suggest that most uncertainty or unfamil-
iarity with the partnership form arises from the different ways in
which the two organizations have been used. To the extent that one
considers the tax-shelter partnerships of the 1970s and 1980s as the
prototype of the business partnership, the conclusion suggested is ap-
prorpriate. These partnerships were enormously complex with tier
upon tier of allocation and distribution provisions and innumerable
special provisions that served no apparent function other than to
cope with various tax concepts.95 When the partnership will simply
provide for all distributions and allocations to be made pro rata to
§ 6.27(c) (requiring a reasonable purpose for restricting transferability).
90. MODEL CORPORATION AcT § 6.27(b).
91. But see supra note 88.
92. Another difference may arise under the securities laws. While corporate stock
will always be a security, non-stock interests may not be. See generally Mark A. Sar-
gent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069
(1992).
93. This may, of course, be due in large part to the fact that partnerships are
simply more flexible. There is little to understand except that the desired relationship
must be created by agreement rather than imposed by statute.
94. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 2-12, suggesting that, to the extent this
difference existed, it has likely narrowed significantly with the widespread adoption of
the RULPA and the acceptance of the limited partnership form for public companies, in
leveraged buy-outs and other business transactions.
95. A good illustration of the type of provision which inordinantly complicates
many partnership agreements is the "qualified income offset" provision. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 1988). Inclusion of such a provision is one means
provided in the regulations to cause the allocations of income under the partnership
agreement to have economic effect as required by I.R.C. § 704(b) without requiring all
partners to repay capital accounts. While the presence of this provision leads to the con-
clusion that the allocations, at least in part, have economic effect, it is expected that this
provision will never in fact be relevant in determining the proper allocation of income
under the agreement. Indeed, by its terms, it applies only in unexpected circumstances.
Other complicating provisions include the innumerable and varied means that were
conceived for limiting the impact of the at-risk rules on the deduction of losses. See
I.R.C. § 465 (1992).
the ownership of units, as would be the case with simple corpora-
tions, it seems unlikely that many would object that the arrangement
is unfamiliar or uncertain.
4. Summary
In summary, if tax considerations are disregarded, the protection
against liability and the presence of organizational continuity af-
forded by the corporate form would lead most businesses to
incorporate.
C. The Dilemma
It is difficult to generalize regarding the proper organizational
form for a new business. There are simply too many variables that
will result in significant exceptions to any statement of purportedly
general application. However, with the caveat that there will be sig-
nificant exceptions, the above discussion points to a common di-
lemma faced by many new businesses: the desire to avoid
incorporation for tax purposes versus the desire to incorporate for
non-tax, business purposes.
Where this common choice of entity dilemma exists, the problem
is how it can or should be resolved. Three basic options are available:
1) incorporate and elect to be subject to the pass-through taxation
provided in subchapter S of the Code,98 2) incorporate and take
steps to ameliorate the increased tax burden,9 7 and 3) avoid incorpo-
ration and endeavor to address the business issues by other means.9 8
III. THE S CORPORATION SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA
Incorporation and election to be taxed on a pass-through basis
under subchapter S may appear as the obvious and best solution to
the choice of entity dilemma. For those who qualify, it is probably
the solution most often chosen. However, not all businesses can qual-
ify to make the election under subchapter S, and not all businesses
that qualify should adopt this solution.
A. Limited Availability of the S Election
To qualify for the subchapter S election, the corporation may not
have more than thirty-five shareholders, 9 have any shareholders who
96. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-78 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 104-67.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 168-74.
98. It is this alternative that has expanded substantially in recent years and that
has the potential to finally solve the choice of entity dilemma. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 176-398.
99. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (1992).
[VOL. 29: 399. 1992] Limited Liability Companies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
are not United States citizens or resident individuals, 100 have more
than one class of stock, 01 or be a member of an affiliated group. 10 2
These limitations can make the S election impracticable for many
businesses.
The subchapter S election is particularly problematic when one of
the owners desires to have some preference to the earnings or assets
of the business, while the business cannot realistically take on the
burden of annual interest payments or the obligation to repay loans
at a certain time in the future. In any such case, the prohibition
against two classes of stock will make the S election
impracticable.0 3
To a new business seeking capital, the prohibition against having
shareholders who are not United States individuals is probably the
most debilitating. A new business in need of capital can ill-afford to
shut itself off from investments by tax-exempt entities, nonresidents,
partnerships, corporations, or other nonindividual sources.
100. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A), (C)(1992).
101. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1992).
102. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2) (1992).
103. The desire for preferences may arise simply from the differing investment
desires of the investors, but will arise in other ways as well. The need for a preferential
class of stock can also arise when the corporation desires to issue shares to a service
provider to whom the parties wish to provide only a share of the future income and
growth in value. This may be a particular concern in that a shift of capital could result in
a prohibitive tax being imposed on the service provider. See I.R.C. § 83 (1992); St. John
v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9158 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1983). In order
to avoid the transfer of a current capital interest, the capital of the business must be
secured to the non-service providers. This is possible only through the creation of prefer-
ences. In an S corporation, the prohibition against the use of a second class of stock
necessitates that the preference be established in the form of an indebtedness. This in-
debtedness must in turn be sufficiently reflective of an arm's length transaction to avoid
characterization as an equity interest violating the prohibition against S corporations is-
suing more than one class of stock. It can prove extremely difficult to achieve both the
tax and business objectives in this context.
Since 1990, the use of an S corporation can be even more problematic if there is to be
a contributor of appreciated property in a business formation that will include a service
provider. Again, the property contributor must receive a preferential right to return of
the capital contributed in order to avoid shifting capital to the service provider, but the
limitations on the use of an S corporation preclude use of a preferred stock interest for
this purpose. The use of indebtedness, however, to establish the capital preference will
not qualify for nonrecognition of gain under section 351 because of the elimination of
securities from the type of property permitted to be received tax free in exchange for a
contribution of appreciated property. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (1992).
B. Tax Disadvantages of Subchapter S Versus
Partnership Taxation
Beyond the fact that subchapter S may not be available to or
practical for every business, it should also be noted that taxation
under subchapter S may, in certain situations, be significantly
greater than the taxation that would have been imposed had a part-
nership been utilized.10 4 Particularly since General Utilities & Oper-
ating Co. v. Helveringa10 was superceded by statute, the S election
can have significant adverse tax consequences as compared to a
partnership.
1. Inability to Adjust Inside Basis
The principal adverse tax consequence that can arise from the use
of an S corporation stems from the fact that, unlike a partnership,
events that cause an increase in the basis of the S corporation stock
will not affect the basis of the S corporation's assets.108
In either a partnership or an S corporation, income attributable to
increases in the value of the business assets can be recognized at
either of two levels: inside the organization by means of a sale or
disposition of the assets or outside the organization through a sale or
disposition of the ownership interests at a price that reflects the in-
creased value of the assets.10 7 Gain exists inside the entity repre-
sented by the difference between the value and the adjusted basis of
the asset. The same gain exists outside the entity represented by the
104. It is not without some trepidation that one suggests that the S corporation is
not a very good solution given the number of S corporation elections in effect. This is
particularly true given that many of the pitfalls of subchapter S have not previously
drawn significant attention. See, e.g., ZOLMAN CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 3.07[2] (1992) (finding very little to list as a disadvantage
of the S form). Nevertheless, the tax pitfalls, which are discussed in the pages that fol-
low, are present in unambiguous form. It is possible that the disadvantages of the S
election as compared to partnership taxation have not been highlighted simply because of
the significantly more limited oportunities to use noncorporate forms in the past.
105. 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See also supra note 28. It does not appear that Con-
gress necessarily considered the impact that the superceding of General Utilities by stat-
ute would have on S corporations.
106. See generally I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 743(b), 754 (1992). No comparable provi-
sions exist for S corporations.
107. While a partnership is not treated as an entity for all tax purposes, it is
treated as an entity in many respects. It is so treated for purposes of taxing the gain or
loss from the disposition of the rights of the partners. See I.R.C. § 741 (1992). The
partnership interest, as property that may be sold or otherwise disposed of, also has its
own basis. I.R.C. § 705 (1992). Obviously, stock in a corporation, including an S corpo-
ration, is property, has a basis, and can be sold or disposed of by the owners. See I.R.C.
§ 1367 (1992) (providing special rules for the determination of the basis of the stock of
an S corporation). Stock of an S corporation is otherwise treated as any other stock
under the Code.
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difference between the value and basis of the interest in the organi-
zation. Thus, the same amount of gain should be recognized either
by a sale of the assets by the organization or a sale by the partners
of their interests in the partnership. 0 8
A single level of taxation of partnership and S corporation income
is generally achieved in that income recognized inside the organiza-
tion passes-through to and is treated as income of the owner. 10 9 The
basis in the partnership interest or the stock of the S corporation is
then increased by the amount of such income passed through to the
owner, and the potential for taxing the same income twice is elimi-,
nated."10 When and to the extent that the income is distributed, the
basis of the owner's interest is reduced, but the distribution is not
income."'
While the potential outside gain is eliminated through basis ad-
justments when the gain is recognized by the entity, the same kind
of adjustment to eliminate potential inside gain is necessary when
the gain has been recognized outside. The Code provides for such an
adjustment in the case of a partnership by permitting the inside ba-
sis of partnership assets to be increased to reflect any outside gain
recognition." 2 However, no comparable provision exists for S corpo-
rations. This means that even though the economic gain represented
by the changes in the value of assets may have been recognized and
taxed at the shareholder level, the low inside basis of the assets to
the S corporation continues, with the result being that the same gain
will be taxed a second time.
108. This is most clearly illustrated in connection with a contribution of appreci-
ated property to an entity in circumstances in which gain is not recognized either under
I.R.C. § 351, if the organization is a corporation, or I.R.C. § 721, if the organization is
a partnership. Assume the contributed property has a value of $100 and an adjusted
basis of $50. The gain realized but not recognized is $50 on the transfer. The intention is
to defer rather than eliminate this gain. The gain is preserved for future recognition by
carrying over the basis of the asset from the contributor to the organization. See I.R.C.
§§ 362(a), 723 (1992). Thus, if the organization disposes of the property, the $50 gain
will be recognized at the entity level. It is also necessary to impose an exchanged basis on
the interest in the entity received by the contributor so that the contributor is not able to
avoid the recognition of gain by the sale of the interest. See I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 722
(1992). Thus, on the sale of the interest, the same $50 of gain will be recognized. Obvi-
ously the result is that the single $50 of gain, which went unrecognized, now exists in two
different properties. The gain has potentially been doubled.
109. I.R.C. §§ 702, 1366 (1992).
110. I.R.C. § 705(a), 1367(a) (1992).
111. I.R.C. § 731(a), 1368(b) (1992).
112. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 743(b), 754 (1992). It should be noted that the recognition
of outside loss also results in a corresponding reduction in basis inside the partnership
when the election has been made.
The inability to adjust the bases of the S corporation's assets does
not necessarily result in ultimately imposing double taxation, but
rather creates distortions in the timing and character of taxable in-
come that can have the same economic effect as double taxation.
With a low basis in the corporate assets, the income determined at
the corporate level and passed through to the shareholders can result
in taxing the same gains twice. However, because the additional cor-
porate income will further increase the shareholder's basis in the S
corporation stock,113 there will ultimately be a loss on the disposition
of the stock that offsets such additional income. The problem is that
this off-setting loss may be long-deferred1 4 and will likely be a capi-
tal loss. 1 In either case, the loss may not effectively offset the ex-
cess income.11
The simplest example of how the absence of the basis increase at
the corporate level will produce an adverse tax consequence can be
illustrated by the situation of a two-person S corporation in which
each shareholder has contributed $250,000 and the S corporation
has no accumulated income or loss. Each shareholder should have a
$250,000 stock basis. Assume also that the S corporation has ordi-
nary income assets with a basis of $500,000 and a value of
$1,000,000. Should one of the shareholders acquire the interest of
the other, presumably paying $500,000 for the stock, the selling
shareholder would have only a single level of tax on $250,000 of
gain. The purchasing shareholder would take a cost basis in the
newly acquired shares and thus an aggregate basis in all stock of
$750,000. Having invested $750,000 in a business worth $1,000,000,
the purchaser, like the seller, should have taxable income at some
point of $250,000. However, the S corporation still has an asset with
a $500,000 basis that is worth $1,000,000 because the stock
purchase does not affect the basis of the S corporation's assets. The
shareholder will therefore report taxable income of $500,000 when it
is recognized at the corporate level. Because the $500,000 of income
passed through to the shareholder will increase the stock basis to
$1,250,000, the excess income reported will eventually be offset by a
113. I.R.C. § 1367(a) (1992).
114. The loss will not be recognized until the stock is sold or disposed of. See
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1992).
115. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1992). To the extent the stock qualified, I.R.C. § 1244
would allow up to $50,000 ($100,000 for a joint return) to be treated as ordinary income,
I.R.C. § 1244(b) (1992). However, I.R.C. § 1244 will not apply to stock acquired other
than by issuance from the corporation and will not provide relief in the circumstance of
purchased or inherited property.
116. Obviously, there is a significant disadvantage to a current overstatement of
income that will not be offset until some time in the future. The problem is exacerbated
when the loss is a capital loss because there are substantial limitations on the ability to
deduct capital losses. See I.R.C. §§ 165(0, 1211 (1992).
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loss on disposition of the stock. However, unless this loss is recog-
nized in the same year that the excess income is recognized and
passed through, a material overstatement of income will exist for
some time. Further, even if the excess income and loss occur in the
same year, the loss on the sale of the stock will be a capital loss that
will not be available to offset the excess ordinary income that was
reported.117
The inside-outside basis disparity arises whenever gain has been
recognized at the shareholder level, including gains on any sale of
stock to third parties or in redemption. Thus, the situations in which
it is appropriate to use shareholder level buy-sell agreements or re-
demption agreements should be narrowly limited in an S corporation
context. It should also be recognized that the same problem can and
will arise in other circumstances. Most notably, the date of death
basis step-up for assets held by the decedent at death creates exactly
the same problem. The decedent's stock will take a basis equal to
fair market value as of the date of death,"18 but the corporation will
continue to hold assets at historic basis. Thus, the use of an S corpo-
ration could eliminate the benefit of the tax law's last great loophole,
the forgiveness of tax on appreciated assets held until death."29
Prior to the superceding of the General Utilities doctrine by stat-
ute, there were numerous techniques for avoiding the impact of the
inside-outside basis imbalance, including in-kind distributions, tax-
free liquidations, and sales incident to a twelve-month plan of liqui-
dation. In each case, corporate level income went unrecognized and
was eliminated, making the low inside basis immaterial.2 0 All of
these nonrecognition provisions have now been superceded.' 2x
The sole opportunity for avoidance of corporate level recognition
of gain in an S corporation is now found in Internal Revenue Code
section 453B(h). 12 ' That section provides that the corporate level
117. If the taxpayer has capital gain from other sources, the loss will be deducti-
ble. If not, the taxpayer will be able to deduct $3,000 each year for the next 167 years
($500,000 - $3,000). I.R.C. § 1211 (1992).
118. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1992).
119. Here the problem is not that the gain was recognized outside. The effect of
the date-of-death basis should be to eliminate the gain. Elimination of the gain outside is
not very helpful if it will nevertheless be recognized inside and passed through to the
shareholder.
120. Prior to 1986, the Code provided for the nonrecognition of corporate level
gain on each of these transactions, thus making inside basis immaterial when these trans-
actions were employed. See I.R.C. §§ 311, 333, 336, 337 (1954).
121. See supra note 28.
122. I.R.C. § 453B(h) (West 1992).
gain will not be recognized when the S corporation disposes of assets
in an installment sale occurring pursuant to a plan of complete liqui-
dation. Additionally, the shareholders must properly elect under sec-
tion 453B(h)(1) to treat the payments received under the installment
obligation as the receipt of payment for their stock in the liquidation
rather than treating the receipt of the obligation itself as a pay-
ment.12 If the taxpayers are willing and able to so arrange their
affairs, the low inside basis will become immaterial. Of course, use
of this approach means that the assets must be sold in exchange for
the purchaser's installment note and the business liquidated. Even if
this result is generally acceptable from a business and economic
point of view, section 453B(h) will -not provide complete relief. Sec-
tion 453B(h) only permits the S corporation to defer the recognized
gain of an installment sale. Recapture gain 1 4 cannot be so de-
ferred.125 Similarly, gain from dealer dispositions or sales of personal
property required to be included in inventory are not subject to in-
stallment reporting, and such gain will be recognized at the corpo-
rate level notwithstanding section 453B(h). 126
A sale of the stock in lieu of an asset sale will alleviate, but not
eliminate, the inside-outside basis disparity problem. While the sell-
ing shareholder will directly incur only a single tax on the sale of the
stock, the purchaser of the stock will effectively assume the tax lia-
bility associated with the low basis asset. In assuming that liability,
the price a purchaser is willing to pay should reflect this liability.
Thus, a sale of stock will indirectly result in the payment of the tax
on built-in gain inside the corporation.
All of these problems can be avoided by the use of a partnership.
Subchapter K of the Code permits partnerships to elect adjustment
of asset bases to reflect the recognition of gain occurring outside the
partnership. Similarly, adjustments to the outside basis at date of
death can be reflected in the basis of the partnership's assets. 127
2. Taxation of In-Kind Distributions
Another adverse aspect of subchapter S pass-through taxation
arises in connection with distributions in kind. Since 1986 (again ow-
ing to the superceding of the General Utilities provisions by statute),
123. I.R.C. § 453B(h) (West 1992).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1992).
125. I.R.C. § 453B(h) only applies to gain that would otherwise be recognized at
the time the installment obligation is distributed. Thus, any gain that cannot be deferred
under I.R.C. § 453 will be unaffected by I.R.C. § 453B(h). Recapture gain cannot be
deferred through installment reporting. See I.R.C. § 453(i) (1992).
126. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1), (2) (1992).
127. See I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 743(b), 754 (1992). The basis adjustments are elec-
tive, not mandatory. Once made, the election will apply to all subsequent years. I.R.C
§ 754 (1992).
426
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an in-kind distribution of assets as a dividend, in redemption of
shares or in liquidation, will result in the recognition of gain at the
corporate level. 128 Further, in the case of a redemption or liquida-
tion, any additional gain in the stock will be recognized by the share-
holder.129 Under subchapter K, such distributions can be made by
partnerships without the recognition of gain either to the partner or
the partnership. 30 The significance of this difference is best ex-
plained by another illustration. Assume X, Y, and Z are equal own-
ers of a business that has assets worth $1,500,000 and a basis of
$600,000. Each owner also has a basis for their interest in the busi-
ness of $200,000. X desires to retire and the parties wish to give X
assets worth $500,000, which have a basis of $350,000, in redemp-
tion of X's interest in the business. If the business has been organ-
ized as an S corporation, the distribution will result in corporate
level income of $150,000, which will be shared equally by X, Y, and
Z. In addition, X will have a gain of $250,000 on the sale of the
stock. Had the business been organized as a partnership, no partner
would have recognized gain on this transaction.13
3. Inclusion of Debt in Outside Basis
Probably the most often discussed difference in taxation under
subchapter S and subchapter K is the fact that corporate debt is not
included in shareholder basis in an S corporation but is included in
the outside basis of partners under subchapter K. 3 2 In theory, this
difference could adversely affect the ability of shareholders of an S
128. See I.R.C. § 311, 336, 1371(a) (1992).
129. See I.R.C. §§ 302, 331, 1371(c)(2) (1992).
130. I.R.C. § 731 (1992). There are exceptions with respect to distributions of so-
called 751 assets or when the redeemed partner is receiving assets in lieu of 751 assets.
See I.R.C. § 751 (1992). These provisions require recognition of gain to the extent nec-
essary to assure that each partner will recognize their appropriate share of ordinary in-
come. Id.
131. This transaction also gives rise to an inside-outside basis disparity with the
potential adverse consequences discussed above in that B and C will have a combined
outside basis of $500,000 but the corporation will have an inside basis of only $250,000.
Had a partnership been used, the partnership would have been entitled to increase the
basis of assets so as to cause the aggregate bases of retained assets to equal the outside
bases of the remaining partner's. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754 (1992).
132. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1992) (treating partners as having contributed cash
equal to their share of the partnership indebtedness). No similar provision exists for S
corporations.
corporation to deduct losses incurred in the business. 133 This differ-
ence, while it may have some continuing significance in specific situ-
ations, should be of diminished concern given the adoption of at-risk
and passive activity limitations on the use of losses. 34
4. Taxation of Contributions and Built-In Gain
Subchapter S corporations and partnerships are also subject to dif-
fering treatment in regard to the ability to transfer appreciated as-
sets to the business without the recognition of gain. Gain will go
unrecognized on transfer to a corporation only if the persons trans-
ferring the property are in control of the corporation immediately
after the transfer. 13 5 Thus, it is not possible to admit an additional
shareholder in consideration of the transfer of appreciated assets
without the recognition of gain unless the new shareholder becomes
the owner of at least eighty percent of the stock or, alternatively, the
existing shareholders make a significant additional contribution in
the transaction. 13 6 Nonrecognition of gain on transfers to a partner-
ship, in contrast, is available whether or not the transferor is in con-
trol of the partnership immediately after the transfer.137
When property is contributed to an S corporation without gain
recognition, the gain inherent in the property 38 will, when recog-
nized by the S corporation, be shared by all of the shareholders in
proportion to their stock ownership.' 9 Thus, some shareholders will
report taxable income notwithstanding that they have not realized
any income economically, while the contributing shareholder will
have underreported his or her income. In some circumstances, this
income shifting could be perceived as an advantage. 40 Most often it
is not.
133. See I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 1366(d)(1) (1992). S shareholders can deduct losses to
the extent of their basis in any loans that they make to the partnership. IR.C.
§ 1366(d)(2) (1992).
134. See I.R.C. §§ 465, 469 (1992).
135. I.R.C. § 351, 368(c) (1992).
136. Previously held shares can be counted toward satisfaction of the control test
of I.R.C. § 368(c) provided that the shares issued to the owner of such previously owned
shares in exchange for a new transfer are not relatively small in value. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (amended 1967). The Service will not treat the new shares as having
a relatively small value as long as they represent at least 10% of the value of the total
shares owned by the transferor. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, at § 3.07.
137. I.R.C. § 721 (1992).
138. There will be built-in gain (or loss) in the property because the basis of the
property contributed to the S corporation will be the same as the basis of the property to
the transferor. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1992).
139. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1992).
140. Income shifting between persons having common economic interests, as be-
tween family members, would be desirable if the result is to shift taxable income to a
person taxed at a lower rate. Shifting tax liability between unrelated parties is far more
problematic.
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This situation again gives rise to a problem similar to the inside-
outside basis disparity discussed above."4 The party having reported
taxable income in excess of economic income should have an offset-
ting loss at some point. However, the loss will effectively offset the
overstatement of income only if it is not deferred too long and the
shareholder can utilize a capital loss. 42 This problem does not arise
in the partnership context because any item of income, gain, loss, or
deduction which is attributable to the difference between the basis
and the value of property at the time of contribution is allocated
entirely to the contributing partner. 43
C. Possible Benefits of Subchapter S over Partnership Taxation
1. Partnership Termination Versus Section 382
There are also differences between the taxation of S corporations
and partnerships that are generally regarded as benefits of the S cor-
poration. One such difference lies in the fact that a partnership will
be deemed to have terminated, distributed its assets, and reformed if
more than fifty percent of the capital and profit interests are sold or
exchanged within a twelve-month period.4 This deemed termina-
tion and reformation generally should not result in the recognition of
any gain. Simply, the partnership's basis in its assets will be adjusted
to reflect the aggregate outside basis of all of the partners. 45 If the
aggregate outside basis of the partners is higher than the partner-
ship's inside basis, the result of a termination under the Code would
141. See supra text accompanying notes 106-27.
142. The offsetting loss exists because of the fact that there will be an increase in
the basis of the stock to reflect the excess income reported. The inside-outside basis dis-
parity arising from this transaction does not exist in the aggregate, but exists for individ-
ual shareholders. To illustrate, assume A contributes $200 in cash and B contributes
property worth $200 but with a $100 basis. Assume there is no economic profit but that
the $100 built-in gain is recognized. A and B will each report $50 of taxable income and
will increase their outside basis to $250 in the case of A and $150 in the case of B.
Because each owns stock worth $200, A has a built-in loss of $50 in the stock as a result
of the overstatement of income, and B has a built-in gain of $50 reflecting the under-
statement of income. This is obviously a benefit to B and a disadvantage to A. B will
ultimately recognize gain to correct the understatement of income. A will have a loss
which will likely be a long-term capital loss, that may or may not effectively offset the
overstatement of income. In this situation at least, I.R.C. § 1244 should provide some
relief.
143. I.R.C. § 704(c) (1992). When applicable, the so-called "ceiling rule" can re-
sult in distortions of income in the partnership context which are similar to those that are
present in an S corporation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2) (amended 1988).
144. I.R.C. § 708(b) (1992).
145. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1) (1960).
be to increase the partnership's basis in the assets and thus produce
a tax benefit. If the partnership's inside basis is greater than the
outside basis, the result of the termination would be a reduction in
the basis of the partnership's assets and would thus be detrimental.
The actual benefit or detriment is in timing the differences and char-
acter of income or loss, but the termination will not change the net
amount of income or loss ultimately reported by the partners. How-
ever, timing and character can obviously be of great significance.
The impact of the deemed termination rule is limited by the fact
that inside and outside basis disparities will exist as an exception and
not as the rule. Indeed, they are avoided by the optional basis adjust-
ment rules. However, the deemed termination can be a disadvantage
under particular circumstances. One circumstance is when there are
significant declines in the value of the property of a partnership in
which over fifty percent of the capital and profit interests have been
sold or exchanged in a twelve-month period. While planning cannot
avoid the economic decline in value, planning can avoid too great a
transfer within a twelve-month period.
The suggestion that S corporations are preferable in this respect is
based on the fact that there is no termination rule for S corporations
and on the assumption that no other provision would produce a simi-
lar result. This assumption is probably incorrect. Section 382 gener-
ally applies to limit the use of net operating losses by a corporation
following a change of ownership. 146 Because S corporations do not
have net operating losses, these rules have never been applied or, at
least prior to 1986, have never been applicable to an S corporation.
However, section 382 now applies not only to net operating loss car-
ryovers, but also to built-in losses.147
S corporations do have built-in losses, and the question therefore
arises whether these built-in losses will be subject to limitation under
section 382. One could argue that section 382 does not apply given
that S corporations must determine income in the same fashion as an
individual, and section 382 does not apply to individuals. 148 On the
other hand, the rest of subchapter C is applicable to an S corpora-
tion, and there is no statutory basis for applying all of subchapter C
other than section 382.149 There is no indication that this result was
intended when section 382 was amended. On the other hand, it is
difficult to see why anyone should be able to avoid the impact of the
section 382 limitations on built-in losses by making a subchapter S
election.
If section 382 is applicable to an S corporation, events that would
146. I.R.C. § 382(a) (1992).
147. I.R.C. § 382(h)(1)(B) (West 1992).
148. See I.R.C. § 1363(b) (1992).
149. See I.R.C. § 1371 (1992).
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have resulted in a termination of a partnership would certainly con-
stitute a change of ownership triggering limitations on built-in
losses. 150 Many other arrangements that vary the ownership of the S
corporation could also trigger the applicability of the section 382
limitations because a change of ownership is very broadly defined for
section 382 purposes. 15'
A termination of a partnership that has built-in losses will result
in a reduction of basis in order to eliminate some built-in loss. How-
ever, the loss eliminated is that which has already been recognized as
a loss by a partner through the sale of a partnership interest. The
built-in loss allocable to partners who have not yet realized their loss
from a sale of their partnership interest will not be affected. 152 Sec-
tion 382, if applicable, will work in a much different way. Section
382 does not reduce basis. Instead, it limits the deductions that are
attributable to the amount of basis which is in excess of the value of
the asset.1 3 This limitation is potentially applicable not only to the
selling shareholder's share of the built-in loss, but also to the ongoing
shareholders' share of such loss.'54 Under section 382, deductions
that are attributable to the built-in loss at the time of an ownership
change are subject to an annual limition equal to the value of the
business as of the time of the ownership change multiplied by the
federal long-term, tax-exempt interest rate.
55
150. See I.R.C. § 382(a) (1992) (limiting deductions after a change of owner-
ship); I.R.C. § 382(g) (1992) (defining an ownership change as any 50% increase in
ownership by one or more 5% shareholders within a 3 year period). Many people can
end up being 5 % shareholders without owning 5 % of the shares. See generally Parker,
supra note 45, at 658-59.
151. A partnership termination results only when there has been a sale or ex-
change of more than 50% of the capital and profits within a 12-month period. I.R.C.
§ 708(b)(1)(B) (1992). Thus, changes in ownership that result from redemptions or new
issuances cannot result in a termination. Similarly, because sales resulting in a termina-
tion must occur within a -month period, there is the possibility of simply deferring
some transactions to avoid termination, as for example, by having some portion of the
interests to be transferred delayed under an option or a contract to sell in the future. An
ownership change under § 382, in contrast, is tested over a three-year period (I.R.C.
§ 382(i) (1992)) and takes into account changes in ownership however effected. I.R.C.
§ 382(g)(2) (1992); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(e)(1)(i) (1986). Additionally, sec-
tion 382 contains numerous provisions to assure that the parties do not take steps that
avoid an ownership shift. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(3)(A)(iv) (1992) (treating options as exer-
cised if it will result in an ownership change); I.R.C. § 382(k)(6) (1992) (permitting
certain stock interests to be treated as not stock and certain non-stock interests to be
treated as stock).
152. See infra the illustration in the text accompanying notes 156-61.
153. See I.R.C. §§ 382(h)(1)(B), (h)(2)(B) (1992).
154. See infra the illustration in the text accompanying notes 156-61.
155. I.R.C. §§ 382(a), (b) (1992).
The substantial differences in the nature of the limitations make it
difficult to generalize as to their impact. In some cases, section 382
will be more onerous than a partnership termination and in some
cases less. To give just one illustration of how the two rules might
operate, assume that A and B are partners in a partnership and that
A, having contributed $600,000, owns 60 % of the capital and prof-
its, and B, having contributed $400,000, owns the remainder. The
partnership in turn owns assets with a basis of $1,000,000 and a
value of $600,000. If A sells her partnership interest to C for
$360,000 (60% of the value of the underlying asset), A will have a
$240,000 loss. This will terminate the partnership, with the result
being the basis of the partnership asset will be reduced to
$760,000.1'6 There is still a built-in loss of $160,000 that will, when
recognized, be allocated to B. 157 Thus, the only effect of the termina-
tion is to reduce the built-in loss inside to reflect the fact that A's
share of the loss has already been recognized outside.
Had an S corporation been used and the same events occurred, the
sale by A to C would still produce a $240,000 loss to A. If section
382 applies, the sale would also be a change of ownership.0 8 Be-
cause the S corporation has a net unrealized built-in loss, 1 9 the de-
duction of that loss, when recognized, either as a depreciation
deduction or on sale, 60 will be limited to the tax-exempt rate multi-
plied by the value of the corporation at the time of the ownership
change. 61 With a value of $600,000 and assuming a federal long-
term, tax-exempt rate of 3 %, only $18,000 of loss will be allowed in
any year. B, as a 40 % shareholder, will benefit from only $7,200 of
this loss each year. On these facts, B obviously is losing the tax bene-
fit of an economic loss in a circumstance in which the loss would
have continued to be deductible if A and B had used a partnership
form.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(iv) (1960). The partnership is deemed to have
distributed its assets to the partners and the partners are deemed to have recontributed
the assets to a new partnership. On the deemed distribution, no gain or loss is recognized
by the partnership or the partners. I.R.C. §§ 731(a), (b) (1992). The basis of the 60%
of the assets deemed distributed to C will have a $360,000 basis and the 40% of the
assets distributed to B will have a $400,000 basis. I.R.C. § 732(b) (1992). No gain or
loss is recognized on the deemed recontribution. I.R.C. § 721(a) (1992). The partnership
will take the partner's basis as its basis for the assets. I.R.C. § 723 (1992). Thus, the
effect of the termination is simply to reduce the partnership basis from $1,000,000 to
$760,000.
157. B is deemed to have contributed assets with a basis of $400,000 and a value
of $240,000. See supra note 156. Deductions or losses attributable to the excess of the
basis over value must be allocated to B. I.R.C. § 704(c) (1992).
158. I.R.C. § 382(g) (1992).
159. I.R.C. § 382(h)(3) (1992).
160. I.R.C. § 382(h)(2)(B) (1992).
161. I.R.C. §§ 382(a),(b), (h)(1)(B) (1992).
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2. Tax-Free Reorganizations
A second difference suggested as a benefit of the S corporation is
the ability to engage in tax-free reorganizations. As discussed ear-
lier, the general significance of the corporate ability to engage in a
tax-free exchange as to the selection of the proper entity is quite
speculative. 162 The same is true with regard to S corporations. Obvi-
ously, a tax-free reorganization is valuable only if there is significant
built-in gain in the S corporation's stock. When there is substantial
built-in gain in S corporation stock, there will also be substantial
built-in gain in the corporation's assets. If the business is acquired in
a tax-free reorganization, the shareholder-level gain is deferred until
the disposition of the shares of the acquiring corporation received in
the reorganization. 6 3 However, in addition, the built-in gain in the
corporation will also be subject to future taxation in the hands of the
acquiring corporation, and the purchase price should, in theory, be
reduced to reflect this assumed tax liability."6 4 Thus, the preference
for incorporation and election under subchapter S, owing to the abil-
ity to engage in reorganization transactions, should exist only if the
single tax on the gain (which would be recognized immediately in
the absence of a reorganization) will exceed the cost of the deferred
shareholder-level tax, the immediate payment of the present value of
the deferred corporate-level tax, and the disadvantage of being re-
quired to retain the acquiring corporation's stock to continue the
deferral. At most, the ability of an S corporation to engage in a reor-
ganization provides the flexibility to balance relevant considerations
should the need arise. 65
162. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
163. See I.R.C. § 354 (1992) (defering gain on the exchange of stock for stock of
the acquiring corporation pursuant to a reorganization); I.R.C. § 358 (1992) (preserving
the gain for future recognition by means of giving the new stock an exchange basis).
164. The liability assumed may have little impact if the built-in gain exists in
goodwill, because the recognition of the built-in gain will be deferred indefinitely. If the
built-in gain exists in inventory on the other hand, the gain to be recognized by the
acquiring corporation will not be long deferred.
165. The ability to participate in a tax-free reorganization could be a great benefit
if the acquiring corporation is unwilling to give any consideration other than stock and
the stock will not be readily convertible into cash. A lower tax burden may not be much
of a benefit if there is no cash available to pay the liability.
D. Summary
The above discussion details many of the potentially adverse im-
pacts of using the S election as opposed to a partnership. The discus-
sion is by no means exhaustive. The differences in treatment arise
from the fact that subchapter S is simply less thorough in its efforts
to create a single-level, pass-through tax regime, but continues to
regard S corporations as corporations for most tax purposes. These
shortcomings manifest themselves in many situations that cannot be
exhaustively addressed in this Article. However, what has been dis-
cussed should be enough to justify the conclusion that, all other
things being equal, taxation under subchapter K should be preferred
to taxation under subchapter S.
Obviously, all other considerations are not equal. Most obviously,
subchapter S is preferable if the business is already incorporated and
there is a desire to convert to a pass-through tax regime. Conversion
to a partnership would require a liquidation and would thus result in
immediate taxation of all gains.1 6 The election to have subehapter S
apply does not involve any liquidation or recognition of gain.
With respect to new businesses, the preference for subchapter K
will not necessarily be controlling unless the organization can also
provide the owners with state law benefits comparable to incorpora-
tion. However, the conclusion of this Article is that comparable state
law relationships are now possible without incorporation or corporate
tax.16 7
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE OF INCORPORATION WITH TAX
REDUCTION PLANNING
It is likely that businesses which cannot utilize the subchapter S
election and to which limited liability and organizational continuity
have been of overriding concern have generally opted to incorporate
and undertake efforts to reduce the burden of double taxation.168
Double taxation of the income earned through a corporation is not
a significant problem in businesses in which capital is not a material
income producing factor. Simply, the income in such a business is
attributable to the services being provided and can typically be paid
out by the corporation as deductible compensation, leaving little or
no taxable income in the corporation. e9 Significant reduction of cor-
porate taxable income is more difficult in a business in which capital
166. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (1992).
167. See infra text accompanying notes 312-98.
168. This was probably due in part to the fact that prior to 1986 the corporate tax
rate was lower than the individual tax rate. Thus, any income accumulated would be
taxed at a lower rate by using a corporate form.
169. Of course, even a business that requires no capital investment may develop
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is a material income producing factor. In such a business, the pay-
ment of all profits to shareholders as purported compensation would
not be justifiable.' 0
Probably the most common arrangement for the reduction of
double taxation in businesses in which capital is a material income
producing factor is the use of a significant amount of debt financing.
The benefits of debt financing are numerous: the payment of interest
on the debt is deductible by the corporation with the result that at
least a portion of the return to investors will escape the corporate
level of taxation; the receipt of payment on the principal balance of
the debt will not be subject to taxation, thereby permitting a signifi-
cant amount of corporate assets and earnings to be used to repay the
indebtedness without double taxation; and the need to repay the in-
debtedness will be treated as a reasonable need of the business justi-
fying accumulations of income without incurring any accumulated
earnings tax and thereby permitting the shareholder level tax to be
deferred.171
The principal tax limitation on the use of debt to ameliorate the
double tax is that loans from shareholders that in fact represent cor-
porate equity will be so treated. 72 Treatment of putative debt as
equity is particularly likely where the debt is proportionately held,
the corporation's debt-to-equity ratio is unrealistically high, or the
shareholder loans are subordinated to the claims of the corporation's
other creditors.' 7 3 Thus, while some debt can be utilized to lessen
corporate taxation, it would certainly be unwise to endeavor to use
debt financing to entirely eliminate corporate tax.
intangible value, which adds to the production of income, and, in such a case, it may not
be possible to legitimately eliminate corporate taxable income through salaries.
170. No doubt compensation and other types of purportedly deductible payments
in excess of what is reasonable are often paid to shareholders to ameliorate the corporate
tax burden. Such amounts would not be allowed as deductions if all facts were to become
known, but all facts often do not become known. Thus, while not theoretically appropri-
ate, the inability of the Service to audit all returns permits much corporate-level tax to
be avoided through excessive payments to shareholders.
171. For a discussion of the tax benefits and costs of debt financing, see BITrKER
& EUsTICE, supra note 18, at 4-28 to 4-49.
172. See generally id. at 4-2 to 4-27.
173. See I.R.C. § 385 (1992). There are currently no regulations implementing
this provision, and given that the Treasury has been unable to provide regulations during
the 23 years that have elapsed since § 385 was adopted, there is reason to be skeptical as
to whether regulations ever will be issued. Section 385 is at least helpful as a partial
listing of those factors that are relevant to the characterization of purported debt. For a
discussion of the one time final regulations that never became effective, see Richard L.
Kaplan & Lowell D. Yoder, New Variations on an Old Enigma: The Treasury Depart-
ment's Debt-Equity Regulations, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 567 (1981).
In addition to tax-based limitations on the use of debt, it should be
recognized that it is not always a simple matter to accommodate the
use of significant indebtedness to the needs of the business. Simply,
many businesses cannot undertake the burden of annual interest
payments or commit to the return of capital at a certain time under
their business plan.
An alternative means to avoidance of corporate taxation is to sep-
arate the ownership of assets from the business. To the extent share-
holders can own assets, such as a building or equipment, outside of
the corporate form and lease the property to the corporation, the
income attributable to the ownership and use of the property should
escape corporate taxation because of the corporation's ability to de-
duct rental payments. Of course, this will qualify the benefits of in-
corporation because liabilities associated with the property will be
charged to the owners. The organizational structure adopted for the
ownership of the property will have to deal with the issues of organi-
zational continuity, lack of transferability, and lack of centralized
management, all of which led to the adoption of the corporate form
for the business in the first place.
There is neither time nor inclination to undertake in this Article a
detailed review of techniques available to reduce the double tax bur-
den. 7 4 Rather, suffice it to say that tax planning can greatly reduce
the burden of double tax. However, tax planning cannot legitimately
eliminate the double tax for all businesses. Thus, the decision to
adopt the corporate form is often made in spite of the higher tax
burden it entails. This decision must be based on the conclusion that
the state law benefits of incorporation justify the cost. Again, this
Article precisely suggests that this conclusion may no longer be
valid.
V. USE OF NONCORPORATE FORMS PRIOR TO 1988
Prior to the mid-1980s, efforts to address the choice of entity di-
lemma through unincorporated forms presented significant difficul-
ties. The concerns regarding the use of this approach had dual
origins. First, because the tax law defines corporations for tax pur-
poses as including both incorporated entities and unincorporated as-
sociations, which more nearly resemble a typical corporation than a
partnership, taxpayers have needed to address the state law issues
without being too successful.175 Second, businesses have needed to
174. See generally CAVITCH, supra note 104, at v. The author notes that a "vast
proliferation of tax materials is available to the lawyer and accountant, from compila-
tions of primary sources to esoteric law review articles, from primers to encyclopedias,
from the lowest level of basic mechanics to the loftiest reaches of academe." Id. Tax
planning for corporations is not a subject to be digested and summarized briefly.
175. Prior to 1988, the only unincorporated organizations under state law that
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discover means by which the state law issues could in fact be ad-
dressed without resorting to incorporation of the business.
A. Entity Classification for Tax Purposes Prior to 1988
1. Background
Federal income tax law takes cognizance of only two types of enti-
ties through which co-owners may conduct business-partnerships
and corporations. 176 Congress understood early on that many of the
diverse relationships permitted under state law could potentially be
utilized to avoid the corporate income tax while providing owners
with many of the benefits of incorporation. Because Congress did not
intend the corporate tax system to be voluntary, it was necessary to
extend the corporate income tax to other forms of organization per-
mitted under state law that were functional equivalents of the corpo-
rate form. Congress sought to accomplish this end by defining
corporations for tax purposes as including incorporated entities, joint
stock companies, and "associations. 1 7 7 Partnerships, in turn, are de-
fined to include any joint business endeavor that is not treated as a
corporation. 17
While there was uncertainty as to the meaning of the term "asso-
ciation" for many years,'7 9 the Supreme Court endeavored in 1935
were reasonably available without corporate characterization for tax purposes were part-
nerships. See supra text accompanying notes 17-24. Since 1988, the limited liability
company has emerged as another option. See infra text accompanying notes 312-76.
176. See I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2) (1992) (defining a partnership as including
any unincorporated organization through which any business is carried on that is not a
corporation, trust, or estate). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2) (amended 1983),
301.7701-4(b) (1986) (requiring that trusts engaged in the conduct of a business be
treated as either a partnership or a corporation). Special tax regimes may apply to cer-
tain qualifying businesses that are not relevant to the present topic. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§§ 851-860 (1992) (dealing with regulated investment companies and real estate invest-
ment trusts).
177. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1992).
178. I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a)(2) (1992). See also supra note 176.
179. For early cases involving the scope of the definition of a corporation for vari-
ous tax purposes, see Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S. 178, 185 (1911) (involving the Corpora-
tion Tax Law of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909), under which an excise tax
was imposed on "corporations and joint stock associations.., now or hereafter organized
under the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory of the United States")
(quoting the Corporation Tax Law of 1909); Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223, 233
(1919) (involving the Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913), imposed on
income tax of "every corporation, joint-stock company or association, and every insur-
ance company, organized in the United States, no matter how created or organized, not
including partnerships") (quoting the Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G)(a), 38
Stat. 172 (1913)); Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924) (involving the imposition of an
to articulate a standard for identifying associations taxable as corpo-
rations in Morrissey v. Commissioner'"s and three companion
cases."" The Court in Morrissey addressed the use of an express
business trust to carry on business activities. The Court held that by
including associations in the definition of a corporation for federal
income tax purposes, Congress intended to extend corporate taxation
not only to an organization that duplicated the corporate relation-
ship, but also to any organization that closely resembled the corpo-
rate form. 8 2 The Court went on to conclude that the classification
issue was not to be resolved by resort to "mere formal procedure,"
but that the test of corporate resemblance should be based on
whether a particular organization possessed those attributes that typ-
ify the corporate form.83
In this connection, the court decided that the express trust at issue
in the case possessed the corporate attributes of associates engaging
in business for joint profit, centralized control of the business, con-
tinuity of existence independent of ownership, limited liability of the
owners, and free transferability of the ownership interests.'84 Finding
these attributes present, the Court held that the entity sufficiently
resembled an incorporated organization to justify the conclusion that
"Congress intended that the income of the enterprise should be
excise tax on trusts under the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (1916), which
defined the organizations subject to the tax in the same fashion as the Corporation Tax
Law of 1909 considered in Eliot, and the Revenue Act of 1918, which used language
substantially the same as that of the Income Tax Act of 1913 considered in Crocker).
The Hecht Court followed Eliot, but did not feel itself bound by Crocker. See also Burk-
Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 113 (1925) (construing the Revenue Act
of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 218(a), 335(c), 40 Stat. 1070, 1096 (1919) and applying the income
tax portions of the Revenue Act of 1918 to a Texas organization in which trustees held
the assets for the beneficial owners who were in turn treated as partners under Texas
law). The Court therein held that the separate treatment under the Revenue Act of 1918
of partnerships was for "ordinary partnerships."
It should be pointed out that the term "ordinary partnerships" was commonly used to
mean general partnerships as opposed to special or limited partnerships. Thus, Burk-
Waggoner could be read to sanction taxation of limited partnerships as associations.
However, it is reported that all states, with the possible exceptions of Arizona and Flor-
ida, had limited partnerships acts in effect at the time Burk-Waggoner was decided. See
WARREN, supra note 17, at 306 n.3. The government did not endeavor to tax all limited
partnerships as associations, however. Instead, the government referred primarily to the
statute under which the limited partnership was formed, declaring some to always pro-
duce partnerships, some to always produce associations, and some to be dependant on the
agreement. For a fairly complete coverage of the status of limited partnerships prior to
1960, see J.M. BARRETT & ERWIN SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAW AND
TAXATION, ch. 13, § 6 (1956).
180. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
181. Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296
U.S. 365 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369 (1935).
182. Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 357.
183. Id. at 358.
184. Id. at 359.
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taxed in the same manner as that of corporations.' 8 5
While the essential features of the corporate resemblance test es-
tablished in Morrissey continue to be controlling, the test has had an
interesting history since it was first articulated by the Supreme
Court.1 86 For present purposes it is sufficient to understand that reg-
ulations were issued in 1960 under which the test for imposing cor-
porate taxation on unincorporated organizations was to be based on
the determination of whether the organization possessed the princi-
pal corporate attributes enunciated in Morrissey, but with a signifi-
cantly more explicit and mechanical test. 87
2. The Mechanical Test of the 1960 Regulations
In general, Treasury Regulations sections 301.7701-2, 301.7701-3
(1967), and 301.7701-4(4)(1986) (the 1960 Regulations) require
that corporate resemblance be determined by resort to the six char-
acteristics that the Court found controlling in Morrissey: associates,
conduct of a business for joint profit, centralized management, con-
tinuity of life, limited liability, and free transferability of interests. 8
The 1960 Regulations then provide that any characteristic typical of
both a corporation and another form of entity be disregarded for
purposes of determining the corporate resemblance of such an
entity. 8"
The regulations expressly recognize that trusts and corporations
both commonly possess all of the corporate attributes other than as-
sociates and the conduct of a business for joint profit. Thus, the reg-
ulations provide that a trust under state law will not be treated as a
trust for tax purposes if it has associates conducting a business for
joint profit.190 As in Morrissey, this test will almost always result in
any trust engaged in the conduct of a business being treated as a
corporation.' 9' Further, because all voluntarily created organizations
must be a trust, a partnership, or a corporation for tax purposes, the
185. Id. at 360.
186. For a concise history of the corporate resemblance test after Morrissey, see
McKEE Er AL., supra note 37, at 1 3.06[1].
187. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (1983), 301.7701-3 (1967), 301.7701-4
(1986). These regulations will be referred to as the 1960 Regulations.
188. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1983).
189. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983).
190. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (1967).
191. Business trusts that lack two of the corporate characteristics will be treated as
a partnership for tax purposes. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-07-028 (Nov. 20, 1990)
(treating a business trust not having free transferability and continuity of life as a part-
nership for tax purposes).
result of the 1960 Regulations is to require all organizations engag-
ing in business activities to be treated as either a partnership or a
corporation.'92
In distinguishing between partnerships and associations taxable as
corporations, the regulations recognize that associates and conduct
of a business for joint profit are common attributes of corporations
and partnerships and are thus not relevant to tax classification. 9 3
Distinction between partnerships and corporations is therefore de-
pendant on the corporate attributes of limited liability, continuity of
life, centralized management, and free transferability.9 4 The stan-
dard imposed under the 1960 Regulations for finding that an organi-
zation is an association taxable as a corporation is that the
organization possess more corporate than noncorporate characteris-
tics. Thus, at least three of the four relevant corporate attributes
must be present for corporate income tax to be imposed. Any unin-
corporated organization not possessing at least three corporate at-
tributes will be treated as a partnership. 19 5
While the 1960 Regulations contemplate that other corporate or
noncorporate characteristics may be relevant 9 ' and that in some in-
stances free transferability might be accorded less weight than the
other characteristics, 197 the express test of the 1960 Regulations does
not allow for the consideration of any other factors or disproportion-
ate weighing of factors. This inconsistency in the regulations was ad-
dressed by the Tax Court in Larson v. Commissioner.98 The Tax
Court held that the 1960 Regulations, as written and then in effect,
did not permit consideration of any factors other than the four prin-
cipal characteristics, that the characteristics necessarily carried
equal weight, and that association status was not possible under the
regulations unless at least three of the four corporate attributes were
present.'99 In 1979, the Service acquiesced in this aspect of the Lar-
son decision. 00
3. Definition of the Corporate Attributes
In addition to imposing a mechanical test for corporate resem-
blance, the 1960 Regulations also undertook to explain the nature of
the relevant attributes in detail. At the time the regulations were
192. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (1967).
.193. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1983).
194. Id.
195. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983).
196. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983).
197. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (as amended in 1983).
198. 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
199. Id. at 185-86.
200. 1979-1 C.B. 1. The Service simultaneously issued Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1
C.B. 448, stating the terms of its acquiescence.
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promulgated, the Service's principal concern was with preventing
professional service organizations from being treated as corporations
for federal income tax purposes. This would have enabled them to
have access to the more favorable treatment accorded corporate re-
tirement plans.201 Thus, the regulations generally made avoidance of
the corporate attributes fairly easy to accomplish.0 2 While subse-
quent approval of professional corporations under state law and later
the equalization of retirement benefits for corporate employees and
partners 03 has eliminated the principal motivation underlying the
definition of the corporate attributes, the 1960 Regulations have not
changed.
The following subsections discuss the general nature of the rele-
vant corporate attributes under the 1960 regulations.
a. Centralized Management
The 1960 Regulations recognize that corporate management is
typically vested exclusively in a representative body rather than in
owners. Consistent with this corporate norm, the 1960 Regulations
state that the corporate attribute of centralized management is pre-
sent in an organization only if "continuing exclusive authority" to
manage the business is vested in representatives instead of in the
owners.
204
The 1960 Regulations state that general partnerships cannot pos-
sess the corporate characteristic of centralized management because
each general partner has, in default of a contrary agreement, an
equal right to participate in management and the right to bind the
partnership for acts occurring within the usual course of business. 0 5
However, this conclusion holds under the 1960 Regulations even if
the partners agree among themselves to vest management in a repre-
sentative group resembling a board of directors because the agree-
ment between the partners cannot remove the inherent power of a
201. The 1960 Regulations, see supra note 187, were issued a short time after and
in direct response to the Ninth Circuit's decision that a group of physicians were an
association taxable as a corporation, and were therefore entitled to establish a qualified
corporate pension plan. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). See
McKEE ET AL., supra note 37, at 3-49 to 3-50. Because the income of the association was
attributable exclusively to the services of the physicians, all corporate income could be
eliminated by the payment of salaries so that no corporate-level tax was in fact incurred.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 204-39.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 67.
204. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1983).
205. See UPA §§ 9, 18(e), (h).
partner to bind the partnership with respect to any person not having
knowledge or notice of the agreement. 06 This inherent power to bind
the partnership causes the centralized management to be nonexclu-
sive because the power to bind cannot be given exclusively to a cen-
tralized management group under state law.
Just as with a general partnership, the right of the general partner
of a limited partnership to manage the business, as an owner, and
the power of general partners to bind the partnership notwithstand-
ing any agreement to the contrary will normally preclude a finding
that a limited partnership has the corporate attribute of centralized
management notwithstanding that limited partners are excluded
from participation in management. 07 This conclusion holds true
even if there is only one general partner.208 Thus, the 1960 Regula-
tions do not appear to be relying on the existence of the inherent
power of partners in reaching this conclusion. Instead, it appears
that the Regulations are relying on the fact that the management
rights are held as an owner under state law rather than as a repre-
sentative. Consistent with this view, the 1960 Regulations limit the
conclusion to situations in which the general partner or partners pos-
sess a substantial interest in the organization.09 When the general
partner or partners of a limited partnership do not have a substantial
interest, the 1960 Regulations seem to conclude that whatever rights
and powers the general partners have are held in a representative
capacity, sufficiently resembling the rights and powers of a corporate
board of directors to find the corporate attribute of centralized man-
agement to be present.210 Further, if limited partners have the ability
to remove the general partner or partners, the likelihood of finding
centralized management is increased. In such a case, the 1960 Regu-
lations state that all facts and circumstances must be considered. 11
This is consistent with the notion that the 1960 Regulations are look-
ing for someone who is managing the business as a representative of
owners rather than as an owner.21 2
206. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983); UPA § 9.
207. See RULPA § 403(a).
208. Treas Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
209. Id. The rational for this exception is not articulated in the regulation. The
regulation also gives no guidance as to what is necessary for an interest to be substantial.
The Service will not issue a ruling that centralized management is absent unless the
general partner(s) hold at least 20% of all interests in the partnership. See Rev. Proc.
89-12, 1989-1 I.R.B. 798, § 4.06.
210. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
211. Id. It is not clear what other facts and circumstances are relevant in this
regard.
212. The 1960 Regulations provide that a substantially restricted right to remove
the general partner, such as a right to remove for cause, will not of itself create central-
ized management. See supra note 187.
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b. Continuity of Life
The existence of a corporation is not dissolved, terminated, or oth-
erwise affected by changes in ownership. Rather, corporations have a
potentially perpetual existence. In contrast, a general partnership
under state law is not generally viewed as an entity for this purpose,
but as a relationship between particular persons. When any person
ceases to be a party to the relationship, that particular relationship
ceases to exist; it is dissolved so far as state law is concerned.2 13 Dis-
solution occurs under state law when the old relationship ceases to
exist even though a new relationship involving most of the same peo-
ple may immediately replace the dissolved relationship and continue
its activities.21 4 It is this fundamental difference between the identity
of corporations and general partnerships under state law that is con-
trolling under the 1960 Regulations.215
The Regulations provide that continuity of life is absent if the
"death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of
any member will cause a dissolution of the organization." '16 In ap-
plying this concept to general partnerships, dissolution is stated to
have reference to the end of the mutual agency, which exists under
state law within a general partnership, not to the ceassation of busi-
ness conducted by the partners or their successor.21 7 With respect to
general partnerships, the 1960 Regulations thereby make it impossi-
ble to conclude that the corporate attribute of continuity of life will
ever be present for tax purposes. So that there be no misunderstand-
ing that this is precisely what is intended, the 1960 Regulations fur-
ther provide that a partnership formed under a statute corresponding
to the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) will never possess the corpo-
rate attribute of continuity of life. 18
The 1960 Regulations reach the same conclusion with respect to
213. See UPA §§ 29, 30.
214. See UPA § 30.
215. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1983).
216. Id.
217. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1983). Compare UPA § 29
with UPA § 30 (distinguishing between dissolution and termination of a partnership).
See also UPA §§ 38(2)(b), 41 (dealing with circumstances under which a partnership
may be continued without winding up following a dissolution).
218. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1983). It is reported that 49
states plus the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands have adopted the
UPA. See 6 U.L.A. 1-2 (West Supp. 1992). Only Louisiana appears not to have the
UPA in effect. While many states have adopted variations from the UPA, only Arkansas
has adopted a provision that provides that a change in the relations between partners will
not be a dissolution when the partners have so agreed. See 6 U.L.A. 364 (1969).
limited partnerships,219 though the rationale for this conclusion is
less clear. Again, the stated test for continuity of life is whether the
bankruptcy, retirement, death, or insanity of any partner would
cause a dissolution absent agreement of the remaining general part-
ners or of all partners to continue the partnership.220 In turn, the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) provides that the retire-
ment, death, or insanity of a general partner will dissolve the part-
nership unless the remaining general partners continue the business
(1) under a right to do so stated in the certificate of limited partner-
ship or (2) with the consent of all other members.2 21 Because the
1960 Regulations expressly recognize that the corporate attribute of
continuity of life will not be present in limited partnerships formed
under a statute corresponding to the ULPA, the regulations must be
construed so as to treat continuation of the partnership without dis-
solution under a right to do so stated in the partnership agreement as
continuation with the consent of the remaining general partners or of
all other partners.22
This conclusion is explainable in one of three ways. First, the con-
sent of all of the other partners could be read so as not to require
that the consent be contemporaneous. In such event, the requirement
of the 1960 Regulations that all other partners consent would be sat-
isfied by reason of the consent given at the time the agreement was
entered into and the certificate was filed. Second, because a general
partner cannot be forced to continue as a partner, the general part-
ners continuing the business under a right to do so set forth in the
certificate are necessarily consenting. Third, continuity could be
lacking because the last remaining general partner, even if not yet
known, will have the power to dissolve the partnership because there
is no remaining partner to continue the business. Regardless of the
explanation for the result, the result is unequivocal. An organization
formed under a statute corresponding to the ULPA does not possess
continuity of life.
The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) is sub-
stantially the same as the ULPA in regard to dissolution with one
219. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(4) (as amended in 1983) (stating that a part-
nership formed under a statute corresponding to the ULPA generally will not possess
continuity of life). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(5) (as amended in 1983) (pro-
viding that all references to the UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT (ULPA) (1969)
also refer to the RULPA). It is clear that the RULPA (1976) is addressed by this regu-
lation. It is not clear whether the reference includes the RULPA (1985).
220. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1983).
221. ULPA § 20. The withdrawal of limited partners does not cause a dissolution
under the ULPA unless the partners have all agreed otherwise. The difference in the
concept of dissolution for general and limited partnerships is no doubt attributable to the
fact that the partners in a limited partnership are not in fact all party to a mutual
agency.
222. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1983).
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notable exception. As in the ULPA, the withdrawal of a general
partner will not cause dissolution if there remains at least one gen-
eral partner and the remaining general partner continues the part-
nership under a right to do so set forth in the certificate of limited
partnership.223 The one significant difference is that even if there is
no remaining general partner, the limited partners may, within
ninety days, appoint a new general partner who may then continue
the partnership. 24 The 1960 Regulations expressly provide that the
statement that a limited partnership formed under a statute corre-
sponding to the ULPA cannot have continuity of life also applies to
limited partnerships formed under the RULPA.215
It should be noted that the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has
taken the position that it will not give an advance ruling that a part-
nership lacks continuity of life if a new general partner can be ad-
mitted to and continue the partnership without the contemporaneous
consent of at least a majority of the limited partners given at the
time of the admission of the new general partner.22 6 It is difficult to
determine the exact scope of this ruling position. However, it appears
if the continuation does not necessitate the admission of a new gen-
eral partner, then the ruling standard will have been satisfied
whether or not continuation with an old general partner requires
consent of the limited partners. Interpreted in this way, the ruling
223. RULPA (1976) § 801(3). The RULPA (1985) drops the reference to the
ability to continue without dissolution with the consent of all other partners. This might
appear to be a significant change, but it is a nonsubstantive amendment. If all of the
limited partners consent to continue and the general partner is unwilling to do so, it will
dissolve. On the other hand, if the general partner is willing to continue and has the right
to do so, whether or not the right is pre-existing, arises from contemporaneous consent of
the limited partners, or from any other source, the partnership will continue. RULPA
(1985) § 801(4) also permits the right to continue to be established in the partnership
agreement without inclusion in the certificate of limited partnership. This is consistent
with the fact that the certificate of limited partnership under RULPA (1985), like most
corporate filings, has become more perfunctory.
224. RULPA (1976) § 801(3). Prior to the RULPA, the situation was not greatly
different. Instead, the limited partners simply needed to find and admit a new general
partner before the old general partner technically withdrew. The RULPA has simply
eliminated the need for advance notice and has dealt with potential surprises. Even under
the ULPA, if the limited partners wished to continue after dissolution, they simply found
a new general partner and formed a new partnership. The fact of dissolution was of little
practical significance.
225. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(5) (as amended in 1983).
226. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 I.R.B. 798, § 4.05. It should be noted that the Ser-
vice is implicitly stating that it will issue a ruling where at least contemporaneous major-
ity consent is required. It should also be noted that the ruling standard does not
necessarily reflect the Service's view of the substantive law.
position is consistent with the 1960 Regulations other than the state-
ment in the regulations that a partnership formed under the RULPA
cannot possess continuity of life. Of course, it is hard to imagine the
circumstance in which a new general partner would be admitted to
continue the business without consent of a majority of the limited
partners. Even if the limited partners have contracted to consent to
continuation, they would at least retain some control over who is to
be admitted.
c. Limited Liability
No shareholder of a corporation is liable for the obligations of the
corporation simply by reason of being a shareholder. In contrast,
general partners, whether of a general partnership or a limited part-
nership, are personally liable for all of the obligations of the partner-
ship.227 Thus, the 1960 Regulations state that partnerships will not
possess the corporate characteristic of limited liability.2  The only
exception to this conclusion under the regulations is that where the
general partner of a limited partnership has no substantial assets and
is a mere "dummy acting as agent of the limited partners," the cor-
porate attribute of limited liability will be present.2 29
227. UPA § 15; RULPA § 403(b).
228. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1983).
229. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). No effort has been
made in the regulations to suggest what will cause a partner to be a dummy acting as an
agent of the limited partners. Because the regulations require that the general partner be
both a dummy and lack substantial assets, the lack of assets alone does not make the
general partner a dummy. It is interesting to note that even if the general partner is a
dummy acting as agent of the limited partners and lacks substantial assets and the or-
ganization therefore appears to possess limited liability under the 1960 Regulations, see
supra note 187, the 1960 Regulations go on to state that this corporate attribute will not
be present because the limited partners, as principals of the general partner, will be per-
sonally liable. It seems that the 1960 Regulations are providing that limited liability will
be absent for tax purposes if for any reason the limited partners will be liable under state
law. As written, the 1960 Regulations would certainly suggest that potential liability
under state law as shareholders of a corporate general partner will be enough. Because
this will always be a possibility, all that is necessary to avoid limited liability is to ensure
that at least one limited partner owns stock of the corporate general partner. One is led
to conclude that limited liability will be present if the general partner lacks reality for
reasons other than the absence of assets, but not if the general partner so lacks reality as
to cause the state law to impose liability on the limited partners. This would clearly seem
to apply to a very narrow range of circumstances, if it would apply to any circumstances
at all. It is certainly difficult to see how the Service will be able to administer rules based
on such narrow questions of state law. Possibly the conclusion should be simply that no
organization formed under the RULPA will possess limited liability. However, one ques-
tions why the potential to pierce the corporate veil will lead to the conclusion that the
corporate attribute of limited liability is absent, but guarantees of all partnership indebt-
edness will not.
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d. Free Transferability
Absent contrary agreement, a shareholder's rights in a corporation
attach to the shares, with the shares being freely tansferable. In con-
trast, ownership of a partnership is a diverse bundle of rights that, at
least in theory, exist and may be dealt with independently.230 The
partner's interest in the partnership means the partner's right to
share economically in the partnership.23' This property right may be
freely assigned under partnership law without the consent of the
other partners.23 2 In addition to the right to share economically, gen-
eral partners also have rights in specific partnership property and the
right to participate in management. 233 For limited partners, the ad-
ditional rights include the right to inspect the books and could in-
clude the right to vote on certain matters.23 4 A purported assignment
does not transfer these noneconomic rights nor permit the assignee to
exercise any of these rights as a partner without the consent of the
other members.23 5 It is in this respect that the rights of partners are
viewed as not freely transferrable.
The 1960 Regulations confirm that the above limitations on the
ability of partners to transfer their noneconomic rights prevents the
corporate attribute of free transferability from existing in a partner-
ship even though the right to share financially in the partnership
may be freely transferred.2 3 6 However, the 1960 Regulations do pro-
vide that free transferability will exist where the persons owning sub-
stantially all of the interests in the organization have the power, by
agreement, to fully substitute another in their place with respect to
all of the assigning partner's property rights.237 It seems this conclu-
sion should not apply to a general partnership as any such substitu-
tion would result in a dissolution of the partnership. Thus, free
230. UPA § 24.
231. UPA § 26.
232. UPA § 27(1).
233. See UPA § 24.
234. See RULPA (1976) §§ 302, 305.
235. UPA § 27(1); RULPA §§ 702, 704. The UPA does not directly recognize
the right of the assignee to be admitted as a substituted partner even with the consent of
the other partners, though it does recognize the ability of the partners to agree to allow
the assignee to exercise the rights of a partner. It seems that substitution should not be
possible simply because the withdrawal of the assigning partner is a dissolution of the
partnership. If the assignee is to become a partner, it should be as a partner of a new
partnership. In all events, it is beyond question that if everyone wants to be partners with
each other, they will be and it makes no difference, except under the 1960 Regulations,
see supra note 187, whether the same or a new partnership exists.
236. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1983).
237. Id.
transferability can exist only in a limited partnership and only if an
agreement of the partners permits the assignment of all rights and
provides partners with the unilateral ability to substitute the assignee
as a member of the partnership.
The 1960 Regulations also state that when the only limitation on a
partner's right to substitute an assignee is a right of first refusal in
the partnership or the other partners, free transferability is pre-
sent.23 However, the regulations are not entirely clear whether free
transferability will be present when less than unanimous consent is
required for a partner to have the right to substitute another. The
authority available suggests that the right to transfer with mere ma-
jority consent will not cause free transferability to exist. 239
No authority suggests that granting partners certain rights condi-
tional on a refusal to consent to transfer would change the conclu-
sion on whether free transferability exists under the regulations even
if such rights create an economic incentive for the other partners to
consent. However, unlike the other characteristics, the presence of
free transferability seems to be a substantive inquiry under the 1960
Regulations. Thus, any arrangements that grant to partners of a lim-
ited partnership the right to substitute another in their place could
give rise to the corporate attribute of free transferability for tax pur-
poses. It does seem odd that the only substantive inquiry under the
regulations that seek to identify which organizations must pay corpo-
rate tax should be the transferability of the owners' noneconomic
interests.
238. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (as amended in 1983). The regulations refer
to this as modified free transferability. For all intents and purposes though, it is free
transferability. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). This rule should not
extend to general partnerships because an assignee cannot replace a former partner in
the same partnership. See supra note 235.
239. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-028 (Dec. 7, 1989) (holding that free transferability
was not present in an organization in which the transferor was required to obtain major-
ity consent, which consent could not be unreasonably withheld); Gen. Couns. Mem.
34,407 (Jan. 22, 1971) (free transferability not present when right of transferee to par-
ticipate in management depended on the majority vote of the members). But cf. Larson
v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 183 (1976); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,910 (Nov. 4, 1976).
An ABA Tax Section Subcommittee on LLCs has reported that it met with several
members of the Service having responsibility for the issue and that it was told that a
requirement of majority consent to transfer would not, in their view, result in the corpo-
rate attribute 6f free transferability being present. Letter from Barbara K. Spudis (Co-
Chairman, ABA Subcommittee) to the members of the ABA Subcommittee (Nov. 19,
1990) (on file with author) (describing the Service's responses to ABA Subcommittee
inquiries at a meeting with Paul Kugler (Assistant Chief Counsel, Passthroughs and Spe-
cial Industries, Branch 2), Arthur Ernst (Chief Counsel, Passthroughs and Special In-
dustries, Branch 2), J. Thomas Hines (Attorney, Branch 2), Susan Hamill (Attorney,
Branch 1), and Richard Manfreda (Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel, Passthroughs and
Special Industries)).
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4. The Uncertain Role of Limited Liability
The benefit of the 1960 Regulations should be the substitution of a
clear test for entity characterization in lieu of what would otherwise
be a vague resemblance test applied largely on a case-by-case basis.
Certainty in this area is possibly more important than substance. So
far as entity characterization is concerned, taxpayers could live with
almost any rational rule so long as they can do so with relative
certainty.
The 1960 Regulations promised this certainty. Unfortunately, the
Service seemed unsatisfied with the substance and demonstrated this
dissatisfaction through ruling policies that are in conflict with the
regulations240 and through a willingness, at least prior to 1976, to
assert the propriety of imposing corporate income tax in situations in
which the 1960 Regulations clearly would have characterized the or-
ganization as a partnership.241 Thus, the desired predictability of the
1960 Regulations could not be fully attained. The Tax Court clearly
rejected any effort by the Service to apply rules to entity characteri-
zation that were in conflict with the 1960 Regulations.242 The Larson
decision coupled with the Service's acquiescence 24 3 should have fi-
nally added the certainty needed in this area. Unfortunately, the
promise of certainty under Larson also did not survive long.
In Larson, the Tax Court reminded the Service that, while the
1960 Regulations would be strictly followed so long as they were in
effect, it was for the Treasury and the Service to decide whether the
regulations should be withdrawn or modified.24 In 1977 and again in
1980, new regulations were issued that would have substantially al-
tered the treatment of organizations possessing limited liability.24
The 1977 proposed regulations were almost immediately with-
drawn,24 and the effective date of the 1980 proposed regulations was
240. See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
241. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 171 (1976); Zuckman v. United
States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. C1. 1975).
242. See Larson, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). See also supra note 198 and accompanying
text.
243. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
244. Larson, 66 T.C. at 185-86.
245. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1,038 (1977) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 30) (proposed
Jan. 5, 1977); 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (pro-
posed Nov. 17, 1980).
246. 42 Fed. Reg. 1,489 (1977).
repeatedly delayed24" 7 and finally withdrawn in 1982.248 While these
regulatory efforts never became effective, it was clear that the Ser-
vice was actively pursuing means by which to protect the corporate
tax base.
In 1982, in connection with the withdrawal of the 1980 proposed
regulations, the Service announced it would undertake a study of en-
tity characterization with particular emphasis on whether the attri-
bute of limited liability should be redefined for federal income tax
purposes and whether limited liability should be treated as a factor
of overriding significance.2 49 In addition, the announced study was to
reconsider the Service's acquiescence in Larson to the extent the ac-
quiescence was inconsistent with the imposition of a minimum net
worth requirement.20 Given the abortive efforts to change the entity
characterization regulations, the announcement of ongoing study of
the entity characterization rules, the reconsideration of the Larson
acquiescence, and the continuing refusal of the Service to issue ad-
vance rulings unless there was a general partner with substantial as-
sets,2 51 it is simply not possible for anyone to employ a noncorporate
form that effectively accomplished limited liability for the owners
without very serious misgivings in regard to its eventual tax
treatment.252
B. Imposition of Corporate Tax Under National Carbide
Prior to 1988, an additional theory for the imposition of corporate
taxation on partnerships existed if the limited partners controlled the
corporate general partner. The argument pressed by the Service
arose from the axiom of taxation that income must be taxed to the
owner of the income and cannot be diverted to others through antici-
patory arrangements. 53 To further this principle and assure that the
treatment of corporations as separate taxpayers was not subverted,214
it had long been recognized that special scrutiny must be given to
any situation in which shareholders claim that their corporation was
247. See I.R.S. Ann. 81-166, 1981-43 I.R.B. 21; I.R.S. Ann. 82-60, 1982-17
I.R.B. 23; I.R.S. Ann. 82-140, 1982-45 I.R.B. 30.
248. See I.R.S. Ann. 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
252. This is somewhat of an overstatement. Anyone willing to comply with the
ruling standards of Rev. Proc. 72-13 could be certain of the results. However, certainty
achieved in this way is objectionable unless one is willing to concede that the Service has
the right to regulate this area without compliance with regulatory procedures.
253. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
254. See Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
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acting as merely an agent on their behalf.2 55 In general, courts uni-
formly recognized that an agency between a corporation and its
shareholders should not be recognized unless the relationship meets
the standards established in National Carbide Corp. v. Commis-
sioner2 6 for recognizing a corporation as "a true corporate agent...
of its owner-principal."25
In Jones v. Commissioner,258 the Service successfully argued that
the principles of National Carbide should be applied to a partnership
in which the general partner was a corporation owned by the limited
partners. While it seems perfectly appropriate to apply the standards
for recognizing a true corporate agent to the agency relationship be-
tween a corporate general partner and shareholder or limited part-
ners, how those standards should be applied was far from clear.2 59
The most troublesome of the National Carbide factors in the context
of a partnership between shareholders and their corporation was the
statement that the corporation's "relations with its principal must
not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if
such is the case. 26° Objectively, it is difficult to fathom what this
statement meant because any agency relationship between a corpora-
tion and its shareholder is obviously dependent on the fact of owner-
ship, at least to some extent. However, the Fifth Circuit in Jones did
not seem interested in any search for deeper meaning, but was satis-
fied to find that the' ownership of the corporate general partner in
that case indicated that no true agency existed between the corpo-
rate general partners and the shareholder or limited partners. 261
Having found no agency or partnership to exist, the corporation was
255. See, e.g., Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485
U.S. 973 (1988); George v. Commissioner, 803 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485
U.S. 973 (1988). See also BITTKER & EusTIcE, supra note 18, 2.10, at 2-34 to 2-37.
256. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
257. Id. at 437.
258. Jones v Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981).
259. The Court stated that the relevant considerations should be as follows:
Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account of the prin-
cipal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money received to the princi-
pal, and whether receipt of income is attributable to the services of employees
of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the rele-
vant considerations in determining whether a true agency exists. If the corpora-
tion is a true agent, its relations with its principal must not be dependent upon
the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business pur-
pose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent.
National Carbide Corp., 336 U.S. at 437 (footnotes omitted).
260. Id.
261. See Jones, 640 F.2d at 754.
determined to be the true owner of the business and was required to
include all income and deductions in its taxable income for the year.
The scope of the Jones decision and the application of the Na-
tional Carbide factors to partnerships between corporations and
their shareholders was very indefinite. It is possible that disregard of
the partnership in Jones was dependent on the fact that the corpora-
tion held legal title to the assets, but such is not made clear in the
case. Alternatively, it may have been possible to have avoided the
issue merely by varying ownership in some fashion.262 Regardless of
the exact scope of the holding, Jones had a chilling effect on the use
of a limited partnership with a controlled general partner.2 6 3
C. State Law Restraints on Use of Noncorporate Forms
Under the 1960 Regulations, the partnership was the only busi-
ness form that offered any hope of creating corporate-like relation-
ships without corporate taxation.264 This was true because the 1960
Regulations gave great significance to highly technical UPA and
RULPA concepts in determining the presence of certain corporate
characteristics. As a result, some characteristics can be substantively
present without causing the organization to possess that characteris-
tic for tax purposes. Organizations that were substantively very simi-
lar would find the 1960 Regulations typically less accommodating
simply because the technical provisions of state law differed. 26a
262. See Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 843 (1985) (ownership of corporation by a 50% owner of partnership enough
to justify conclusion of true agency). But see Frink v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106, 110
(4th Cir. 1986) (common ownership is sufficient to disregard agency notwithstanding
disparity between ownership of corporation and ownership of the partnership). But see
McKEE ET AL., supra note 37, ff 3.04[2] & n.138 (suggesting that limited partnership
interests might be treated as preferred stock if the limited partners own the corporate
general partner without any suggestion that this should be limited to a narrow range of
facts).
263. Professors Bittker and Eustice offered the following advice:
Because of the ineluctably factual nature of the nominee-agency issue, the de-
cided cases are scattered along a spectrum, so that generalizations and, a forti-
ori, predictions, are perilous. Taxpayers who want to strengthen their cases are
well advised to use unrelated (and compensated) third-party entities for nomi-
nee functions when feasible.
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 18, at 2-36.
264. By 1988, there were two states that had adopted limited liability company
acts, Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101-136 (1977) [hereinafter the Wyoming Act])
and Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.471 (West Supp. 1992) [hereinafter the Flor-
ida Act]). See text accompanying notes 312-76 regarding the nature of limited liability
companies. Because of the Service's refusal to rule on the proper tax characterization of
limited liability companies (see Rev. Proc. 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 579), it appears that no
organizations were formed and operated under either of these statutes prior to 1988.
265. For example, a partnership that is dissolved on the withdrawal of any member
lacks continuity under the regulations, yet an organization has potentially perpetual exis-
tence under statute but that grants each person a contractual right to terminate would
probably have continuity for tax purposes. The substance is the same. The only difference
452
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It is abundantly clear that general partnerships will never be
treated as associations taxable as corporations. They will always
lack, at the very least, the corporate characteristics of limited liabil-
ity, continuity of life, and centralized management as those terms
are defined in the 1960 Regulations. 6 However, the general part-
nership form does not offer an acceptable solution to the choice of
entity dilemma. Simply, there is no effective way to utilize the gen-
eral partnership form and create protections against owner liability
that is comparable to corporate protection.
There has always been a significantly greater ability to use a lim-
ited partnership to create corporate-like relations. Indeed, in the
early 1980s there were numerous organizations that were able to
utilize the limited partnership form even though the interests in the
partnership were represented by certificates of beneficial interest,
which were actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange.26 7
The sole general partners of most publicly traded partnerships
were independent sponsoring corporations. Thus, no individual was
subject to personal liability, and yet the partnerships lacked the cor-
porate characteristic of limited liability within the meaning of the
1960 Regulations. Similarly, because the bankruptcy, dissolution, or
withdrawal of the corporate general partner would potentially dis-
solve the partnerships, they lacked the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life under the 1960 Regulations even though the part-
nerships would continue for as long as the corporate general partner
continued. Because the partnership interests were traded on the New
York Stock Exchange, there was obviously free transferability for all
practical purposes. However, the fact that the transfers conveyed
only the right to share economically and the assignee could not be
admitted as a limited partner without the consent of the general
partner was enough to avoid having free transferability for purposes
of the 1960 Regulations. The fact that the general partners regularly
and consistently consented to the admission of assignees as limited
partners was simply not relevant to entity characterization.
The only corporate attribute that these organizations possessed for
purposes of entity characterization under the 1960 Regulations was
centralized management (management was vested in a general part-
ner which did not have a substantial interest in the partnership). In-
terestingly, it is with respect to management that the public limited
is that the Treasury disregarded substance with respect to partnerships.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 176-252.
267. See generally Taylor, supra note 22.
partnership form did not duplicate the relationship, which would be
typical of a corporation. In a corporation, the shareholders have the
right to elect the board of directors. In the public limited partner-
ships, the corporate general partner was independent of the limited
partners and thus the beneficial owners of the business were not able
to elect the representatives that would be charged with the manage-
ment of the business.268
While the use of the limited partnership form for public compa-
nies was gaining increasing momentum in the early 1980s, it did not
survive for long. In '1987, this alternative was statutorily withdrawn
by the enactment of section 7704, which requires that any business
having interests traded on an established securities market be taxed
as a corporation.269
The imposition of corporate taxation on publicly traded partner-
ships obviously has no affect on the ability of nonpublic companies to
employ the partnership form. However, at least through the mid-
1980s it was much more difficult for nonpublic businesses to adapt
the limited partnership form to serve as an alternative to incorpora-
tion. Part of the success achieved by publicly traded partnerships re-
sulted from the corporate general partner's independence from the
limited partners. In nonpublic businesses, this arrangement is unac-
ceptable simply because it divorces management and control of the
business from ownership of the business. Thus, the use of a limited
partnership with an independent general partner was seldom accept-
able. On the other hand, there was significant reason to be con-
cerned that the use of a limited partnership with a controlled
corporate general partner would not achieve the desired limitation on
the liability of the owners who acted as employees, officers, directors,
and shareholders of the corporate general partner. 1
Under ULPA section 7, which was widely in effect through the
268. While the public limited partnership form failed to match the management
relationship, which would have existed had the business been incorporated, this difference
does not appear to have been material. This is probably because of the relative inability
of most owners of stock in a public corporation to realistically affect the selection of
directors in any event.
269. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1987).
270. There are obvious exceptions to this generalization, particularly when the bus-
iness is for a single undertaking. Indeed, the limited partnership form was ideally suited
to real estate development activities, equipment leasing, and similar activities in which
the separation of management from ownership was not only acceptable, but desirable.
However, for ongoing or diverse businesg operations, the use of a limited partnership with
an independent corporate general partner was not an acceptable alternative.
271. Part of the concern may have involved the propriety of having a corporate
general partner. See Frigidare Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 544 P.2d 781
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976), aff'd, 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977) (suggesting that the liability
of limited partners who were shareholders of the corporate general partner in Delaney v.
Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975), may have been based on the theory
that corporations could not be general partners). ULPA § 1 defines a partnership as
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mid-1970s,272 limited partners would become liable to creditors if
they took part in the control of the business. Applying this rule, at
least one court found that the general protection against liability was
forfeited when limited partners took part in control of the partner-
ship business notwithstanding that their participation occurred in
their capacity as agents or employees of the corporate general part-
ner.273 Contrary decisions under ULPA section 7 stated that this
conduct alone was not sufficient to impose liability on the limited
partners in the absence of knowledge and reliance by the creditor on
the conduct of the limited partner as a basis for believing personal
liability to exist and in deciding to extend credit. 4 Unfortunately
for partnership businesses, the principal case imposing the necessity
of creditor reliance in order to find limited partner liability also sug-
gested that a different result might have been obtained had the cor-
porate general partner been a newly organized corporation without
other substantial business activity. 7
In 1976, the RULPA was promulgated and replaced ULPA sec-
tion 7 with new section 303. Where adopted, section 303 expressly
provided that being an employee or agent of the limited partnership
or of a general partner would not constitute taking part in the con-
trol of the business.276 It also added that creditor knowledge of the
limited partner's participation in control would be required to impose
liability on the limited partners at least in some cases. However,
the exact scope of the protection afforded by the limited partnership
form to limited partners, and particularly to limited partners who
being formed by two or more persons but the ULPA does not define "person." In addi-
tion, ULPA § 20 did not include dissolution of a general partner as an event of dissolu-
tion. But see RULPA §§ 101(7), (11) (clearly permitting corporate partners).
272. See ULPA, 6 U.L.A. 559 (1969) (listing 43 states as having adopted the
ULPA as of 1969).
273. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). See also Mur-
sor Builders, Inc. v. Crown Mountain Apartments Assocs., 467 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D.V.I.
1978) (holding limited partners who were also officers of a corporate general partner
were liable under ULPA § 7 as general partners when they failed to maintain their
corporate officer identity in conducting the partnerships affairs and otherwise failed to
follow appropriate corporate formalities).
274. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1976).
See also Outlet Co. v. Wade, 377 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
275. Frigidare Sales Corp., 562 P.2d at 246.
276. RULPA (1976) § 303(b)(1).
277. RULPA (1976) § 303(a) created a dual approach to finding liability. Liabil-
ity existed if the limited partner's participation in control was substantially the same as
the exercise of the powers of a general partner, and limited partners would otherwise be
liable only if the creditor actually knew of the participation in control.
were also officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporate gen-
eral partner, remained fairly uncertain under the RULPA.17 8
In light of the uncertainty regarding the liability of the limited
partners who were also officers, directors, and shareholders of the
corporate general partner, the use of the limited partnership form
was reasonable only where there would be an independent general
partner. If the separation of management from ownership was a
problem, then efforts could be made to shift effective control back to
the limited partners. For example, a significant measure of control
might be achieved through the right of limited partners to appoint a
new general partner and to expel the old. Of course, these efforts had
to stop short of vesting control in the limited partners to such an
extent as to create liability or expose the organization to corporate
taxation. At the least, the use of a limited partnership under these
circumstances resulted in great expense, confusion, and uncertainty.
VI. RECENT CHANGES AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF ENTITY
A. Liability of Limited Partners
Given that owners desiring to be active in a business could avoid
personal liability by the mere act of incorporation, it is difficult to
perceive any public policy requiring the imposition of personal liabil-
ity on owners who choose not to incorporate when creditors have no
reason to believe that such liability exists. Overwhelmingly, state leg-
islatures seem to have reached this same conclusion.
The risk of personal liability for limited partners arose under sec-
tion 7 of the ULPA, which simply provided that limited partners
would be liable to creditors if they took part in the control of the
business. The RULPA, promulgated in 1976, modified the rule but
278. For example, it is not clear under RULPA (1976) § 303 what participation
would be similar to exercise of the powers of a general partner. It was also not clear in
other circumstances whether the creditor needed to have believed the limited partner was
a general partner as a result of the knowledge of participation in control. It also re-
mained unclear what would be considered participation in control. Finally, the creation
of a safe harbor for persons who were agents or employees of the general partner left
open the question of how to deal with persons who were officers, directors, or sharehold-
ers of a corporate general partner. The ambiguity of RULPA (1976) § 303 is illustrated
by Alzado v. Binder, Robinson & Co., 752 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1988). The plaintiff, who was
also the vice-president of the corporate general partner, had succeeded at the trial level
in imposing liability on a corporate limited partner. Obviously, the plaintiff knew that the
defendant was not a general partner, but the trial court apparently felt it sufficient that
the plaintiff knew of the acts that constituted taking part in control, whether or not this
knowledge led to a reasonable belief that the defendant was in fact a general partner.
While the decision of the trial court was reversed, the court did not suggest that liability
required a reasonable belief that the defendant was a general partner. Instead the court
relied on the fact that the activities of the limited partner were not significant enough to
establish that it took part in the control of the business. Id. at 551-53. See generally
Gavin L. Phillips, Annotation, Liability of Limited Partner Arising from Taking Part in
Control of Business Under Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 79 A.LR.4th 427 (1990).
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did not eliminate all uncertainties. In particular, it remained uncer-
tain whether limited partners could be liable to creditors when they
were officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporate general
partner. A further effort to clarify the law in this area was finally
made in 1985 through the amendment of RULPA section 303 .279
Amended section 303 provides an expanded list of activities that
will not be considered to be taking part in the control of the business.
Included in the expanded list are any actions taken as contractor,
agent, employee, officer, director, or shareholder of a corporate gen-
eral partner.28 In addition, section 303 was amended to provide that
any acts that did constitute taking part in the control of the business
would result in liability only if the creditor reasonably believed,
based on such conduct, that the limited partner was in fact a general
partner.2"'
It is inconceivable that limited partners will have a significant ex-
posure to personal liability under amended section 303 of the
RULPA except in very unusual circumstances. Given the safe har-
bor afforded to acts in the capacity of an agent, employee, officer,
director, or shareholder of a corporate general partner, it seems clear
that liability should be avoided simply by assuring that the organiza-
tional documents do not give the limited partner the right to partici-
pate as a general partner, by observing ordinary corporate
formalities, and by giving each active partner an employment capac-
ity with the corporation. Further, even if a limited partner engages
in activities that are found to be taking part in control of the busi-
ness because such limited partner was not acting in a corporate ca-
pacity, these acts will result in personal liability only if they caused a
creditor to reasonably believe that such person was a general part-
ner. So long as the name of the organization clearly discloses that
the organization is a limited partnership, as required under RULPA
in any event,2 82 combined with the fact that limited partners can
participate in the business in so many other capacities without being
a general partner, it is difficult to imagine how a creditor could have
a reasonable belief that someone is a general partner without some
affirmative misconduct on the part of that partner. It certainly
seems, at the very least, that vicarious liability to a tort creditor will
be rare since the normal tort creditor will not have had dealings with
279. See supra text accompanying notes 272-78.
280. RULPA § 303(b)(1).
281. RULPA § 303(a).
282. RULPA § 102(1).
the partnership or any partner such as to have formed any belief at
all.
At the current time, there is a clear and rapid trend in the states
toward expanding the role that limited partners are permitted to
play in the conduct of the business while maintaining protection
against personal liability. Only two states, Alaska and Vermont, still
have ULPA section 7 in effect.2 83 Only five states that adopted
RULPA continue to have the 1976 version of section 303 in effect.284
Five states also continue to have provisions similar to the 1976 ver-
sion of section 303(a), but have added provisions stating that actions
as an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporate general partner
will not be considered to be taking part in control.285 Within the last
few years, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have al-
ready adopted provisions at least as restrictive as the 1985 version of
section 303.286
283. ALASKA STAT. § 32.10.060 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1397
(1984). Several other states still have the ULPA in effect, but have also enacted
RULPA, which is in effect for new organizations. UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6
U.L.A. 203 (Supp. 1992).
284. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-319 (1956); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 449.1303 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-12-703 (1991); OHIO REV CODE
ANN. § 1782-19 (Baldwin 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-14-403 (1977).
285. ALA. CODE § 10-9A-42 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 545.303 (West 1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2A-27 (West Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-303 (1989); S.C.
CODE ANN. §33-42-430 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
286. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-43-303 (Michie 1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632(West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-62-303 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN.
§ 34-15 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 17-303 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-433 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.129 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
9-303 (Harrison 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 425D-303 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 53-
219 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 , 11 153-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-16-4-3 (Burns 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a203 (Supp. 1991); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.437 (Baldwin 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 433 (West
Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 10-303 (1985 & Supp. 1991); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 109, § 19 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322A.26 (West Supp. 1992); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-14-303 (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 359.201 (Vernon 1992); NEB. REV,
STAT. § 67-251 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.430 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304-8:19 (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-2-20 (Michie 1988); N.Y. PARTNER-
SHIP LAW § 121-303 (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-10.1-22 (Supp.
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 54, § 320 (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 70.135 (1988);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8523 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-13-19 (Supp. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 48-7-303 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-2-301 (1989); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, art. 3.03 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2a-303 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.24 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 25.10.190 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 47-9-19 (1992); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 179.23 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
In some of these states, the protection afforded limited partners goes even further than
RULPA (1985) § 303. For example, in Georgia, the statute simply states that limited
partners will not be liable for the obligations of the partnership. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-
303 (Harrison 1990). Maryland goes on to clarify that a limited partner will not be
considered to be taking part in the control of the business as an officer, shareholder, or
director of a corporate general partner, even if the corporate general partner is the sole
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B. Limited Liability Companies
The trend to limit the personal liability of the owners of unincor-
porated organizations is not occurring solely with respect to limited
partnership acts. In recent years, a number of states have adopted
Limited Liability Company (LLC) acts, which authorize a new form
of organization in which personal liability of owners is limited.187
The LLC acts that have been adopted borrow from both corporate
and partnership law in order to create a new hybrid form of organi-
zation.2"' The most salient feature of the limited liability company
form is that the owners, designated as members, are statutorily pro-
tected from personal liability for the obligations of the business in
the same way that shareholders are protected from liability for the
obligations of a corporation.28 9 In most other respects, the various
general partner and even if the limited partner is the only officer, director, and share-
holder of the only general partner. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 10-303 (1985 &
Supp. 1991).
287. Through June of 1992, LLC acts exist in Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§8 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1992)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -913
(1990)); Delaware (Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434
(H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (1992) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to
-1107)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.471 (West Supp. 1992)); Illinois (Illinois
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180,§§ 322B.01-.955); Iowa (Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch.
2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100-.1601)); Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1991)); Louisiana (Louisiana Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW)
(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 12:1301-1369)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (Supp. 1992)); Minnesota (Minnesota Limited
Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 322B.001-.912)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.010-.571 (1991)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West 1992)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992)); Texas (TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts. 1.01-9.02
(West Supp. 1992)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -156 (1991)); Virginia
(VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1069 (Michie Supp. 1991)); West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (Supp. 1992)); Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136
(1977)). These acts are hereafter referred to collectively as the "LLC acts" and individu-
ally as the "act" of a particular state. Six of the LLC acts were adopted in the first six
months of 1992. By the time of publication of this article, it is likely that several more
states will have adopted LLC acts.
It is reported that at least a number of other states have bills pending or groups study-
ing LLC legislation. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company, A
Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 379 n.5 (1992).
288. For an exhaustive comparison of the provisions of the LLC acts, see Keatinge
et al., supra note 287, at 386-403.
289. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-651 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
80-705 (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B.
608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.436 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill.
Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 10-10a (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited
LLC acts adopt provisions most closely resembling partnership law.
For example, management of an LLC is vested in the members un-
less the members otherwise agree;290 the LLC is dissolved upon the
death, dissolution, withdrawal, or bankruptcy of any member unless
the other members agree to continue;" 1 the members may not sub-
stitute another person in their place without the consent of the other
Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.601); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7620 (1990); Louisiana Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW)
(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(b)); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS
§ 4A-301 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2,
§§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.302); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.371
(1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2022 (West 1992); R.I. GEN, LAWS § 7-16-23
(1992); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 4.03(A)(West Supp. 1992); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 48-2b-109 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (Michie Supp. 1991); W.
VA. CODE § 31-1A-33 (Supp. 1992); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977).
290. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(a)(Supp. 1992); Delaware Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1992); Illi-
nois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 15-
1 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis.
Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (1991); Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La.
Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1311); NEv. REV. STAT. § 86.291 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-14 (1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie Supp.
1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18 (Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977). Min-
nesota, Oklahoma, and Texas appear to reach the same result by vesting management in
managers unless reserved to the members in the LLC's regulations. See Minnesota Lim-
ited Liability Company Act, 1992 ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.605, .322); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2013, 2015 (West 1992);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1992). But see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-80-401 (1990) (vesting management exclusively in managers).
The Maryland Act does not expressly state who has the right to manage the business,
but the absence of any reference to managers, the recognition of broad authority in all
members to bind the LLC (MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-401 (Supp. 1992)),
and the general requirement of majority consent for decisions concerning business affairs
of the LLC (MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A-303(b)(Supp. 1992)) clearly indi-
cate that there will be member management unless otherwise agreed.
291. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-733, 734, 781(a)(3)(Supp. 1992); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-80-801 (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch.
434 (H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(4));
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act,
1992 I11. Leg. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, Sec. 180, § 35-1(3) (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be
codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1301); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622 (1991); Louisi-
ana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)
(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1334(3)); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 4A-606, 4A-901 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.303,
.801); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.491 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037 (West
1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-39(d)(1992); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art.
6.01 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-137 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1046 (Michie Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-35 (Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-
15-123 (1977).
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members, though they may assign their economic rights;29 2 the or-
ganization is formed by the filing of a document closely resembling a
certificate of limited partnership and which must be amended in
largely the same circumstances in which a certificate of limited part-
nership is amended;293 and the parties are permitted to establish var-
iations in their relationship under an operating agreement.29 4 Thus,
292. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-732. (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-
702 (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B.
608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702 (1992)); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.432 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Act, 1992 Ill. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 30-5 (SB 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited Liability
Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.902 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (1991); Louisiana Limited Lia-
bility Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to
be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1330(a) (West 1992)); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS'NS § 4A-603 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2,§§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.304 (West 1992)); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 86.351 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2033 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-35 (1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1528n, arts. 4.05, 4.07 (West Supp. 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-131 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1039 to -1040 (Michie
Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-34 (Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
293. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-
204 (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws oh. 434 (H.B.
608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-201, -202); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.409 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992
Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, §§ 5-1, -10 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be
codified in IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.303 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607
(1991); Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780
(H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1304, 1309);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-204 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Liability Com-
pany Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.104);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.161 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2005 (West 1992); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-5, -12 (1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 301
(West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-116 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1011
(Michie Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-8 (Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-107
(1977).
294. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-682 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-
102(11) (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434
(H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(6)); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.423 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992
Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 15-5 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.703); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (1991); Louisiana Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW)
(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(16)); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'NS § 4A-402 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art.
2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.322, .602); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 86.101 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2(s)(1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1528n,
art. 3.05 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126 (1992); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13-1-1023 (Michie Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-19 (Supp. 1992).
the LLC would be most appropriately characterized as a partnership
in which no partner is personally liable for the obligations of the
business.
C. Clarification of the Role of Limited Liability
in Entity Characterization
The Service's study of the 1960 Regulations and of the role that
limited liability should play in entity characterization was completed
in 1988. The conclusion announced was that there would be no rec-
ommended changes to the 1960 Regulations.295 Implicit in this rul-
ing is the conclusion that limited liability would continue to be
merely one factor in determining entity characterization.
The Service's conclusion regarding the role which limited liability
should play was immediately reflected in Revenue Ruling 88-76.29
The ruling involved the proper characterization for federal income
tax purposes of a limited liability company formed under the Wyo-
ming Act.297 That the Service would issue this ruling is surprising in
several respects. First, it is somewhat surprising, given the content of
the proposed regulations issued in 1977 and 1980, that the Service
finally determined that limited liability should have no greater sig-
nificance than the other characteristics. Secondly, it is somewhat
surprising that the Service was willing to recognize an LLC as an
unincorporated organization to which the entity characterization
regulations apply.298 The third surprise is that the Service appears to
be quite satisfied with the ruling notwithstanding all that it
portends. 299
The Oklahoma and Wyoming Acts contemplate, but do not expressly authorize or de-
fine, operating agreements. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001(16) (West Supp.
1993); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977).
295. I.R.S. Ann. 88-118, 1988-38 I.R.B. 25.
296. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
297. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977).
298. The 1960 Regulations, see supra note 187, only apply to unincorporated orga-
nizations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983). It is difficult to figure
out what this means if it does not refer to a fictional person recognized by the law. It also
seems that an organization that can own property, sue. and be sued, and for the obliga-
tions of which no owner will be liable must come pretty close to being a fictional person
recognized under law. Early cases held that the term "associations" included organiza-
tions created by statute or deriving statutory benefits. See Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U.S
178, 187 (1910). The Service could have taken the position that the extension of the
association concept to other organizations which resemble corporations did not remove
statutorily created organizations from the definition of associations. But see Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(c) (1967) (providing that the corporate resemblance test would apply to
so-called partnership associations that are also statutory creations).
299. See infra text accompanying notes 331-76 (suggesting that the emergence of
the LLC will, if unchecked, contribute to making corporate income tax an elective
regime).
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While the willingness to rule and the satisfaction with the pros-
pects of the ruling are surprising, the result reached in the ruling is
not itself surprising. Applying the 1960 Regulations, the only possi-
ble conclusion was that the LLC was a partnership. Obviously the
LLC possessed the corporate characteristic of limited liability.300
The LLC at issue in the ruling had also elected, as permitted under
the Wyoming Act,301 to be managed by "managers" rather than by
the members and therefore possessed the corporate characteristic of
centralized management.0 2 Thus, treatment of the entity as a part-
nership for federal income tax purposes depended upon the entity
lacking continuity of life and free transferability. 303
The ruling held that free transferability was absent because the
Wyoming Act prohibited transfer of anything more than the right to
share in profits, losses, and distributions without the consent of the
other members. 304 Because management rights had been divorced
from membership, this effectively meant that any right to vote could
not be assigned. Under the regulations, this is enough to establish
that free transferability does not exist.30 5
The ruling also concluded that the LLC lacked continuity of life
because the Wyoming Act provides that LLCs will be dissolved upon
the death, withdrawal, or bankruptcy of any member unless the
other members all agreed to continue the business.30 6 Because the
300. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977) (providing that no member will be liable
"for a debt, obligation or liability of the limited liability company").
301. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977) (providing that "if provision is made for it in
the articles of organization, management of the limited liability company may be vested
in a manager or managers who shall be elected by the members in the manner prescribed
by the operating agreement").
302. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-117 (1977) prohibits any person other than a manager
from contracting debt on behalf of the LLC if management has been vested in managers.
Thus, no member possessed any right or power to bind the LLC, and the management
clearly was centralized within the meaning of the 1960 Regulations. Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1983) (defining "centralized management").
303. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983).
304. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (as
amended in 1983).
305. Because the LLC at issue had elected to be managed by managers, the non-
manager members would have no right to participate in the conduct of the business. At
most, the members would have possessed any voting rights left with members and the
right to inspect the books. It is not entirely clear from the ruling whether there were any
matters upon which the members would be entitled to vote or consent other than a trans-
fer of interests. It is possible, therefore, that consent to transfer affected only the ability
to give the transferee the right to reasonable inspection of the books and to consent to the
next proposed transfer. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
306. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123 (1977); see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as
amended in 1983).
limited liability company lacked continuity of life and free transfera-
bility, the proper characterization of the entity for federal income
tax purposes was held to be that of a partnership.
D. Modification of the National Carbide Standards
Jones v. Commissioner,17 based on the application of the Na-
tional Carbide standards for recognizing true agencies,308 suggested
that a limited partnership in which a limited partner controlled cor-
poration served as general partner would not, in at least some cir-
cumstances, avoid corporate taxation, independent of whether the
organization passed muster under the 1960 Regulations. Notwith-
standing the Service's successes with this argument in Jones, it is no
longer available to the Service so long as a written partnership exists
and the fact that the corporation is acting as general partner is dis-
closed to third parties.
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. Bollin-
ger,30 9 substantially clarifying the issue of when a corporation would
be a true agent. The Court stated:
the genuineness of the agency relationship is adequately assured, . . . when
the fact that the corporation is acting as agent for its shareholders with
respect to a particular asset is set forth in a written agreement at the time
the asset is acquired, the corporation functions as agent and not principal
with respect to the asset for all purposes, and the corporation is held out as
the agent and not the principal in all dealings with third parties relating to
the asset.310
To the extent that National Carbide required any greater showing, it
is no longer applicable. 1
Under Bollinger, a partnership between a corporation and its
shareholders will certainly be recognized as the true owner of the
business if there is a written partnership agreement, the assets are in
the partnership's name, and the business is conducted in the name of
the limited partnership.
307. 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S 965 (1981).
308. National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S 422 (1949).
309. 485 U.S. 340 (1988). The occurrence in 1988 of both the Bollinger decision
and Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (holding that a limited liability company would be
taxed as a partnership) was likely coincidental, but the result was to make 1988 a pretty
good year for taxpayers desiring limited liability without corporate tax.
310. Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 349-50.
311. See George W. Heaton, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 2197 (1989) (holding that the
three requirements set out in Bollinger will be controlling on the issue of whether a
partnership between a corporation and its shareholders will be recognized as the owner of
the business).
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VII. CHOICE OF UNINCORPORATED FORMS AFTER 1988
A. Choice of the Limited Liability Company Form
1. In General
The emergence of LLCs should add a significant alternative for
new businesses facing the choice of entity dilemma, 332 but predicting
the role that LLCs can or will play is complicated by several factors.
First, while LLCs are receiving a great deal of attention, so far they
have only been authorized in eighteen states.313 Unless a business
happens to be engaging in activities only within those eighteen
states, uncertainty regarding the treatment of LLCs in other states
may militate against use of this form. 314 Second, the choice of the
LLC form is also limited currently by the fact that existing LLC
acts are not uniform and contain significant ambiguities and uncer-
tainties.31 5 Finally, while the application of the 1960 Regulations to
various arrangements that may be established under the LLC acts
does not appear to be particularly uncertain, it is not yet clear
whether the Service will accept the apparent application of the 1960
Regulations or will endeavor to impose more stringent rules either
substantively or for ruling purposes.316
312. Existing businesses may also find that the LLC better suits their needs. For
those already organized as a partnership for tax purposes, conversion to an LLC will not
involve any tax liability. Indeed, the LLC will be deemed to be the same partnership as
its predecessor for tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 708(a) (1992). For businesses that are
incorporated, conversion to the LLC form will entail a liquidation of the corporation and
therefore recognition of all gains. See I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (1992).
313. See supra note 287.
314. The choice of law applicable to an LLC operating in a state that does not
have an LLC act is simply unknown as yet. See Keatinge et al., supra note 287, at 442.
315. See generally infra text accompanying notes 331-73.
316. A principal uncertainty is whether and to what extent the Service will treat
LLCs that are governed in certain respects by provisions corresponding to the UPA or
the ULPA as being covered by statements of general application to UPA or ULPA part-
nerships. For example, partnerships formed under statutes corresponding to the UPA or
the ULPA cannot possess continuity of life (Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as
amended in 1983)) and usually cannot possess centralized management (Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983)). Obviously, LLC acts do not correspond to
the UPA or the ULPA in an overall sense, but may correspond very closely with the
UPA or the ULPA so far as management or continuity of life are concerned. Because the
only relevance to the presence of continuity of life or centralized management are the
provisions that govern the life and management of the LLC when these provisions corre-
spond to the partnership acts, the same conclusions should obtain.
2. Ideal LLC Legislation
LLCs will become a significant alternative only if authorizing leg-
islation becomes more widespread, more uniform, and more aptly
suited to the goal of finally solving the choice of entity dilemma. It
seems likely that these events will occur.3 17 While it is beyond the
scope of this article to attempt to predict what future LLC legisla-
tion will provide or to recommend a model LLC act, it can be sug-
gested what the ideal LLC legislation might look like in general
terms. An ideal LLC act probably should do little more than restate
the UPA, adopt a provision granting members limited liability, and
otherwise depart from the UPA only to the extent clearly necessary
to respond to a legitimate business or public interest.
The principal benefits of such an ideal act would arise from the
fact that such an act would be uniform and would contain provisions
that have a significant history and that are fairly widely understood.
Perhaps as significant, such an ideal act would create relationships
that have been expressly addressed by the 1960 Regulations and that
should have a more certain federal tax consequence.
Beyond increased certainty both under state law and under federal
tax law, the ideal act would provide maximum flexibility for the
owners to establish relationships suited to their particular business.
The UPA generally recognizes that the relationship between owners
is fundamentally contractual,318 and an LLC act following the UPA
would allow the same degree of flexibility. A more rigid LLC act
will simply cause the LLC form to be inappropriate for many busi-
ness to which it ought reasonably to be available. For example, the
LLC form would seem to be the most obviously appropriate form for
a small business with a limited number of owners who are all active
in the business. In such a business, centralized management may be
neither necessary nor appropriate. If the LLC act mandates central-
ized, representational management, this business would be required
to accept a relationship which is not particularly well suited to its
business in order to use the LLC form.319
317. See supra note 287 (regarding the number of states considering LLC legisla-
tion). There are projects underway within the American Bar Association and with the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws regarding LLCs. See Keatinge et al., supra note
287, at 456.
318. Most of the UPA provisions regulating the relationship of the partners inter
sese apply only in the absence of agreement. See UPA § 9 (scope of the partners' au-
thority), § 18 (economic and management rights), § 19 (maintenance of books), § 22
(right to an account), § 23(1) (continuation), § 25(2)(a) (right to occupy partnership
property), § 27(1) (rights of an assignee), § 31 (events of dissolution and right to dis-
solve), § 36 (effect of dissolution on existing liabilities), § 37 (right to wind up), § 38
(right to distribution and winding up following dissolution), and § 42 (rights of with-
drawing members in the event of continuation).
319. Colorado imposes just this requirement. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401
(1990) (vesting management exclusively in managers).
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Flexibility in LLC acts is particularly important given that the
ultimate purpose of the legislation is to authorize a new form of or-
ganization that provides limited liability to the owners without caus-
ing them to incur corporate taxation. The price to be paid to avoid
corporate taxation is that the business must be willing to forego at
least two of the principal corporate attributes as they are defined in
the 1960 Regulations. A rigid LLC act, which necessarily creates
two corporate characteristics in every LLC, limits the ability of the
legislation to accomplish this goal. Following the example above, if a
rigid LLC act requires centralized management, then all LLCs
formed under the act will possess both limited liability and central-
ized management under the 1960 Regulations. As a result, any busi-
ness (including those that do not need or desire centralized
management) in which freely transferable interests, for example, are
necessary will have a difficult time avoiding corporate characteriza-
tion for tax purposes should they wish to use an LLC. If a rigid LLC
act also prohibited the creation of free transferability by agreement,
this business will simply be foreclosed from the use of an LLC.3 20 At
the same time, there is no conceivable reason why this business
should be denied access to the LLC form.
Variations from the UPA under an ideal LLC act would be neces-
sary, but should be only as are clearly justified by business or state
concerns. No such variations would be necessary to facilitate an ap-
propriate relationship between the owners because the members will
be free to establish any relationship they desire by agreement.32' At
most, variations should do no more than to alter some of the terms
that will apply in default of an agreement. For example, profit shar-
ing in the absence of contrary agreement could be based on contribu-
tions rather than being per capita as is required under the UPA in
the absence of contrary agreement. 22
Variations from the UPA will be appropriate to clarify and estab-
lish the relationship of the LLC to the state. Most obviously, it is
appropriate to require a state filing as a condition to claiming the
benefits of formation under the LLC acts. 23 Similarly, because the
320. Not only does Colorado prohibit member management (CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 7-80-401 (1990)), it also seems not to permit free transferability to be created by
agreement. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702 (1990). While this rigid statute may prevent
anyone from inadvertently creating an LLC that is taxable as a corporation, it does so by
making it very difficult for some businesses to employ the LLC.
321. See supra note 318.
322. See UPA § 18(a).
323. The LLC acts all provide that the LLC is formed upon the filing of articles of
LLC is created by a state filing, additional filings disclosing dissolu-
tion or other alteration of the organization are appropriate.3214 Other
departures could include provisions permitting mergers325 or the re-
gistration and regulation of foreign LLCs.326 Finally, because there
organization. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-631 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
80-203 (Supp. 1992); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434
(H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.405 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992
IlI. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, Sec. 180, § 5-1 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.301); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7605 (Supp. 1991); Louisiana
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 262)
(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1304); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-202 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act,
ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.102); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 86.151 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West 1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-16-5 (1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 3.03 (West Supp.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-103 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1010 (Michie
Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-7 (Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-106 (1977).
324. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-783 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
80-807 (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B.
608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-203); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 608.411, .445 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act,
1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 35-15 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be
codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1305); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7610, -7627
(1991); Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780
(H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1339, :1340);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-909 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.804); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.221, .531 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§ 2041 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-47 (1992); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, art. 6.07 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-121, -140 (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1014, -1050 (Michie Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-IA-39, -40
(Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-127, -129 (1977).
325. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-751 to -757 (Supp. 1992); Iowa Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.1201-.1206); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7650 (1991); Louisiana
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1357-:1362); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASs'NS §§ 4A-701 to -710 (Supp. 1992); Minnesota Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 322B.701-.709); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2054 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 7-16-59 to -64 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-149 (1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-
1A-41 to -46 (Supp. 1992).
326. See ARIz. STAT. REV. ANN. §§ 29-801 to -812 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 7-80-901 to -913 (1990); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del.
Laws ch. 434 (H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,§§ 18-901 to -911); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A.
87-1062, sec. 180, §§ 45-1 to -45 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited Liability
Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 490A.1401-.1410); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7605 (Supp. 1991); Louisiana
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1342-:1356); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 4A-1001 to -1012 (Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§§ 2042-2050 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-48 to -55 (1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-143 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1051 to -1060 (Michie Supp. 1991);
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will be a state filing, this filing could be used to give certain kinds of
notice, including notice that would otherwise involve the rather
meaningless act of publication in a newspaper of general circula-
tion.32 7 While variations as to the formalities of formation are appro-
priate, there seems little reason to depart from the substantive
notions of the UPA as to the nature of the organization.
Having generally identified what an ideal act might be, it must be
conceded that it is difficult to know how close any particular LLC
act is to such an ideal. Because of the uncertainties in the LLC acts,
the discussion which follows endeavors to analyze how the LLC
could be utilized if formed under the ideal act described and to iden-
tify to what extent other LLC acts will or might permit the same
result.
3. General Uses of the LLC Form
It is difficult to conceive of a reason why any business that in the
past would have adopted a general partnership form will not in the
future use an LLC. An LLC will vary from the general partnership
form primarily in providing the owners limited liability and in re-
quiring a state filing as a condition to obtaining this benefit. 328 It
seems a safe assumption that statutory limited liability will always
be perceived to be a benefit. It also seems safe to assume that the
need to file articles of organization is a nominal price to pay for this
benefit. Thus, the LLC seemingly should supplant the general part-
nership form whenever and wherever it is available. 29
Beyond supplanting the general partnership form, it seems clear
that the LLC should be a very accommodating and possibly the pre-
ferred form of organization when the owners desire limited liability
and not more than one of the other principal corporate attributes.
The ability to have limited liability and avoid corporate taxation in
W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-48 to -63 (Supp. 1992).
327. See UPA §§ 35(1)(b)(II), (3)(c)(II) (requiring notice of dissolution to be
published in a newspaper in order to fully terminate the power of partners to bind the
partnership). See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-401(a)(3)(ii) (Supp. 1992)(permitting the members to give in the articles of organization constructive notice of
limitations on authority to bind the partnership).
328. See supra notes 289 and 293 and accompanying text.
329. Many relationships are partnerships under state law simply because the rela-
tionship created was not recognized by the participants as anything more than co-owner-
ship or some other relationship not generally regarded as creating a business
organization. See UPA §§ 6, 7. Many of these relationships will continue to be treated
as general partnerships. With limited liability available, it may also be that many people
will now affirmatively endeavor to place their relationships under the LLC form.
such situations is clear. Only incorporation and an S election would
provide an equally simple and direct solution. However, given the
strict limitations on the availability of the S election and the less
favorable tax treatment accorded to S corporations in many situa-
tions compared to the treatment of an LLC taxed as a partner-
ship,330 the LLC should be preferred over the S corporation in this
context.
B. Use of the LLC to Obtain Corporate Benefits Without
Corporate Taxation
The most interesting question is to what extent an LLC can be
used to solve the common choice of entity dilemma when the owners
desire that their organization possess more than two of the principal
corporate characteristics for state law purposes. Under an ideal LLC
act, limited liability will be present and all of the other corporate
attributes could be established by agreement; achieving the desired
structure for state law purposes should be merely a drafting issue.
However, again under the ideal statute, the LLC need not necessa-
rily have any corporate attribute for tax purposes except limited lia-
bility. Thus, the use of an LLC to solve the choice of entity dilemma
in this context depends upon the ability to draft agreements that sat-
isfy the need for continuity of life, centralized management, and free
transferability for business purposes without also causing those at-
tributes to be present for tax purposes. The discussions that follow
suggest that this should be possible.
1. Centralized Management
Under an ideal act, and most of the existing LLC acts, if the
members desire to retain management, they may do so.331 In any
330. See supra text accompanying notes 104-67.
331. Most of the LLC acts vest management authority in members unless the par-
ties have provided for management by managers in the articles of organization. See
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(a)(Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West
Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-
1062, sec. 180, § 15-1 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (1991);
Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B.
1262) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 86.291 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116
(1977). Iowa, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia are similar except that they
also allow the agreement to use managers to be established in the operating agreement.
See Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW)
(to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-14 (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1010 (Michie Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18 (Supp. 1992).
Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Texas vest management in managers unless the articles or an
agreement provide for member management. See Minnesota Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.603, .322);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2013, 2015 (West 1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
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such event, centralized management should not be present for tax
purposes.332 On the other hand, if the members establish a represen-
tational management structure either by mandate of the LLC act or
'through their articles of organization, centralized management will
likely be present both for business purposes and for tax purposes.333
1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1992). The Delaware and Maryland acts most closely re-
semble the UPA. The Delaware Act provides for management by members unless the
members otherwise agree. Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch.
434 (H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (1992) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
402). Indeed, the Maryland Act does not even refer to managers. However, the Mary-
land Act will permit the members to create any management structure they desire by
agreement. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-402(a)(1)(Supp. 1992). Colo-
rado vests management in managers and does not permit members to manage their own
business as members. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203 (1990).
332. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (as amended in 1983).
333. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-017 (Aug. 12, 1991);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-19-029 (Feb. 7, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-52-039 (Oct. 2, 1990); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 90-29-019 (Apr. 19, 1990). Only Colorado mandates centralized management.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1991). When not required, the LLC acts gen-
erally permit the use of managers to be established by provision to that effect in the
articles of organization. See supra note 331. This arrangement, because it vests manage-
ment in a group that does not include all of the members, will cause centralized manage-
ment to be present for tax purposes under the 1960 Regulations as long as the members
do not retain the power to bind the LLC. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as
amended in 1983). At the very least, it seems that a provision in the articles of organiza-
tion taking management away from members should also take from the members any
power to bind the LLC. Such power is expressly removed in many states. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-407, -408 (Supp. 1991);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.424, .425 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7614
(Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.301, .311 (Supp. 1991); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-26-127 (1992);
W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-21 (Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-117, -118 (1977).
It is hard to understand why the use of managers should be required to be disclosed in
the articles of organization. The disclosure is generally not self-executing. There will still
need to be an agreement governing the number of managers, how they are elected, how
long they are to serve, how often they are to meet, what powers they are to have, what
issues are reserved to members, and a slew of other questions. Because the real purpose
for inclusion in the articles of organization is a topic for agreement, the only good expla-
nation for inclusion in the articles of organization is to give notice of this fact. One is left
to wonder why notice is mandatory, what happens if the members change their mind and
forget to amend, or if they simply operate otherwise. For limited partnerships, the
RULPA has moved toward a perfunctory state law filing with the ability to include other
matters. See RULPA § 201. Probably the real reason that the LLC acts require signifi-
cantly greater information, including whether there are managers, is that Wyoming
adopted such a provision prior to the time when partnership filings became perfunctory,
and others have simply followed suit.
The Minnesota LLC Act provides for management by a Board of Governors. Minne-
sota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 322B.603(l)). But member management can be substituted under a
"Member Control Agreement." Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art.
2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.322). The Minnesota Act is
different from, and more complicated than, any other LLC act. Therefore, practitioners
Thus, if effectively centralized management is desired without this
attribute under the 1960 Regulations, some other arrangement will
have to be established by agreement.
A suggestion is that the LLC not vest management in representa-
tives in the state filing, but that they create a form of centralized
management under an operating agreement. Under an ideal act, this
distinction alone should be enough to avoid centralized management.
In such event, each member would have the power to bind the LLC
for transactions occurring in the ordinary course of business when
dealing with a third party who does not know of the restrictions on
the authority of the members.334 The 1960 Regulations expressly
recognize that this kind of power to bind, which is statutorily vested
in owners, prevents centralized management.3 35
Whether this approach will be possible under existing LLCs is un-
certain. In Colorado, this approach is not available simply because
the statute vests management in a representative group. 330 Arizona
and Louisiana clearly recognize inherent authority in members ab-
sent the disclosure of the use of managers in the articles of organiza-
tion.3 7 Thus, centralized management in Arizona is avoided simply
by not providing for the use of managers in the articles. Since Mary-
land generally follows the UPA with regard to the agency power of
members, centralization of management for tax purposes should not
be possible for Maryland LLCs even if, by agreement, management
is vested in a group resembling a board of directors. 338 Delaware,
Iowa, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Virginia clearly will permit the
creation of representative management by operating agreement, 339 as
will find predictions as to its effect much more difficult.
334. See UPA § 9(1).
335. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983). See also Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989) (holding that an LLC (the state of organization
cannot be ascertained from the ruling) in which the members had inherent power to
bind, notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, prevented the organization from
possessing centralized management under the 1960 Regulations (See supra note 187)).
336. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1991).
337. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1992); Louisiana Limited Liability
Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to be
codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1317(a)).
338. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-401 (Supp. 1992). The Mary-
land Act does permit a statement in the articles to provide constructive notice of limita-
tions on member authority to third parties. It is possible that the Service will take the
position that use of this notice provision is enough to remove the inherent authority nec-
essary to avoid centralized management under the 1960 Regulations. See MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-401(a)(3) (Supp. 1992).
339. See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B.
608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402); Iowa Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702); Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art,
2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.322); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-
14 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie Supp. 1991).
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will Texas.340 In the other states, while not entirely clear, it is at
least arguable that representational management can be created by
an operating agreement without being made part of the articles of
organization.34' However, to be effective in avoiding the tax charac-
teristic of centralized management, the centralized management cre-
ated under agreement must leave the members with authority to
bind the organization when dealing with persons who do not have
knowledge of the agreement. It is not clear whether any such power
would exist under LLC acts other than Arizona and Maryland when
representatives are given management authority by agreement. Ex-.
cept for Arizona and Maryland, no state has an act that includes a
provision similar to UPA section 9, which expressly recognizes such
power in general partners. At most, the LLC acts provide that no
340. Texas vests management in managers unless the regulations reserve manage-
ment to members. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.13 (West Supp.
1992). Thus, the ability to vest management in members by agreement is expressly
established.
341. Most LLC acts vest management authority in members unless the parties
have provided for management by managers in the articles of organization. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(a) (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp.
1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 I11. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec.
180, § 15-1 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1991); Loui-
siana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)
(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 86.291 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116
(1977). Whether the parties could omit such a provision for management by managers
from the articles of organization in these states and then create essentially the same
arrangement by agreement is unclear. The reality is that they can and will do so, but it is
not clear that this result is sanctioned by law. Generally, these LLC acts permit the
members to enter into an operating agreement (referred to variously as by-laws, regula-
tions, or an operating agreement) to regulate the internal affairs of the LLC so long as
the agreement is not inconsistent with law or the articles of organization. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-682 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.423 (West Supp. 1992);
Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180,§ 15-1 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1991); Louisiana
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(16)); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-126 (1992). See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.101 (Supp. 1991). While Wy-
oming has no express provision concerning operating agreements, their existence is ac-
knowledged. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977). Thus, the issue will exist whether an
agreement vesting management in managers without so providing in the articles of or-
ganization is inconsistent with the law or the articles. This issue cannot yet be answered.
It does seem that management by members should not foreclose delegation of manage-
ment authority to others, and the extent of such delegation probably should not be lim-
ited by the ability to have created managers through the articles. But see FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 608.424, .425 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7614 (Supp. 1991);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.301, .311 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126 (1992); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 17-15-117, -118 (1977), each of which provide that only a member can bind a
member-managed LLC.
one other than any member can bind a member managed LLC.3 42
Thus, before it can be determined whether this approach will work
under existing LLC acts, the nature and extent of the authority of
the members will have to be determined by the courts of each
state.343
The inherent power of members, if any, to bind an LLC notwith-
standing an agreement to the contrary could cause the suggested ar-
rangement to fall short of the centralized management desired for
business purposes. In light of this fact, it would be appropriate if the
ideal LLC act also permitted the LLC to give notice of an agree-
ment limiting the inherent power of the members in the organiza-
tional filing. 4 This seems to be the effect of providing for
representational management in the articles of organization. How-
ever, if the inherent power of members to bind the LLC can be and
is eliminated by a statutory filing, it may be that the absence of any
inherent power of the members to bind will cause the organization to
have centralized management.
An alternative means to avoiding centralized management for tax
purposes under the 1960 Regulations is to make the centralized
management noncontinuous or nonexclusive. The test for centralized
management under the 1960 Regulations is whether "continuing ex-
clusive" authority to manage the business is vested in representa-
tives.345 One could argue that, if centralized management can be
created by operating agreement, 346 any centralized management cre-
ated by an agreement that the members can amend at any time does
not create a continuous and exclusive authority to manage the busi-
ness. Going a step further, continuous management rights should
clearly be avoided merely by creating a representative management
structure that will continue for only one year. Even if the members
acting by majority vote under the operating agreement determine to
342. The same provisions that limit authority to bind a manager-managed LLC
provide that only members can bind a member-managed LLC. See supra note 333.
These provisions are interesting in certain respects. Presumably they are not intended to
mean that the LLC cannot authorize others to act as the agent of the LLC. Perhaps,
then the import is to remove inherent agency powers from members when the LLC has
managers and to confirm such powers when there is member management, at least when
the managers are established by a provision in the articles of organization. It is unclear
what effect there would be on the authority of members who vest management in others
by agreement. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1992) and Louisiana
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)
(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1317) with MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-401 (Supp. 1992).
343. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989), in which the Service assumed
without analysis that a member's inherent power to bind a member-managed LLC ex-
isted notwithstanding a contrary agreement.
344. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 42-401(a)(3)(Supp. 1992).
345. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1983).
346. See supra notes 336-41 and accompanying text.
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vest exclusive management in a representative group for a second
year, or a third, or fourth, and so on, the management structure is
not continuous in the corporate sense. Alternatively, or additionally,
the centralized management could be made nonexclusive simply by
permitting the members by majority vote to exercise management by
majority and to override any decisions of the representative
managers.3 47
The only basis on which the Service would be able to assert that
centralized management is present under this arrangement is that
the substance of the arrangement will closely resemble the central-
ized management present in corporations. This arrangement cer-
tainly does achieve largely the same end for business purposes, but
the test of the regulations is highly formal. While the operative ef-
fect may be very similar, the authority vested in the centralized rep-
resentative management group is nonexclusive and noncontinuous,
and the 1960 Regulations expressly state that these factors are de-
terminative of the presence of centralized management for tax pur-
poses. 48 The fact that the 1960 Regulations are not satisfied with a
situation that substantially accomplishes centralized management is
abundantly clear from the fact that a partnership management
structure that by agreement of the partners is centralized, continu-
ous, and exclusive does not create centralized management because
of the inherent power of partners to bind the partnership, albeit that
any exercise of that power would constitute a breach of contract.
The conclusion in the 1960 Regulations is that this circumstance
leaves the centralized management group without the sole authority
to manage the business, and thus without centralized management
under the 1960 Regulations. 49
2. Continuity of Life
Under an ideal act, the LLC would be dissolved any time a person
ceases to be a member. 5 0 Any continuation of the business would
necessarily involve a new organization that replaces the dissolved or-
ganization. Under such a statute, an LLC'could not have continuity
347. When operating agreements are permitted to establish management, non-con-
tinuous or non-exclusive arrangements should be simple to establish. See supra note 333.
Cf. Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified
at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.603(2)).
348. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1983).
349. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
350. See UPA § 31.
of life within the meaning of the 1960 Regulations.351
The 1960 Regulations provide that continuity is absent if the or-
ganization is dissolved when any person ceases to be a member.35 2
For this purpose, the 1960 Regulations expressly state that reference
is to be made exclusively to state law to determine if there has been
a dissolution.153 When dissolution results under state law, the regula-
tions expressly state that the organization cannot possess continuity
of life even if the remaining owners continue the business in a new
organization. 54 Thus, any LLC act that simply provides that the
LLC will be dissolved upon any change in membership will necessa-
rily cause continuity of life to be absent.3 55
While the ideal act would preclude a finding of continuity of life
for tax purposes, it should not impede the creation of acceptable con-
tinuity of life for business purposes. The members could simply
agree that no one would voluntarily cause dissolution, and that upon
dissolution, a new LLC would immediately be formed to replace the
old LLC and to succeed to the business and all of the assets and
liabilities of the old LLC. The agreement could further provide that
all of the members of the old LLC that did not cause the dissolution
would have rights as owners of the new LLC that reflect their inter-
ests in the old, that any owner, or the legal representative of any
deceased owner, who did not cause the dissolution in violation of the
agreement could be admitted as a member of the new LLC with
interests that reflect the interest held in the old LLC. The Regula-
tions also provide that any persons who caused the dissolution of the
old LLC or who do not elect to become members of the new LLC
will have the right to be paid for their interest in the old LLC either
at a price that will clearly discourage withdrawal or on terms that
match the distributions such owners would have received were they
still members.356
351. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1983). See also supra
notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
352. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1983).
353. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1983).
354. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)(last sentence) (as amended in 1983).
355. Only Maryland has adopted such a provision. See MD. CoDn ANN., CORPS.
& Ass'Ns §§ 4A-901 to -911 (Supp. 1992).
356. The ability of partners to control their relationship by contract would allow
this sort of agreement. The UPA generally.permits partners of a dissolved partnership to
demand a winding up and distribution of assets only if they have not otherwise agreed.
See UPA § 38(1). More troublesome is the ability to vary the rights of the partner who
has wrongfully caused a dissolution. See UPA § 38(2)(c). However, such a partner is
merely entitled to the ascertainment and payment of the value of the partnership interest
in cash or secured by bond. If the partnership agreement fixes the rights of a defaulting
member, this should be taken into account in the ascertainment of the value of the part-
nership agreement. Further, while UPA § 38(2)(c) provides a defaulting partner rights
without express recognition of the ability to agree otherwise, partners (like anyone else a
party to a contract) can waive rights they would otherwise possess.
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Instead of adopting provisions similar to the general partnership
rules, most states have adopted a provision that more closely resem-
bles the ULPA in regard to dissolution.117 In general, the LLC acts
provide that the LLC will dissolve on the withdrawal of any member
unless continued under certain authorized circumstances. 58 Under
these acts, there is no right to continue under circumstances in which
the ULPA or the RULPA would not have permitted continuation. 9
Under the general description of continuity of life in the 1960
Regulations, it would seem possible to create an organization that
possesses continuity of life because the regulations require that disso-
lution follow an event of withdrawal unless the remaining owners all
agree to continue.360 The 1960 Regulations also provide that if the
effect of an agreement is that no partner has the power to dissolve
the organization, continuity of life is present.3 61 On the other hand,
the Regulations also state that continuity of life is absent in any or-
ganization formed under a statute corresponding to the ULPA. 62
Because the LLC acts recognize that dissolution is caused by the
same events that cause dissolution of a partnership and do not per-
mit continuation in any circumstances in which the ULPA or the
RULPA would not do so, this conclusion should extend to LLCs as
well.
If the Service would be willing to acknowledge that the blanket
357. The reason that the state statutes more closely resemble the ULPA than the
RULPA is probably due to the fact that Wyoming adopted the first act and did so while
the ULPA was still in effect. Other states have merely followed Wyoming's lead notwith-
standing that partnership law has changed.
358. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-781(a)(3)(Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 7-80-801(I)(c) (Supp. 1991); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del.
Laws ch. 434 (H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
801(4)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441(1)(c) (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability
Company Act, Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 35-1(3) (S.B. 2163)
(WESTLAW); Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369
(WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1301(3)); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7622(a)(3) (Supp. 1991); Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La.
Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1334(3)); Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-
141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.801(1)(5)); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 86.491(1)(c)(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-39(d)(1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, art. 6.01 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-137(3) (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(iii)
(1977).
359. See ULPA § 20; RULPA § 801(4).
360. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(1),(3)(as amended in 1983).
361. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1983).
362. Id.
statement in the 1960 Regulations-that ULPA and RULPA part-
nerships cannot have continuity of life-also extends to LLCs
formed under acts virtually identical to the ULPA with regard to
dissolution, continuity of life will always be absent for tax purposes.
The only problem is to create adequate continuity under these LLC
acts for business purposes.
Creation of acceptable organizational continuity for business pur-
poses could be most effectively achieved when the articles of organi-
zation or, when permitted, the operating agreement could simply
provide that the LLC will continue following an event of dissolution
so long as some number of owners desire to continue. Because the
desire to continue is the inverse of the desire to liquidate, the vote
required to continue could be simply the inverse of the vote required
to liquidate. 63 In such a case, an event of withdrawal will do little
363. The ability to insert such a provision under the various LLC acts is not en-
tirely clear. Some of the LLC acts provide that the LLC can continue only with the
consent of all members under a right to do so stated in the articles of incorporation. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c) (Supp. 1991); Minnesota Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.801(1)(5)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.491(I)(c) (1991); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-
123(a)(iii) (1977). The inclusion of the right to continue in the articles already requires
at least the conditional consent of all members to continuation. Presumably at least, such
a provision could not get into the articles unless the members have so agreed. Thus, the
additional requirement of consent under the statute must contemplate consent which is
contemporaneous with the continuation. But see Illinois Limited Liability Company Act,
1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 35-5 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW) (requir-
ing only the agreement of members to continue); Minnesota Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.011(4)) (ex-
pressly recognizing ability of members to contractually bind themselves to give the con-
temporaneous consent in the future). Otherwise, the additional consent requirement in
the statute would be redundant. If this is the proper interpretation, the statutes have
unreasonably restricted the members' freedom of contract for no apparent reason. Still,
the need to have any agreement concerning continuity reflected in the articles of organi-
zation is a little baffling. If all the parties must agree to the continuation, why must they
have also previously agreed that they could so agree and have reflected this fact in the
articles? In all events, these states do not appear to permit the type of provision
suggested.
The Utah LLC Act is unique in requiring only majority consent to continue, but it still
requires that the continuation by vote occur under a right to do so stated in the articles
of organization. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-137(3) (1992). Thus, it has the same
statutory interpretation problem that exists in Colorado, Nevada, and Wyoming and ap-
parently will not permit continuation with less than contemporaneous majority consent.
Other states permit continuation either with the consent of all of the members or
under a right to do so stated in the articles of organization. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.441(1)(c) (West Supp. 1982); Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Iowa
Acts 2369 (to be codified at IowA CODE ANN. § 490A.1301(3)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7622(a)(3) (Supp. 1991). The need to have the right disclosed in the articles of
organization implicitly indicates that the partners must have agreed that there will be the
possibility of continuation. See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-781(a)(3)(Supp. 1992);
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 68 Del. Laws 434 (1992) (to be codified at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(3)); Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992
La. Acts 780 (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1334(3)); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 6.01 (West Supp. 1992) (permitting continuation either
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more than put before the members the question of whether to liqui-
date. For example, if a two-thirds vote is required to liquidate the
LLC, a one-third vote to continue after a withdrawal would be ap-
propriate. If a majority vote to liquidate would suffice, then a major-
ity vote for continuation should be necessary. The only other matter
that would need to be addressed by the agreement of the parties is
the rights of the withdrawing members or their legal representatives.
Presumably, the legal representative of any deceased member could
be given the option to become a substituted member, as could any
other persons for whom such a right seems appropriate. Other for-
mer members could be given limited rights to payment that discour-
age withdrawal or that provide rights equal to the distribution rights
they held as members.' 64
Notwithstanding clear approval in the 1960 Regulations of the
above suggested arrangement, when permitted under the LLC acts,
the Service apparently may not be willing to recognize the absence
of continuity of life in any organization if continuation following
withdrawal can occur with consent of less than a majority of the
remaining owners. 65 That the Service is unwilling to rule in regards
to certain arrangements does not necessarily mean that they believe
the arrangement does not satisfy the substantive requirements of
under a right established by agreement, which does not need to be reflected in the arti-
cles, or by consent of all members). These states will permit provisions of the kind sug-
gested. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-39(d)(1992) (permitting continuation as
provided by the articles of organization or the operating agreement).
Virginia permits continuation following withdrawal only if the remaining members
unanimously consent, but there is no indication that the consent must be contemporane-
ous. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046(3) (Michie Supp. 1991). Thus, it seems that Vir-
ginia would permit organizational continuity to be established in the fashion suggested.
Maryland LLCs dissolve, but a new LLC will replace the old if the business is contin-
ued. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 4A-901 to -911 (Supp. 1992). See also supra
note 355 and accompanying text. The parties appear free to enter into any contract they
desire with respect to continuation.
364. See supra note 356.
365. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, at § 4.05. But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-
10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989) (holding that there was continuity of life owing to the fact that
the LLC could be continued by majority approval, although the LLC was held to be a
partnership for tax purposes because it lacked free transferability and centralized man-
agement). Rev. Proc. 89-12 does not require contemporaneous majority consent to all
continuations. It merely requires contemporaneous majority consent to the admission of a
new general partner who will continue the business. This seems consistent with Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), which requires only the consent of either the remaining gen-
eral partners or all remaining partners. Without an existing general partner to consent,
the regulation does require the consent of the limited partners. On the other hand, if
there is an existing general partner who will continue, the requirement of limited partner
consent under Rev. Proc. 89-12 would not apply.
law. Nor is there any indication that the Service would be willing to
litigate the issue should an organization fail to meet the ruling stan-
dards. Even if the Service were willing to litigate the issue, it seems
very unlikely that they could prevail in light of the rather unambigu-
ous statements in the 1960 Regulations. Nevertheless, for businesses
that desire advance assurance from the Service, at least majority
consent to continuation will apparently be required. 368
Alternatives to the above suggested arrangement are possible that
would also create adequate continuity for business purposes without
creating continuity for tax purposes. One such possibility would be to
give an option to purchase the business and assets of the dissolving
LLC to members desiring to continue the business. This option can
be assigned to a newly formed LLC. Under such an arrangement,
the withdrawal of any member will simply be permitted to lead to
dissolution of the old LLC under state law and, thus, continuity of
life should be absent under the 1960 Regulations. The fact that a
new organization is formed and continues the business of the dis-
solved LLC should be irrelevant. 67 Under this option, the considera-
tion to be paid by the new LLC could be interests in the new LLC.
In such a case, the dissolution of the old LLC under state law should
not have any significance other than under the 1960 Regulations.
Interests in the new LLC would simply be distributed to the continu-
ing members of the old LLC. The consideration paid could also in-
clude other consideration that by agreement would be paid to the old
members who wrongfully caused dissolution. Again, such additional
consideration could be at a level that will discourage anyone from
causing a dissolution or could closely resemble the distribution rights
that such member would otherwise have been entitled to.36 8
The Service might argue that this arrangement is in substance a
continuation of the old. Of course it is. For all other tax purposes,
the new LLC would be treated as the same partnership. °9 While for
all other tax purposes the old and the new LLCs would be treated as
if they were the same organization, the 1960 Regulations expressly
look to a different rule for purposes of determining whether there is
continuity of life. While a technical dissolution under state law is not
relevant for most tax purposes, it is made the only relevant consider-
ation with respect to the presence or absence of continuity of life.
366. Proposed regulations were issued on July 22, 1992, confirming that majority
consent to continuation would not cause the organization to possess corporate-like con-
tinuity of life. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7702-2(b)(1), 57 Fed. Reg. 32472 (1992).
367. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)(last sentence) (as amended in 1983).
368. An agreement to this effect would not be inconsistent with law or the operat-
ing agreement and therefore should be possible in all states.
369. See I.R.C. § 708(a) (1992).
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While everyone would agree that the rule is nonsensical, it is never-
theless the rule.
3. Free Transferability
Free transferability will be the most difficult characteristic to cre-
ate for business purposes without also having the characteristic for
tax purposes. Fortunately, for LLCs formed under an ideal act or
most of the existing LLC acts, the apparent ease of avoiding central-
ized management and continuity of life under the 1960 Regulations
means that it should typically not be necessary to avoid free trans-
ferability for tax purposes.
The first hurdle in addressing this problem is determining whether
ownership interests can be made transferable under state law. Under
an ideal act, members would be able to do anything they agree to do.
Only Maryland has such a provision.37 0 Under existing LLC acts,
the issue is not so clear. In connection with transfers of interests, the
other LLC acts are surprisingly uniform. In general, they provide
that the interests in the LLC may be assigned to the extent provided
in the articles of organization or in an operating agreement. How-
ever, they further provide that any assignment made pursuant to the
articles or an operating agreement will transfer only the right to re-
ceive distributions unless the other members consent to the substitu-
tion of a new member.3 71
370. Under an ideal act, the parties may not be able to substitute an old member
for a new member in the same LLC. See supra note 235. However, by agreement the old
LLC could be dissolved and a new one formed with the substituted member without
anyone noticing that there has been a change. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS§§ 4A-902, -904 (Supp. 1992).
371. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702(1) (Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.432 (West Supp. 1992); Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 87-1062, sec. 180, § 30-5 (S.B. 2163) (WESTLAW); Iowa Limited Liability
Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 490A.902, .903); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1991); Minnesota
Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.31(2)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.351 (Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-
35, -36 (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977). See also Minnesota Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.011(5)) (allowing the parties to contract in advance to give consent to transfers).
Utah differs from the above only in that consent need only be given by a majority of the
other members. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-131(1) (1992). Again, it is a little baf-
fling why the members must agree that they can agree to substitute a new member and
must further reflect such an agreement in the articles.
Virginia permits the right to transfer to be governed entirely by the operating agree-
ment, but then limits the assignees rights to be admitted as members by requiring the
unanimous consent of the other members. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1038, -1039
As written, most of these statutes do not appear to permit the re-
quirement of consent to be waived or modified by agreement of the
parties.3 72 There is no apparent explanation why the LLC acts
should not permit the parties to grant the right to assignment with-
out contemporaneous consent by agreement among themselves.
While there is no expresi requirement that the unanimous consent
required by the LLC acts needs to be contemporaneous, the addi-
tional requirement of consent would be redundant unless it is so in-
terpreted.3 73 On the other hand, limiting the flexibility of the
(Michie Supp. 1991). The effect of these two provisions is the same as the other states,
but at least the agreement that the members can agree does not have to be in the
articles.
Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Texas depart from the norm.
In Arizona, Delaware, and Iowa, the members can establish any desired substitution
provision in their operating agreement. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-731 (b)
(Supp. 1992); Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B.
608) (WESTLAW) (1992) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702) and
Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia. Legis. Serv. oh. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to
be codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.903) with Minnesota Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141, 1992 Minn. Laws 517 (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.011(5)). In Louisiana and Rhode Island, an assignee may be admitted
either upon unanimous vote or as provided in the operating agreement. See Louisiana
Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 780 (H.B. 1262)
(WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 7-
16-36 (1992). In Texas, the parties may establish any arrangement regarding transfer
that they desire by company regulations. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts.
4.05-.07 (West Supp. 1992).
372. But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-731(b) (Supp. 1992); Delaware Limited
Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws ch. 434 (H.B. 608) (WESTLAW) (to be codi-
fied at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702); Iowa Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ia.
Legis. Serv. ch. 2369 (WESTLAW) (to be codified at IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.903(1)); Louisiana Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 La. Sess. Law Serv.
Act 780 (H.B. 1262) (WESTLAW) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-36 (1992); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts. 4.05-.07
(West Supp. 1992), which do permit such waiver.
At this point the temptation to strongly criticize the legislative effort in a number of
states becomes irresistable. By precluding any degree of organizational continuity from
being established, one wonders who would be willing to spend significant energy organiz-
ing capital and acquiring assets. Combined with the inability to establish any possible
right to sell the interests, this provision also makes it difficult to imagine who would
invest. Thus, LLC acts which impose an unwaivable requirement of contemporaneous,
unanimous consent to continuation or substitution of new members have probably re-
stricted use of the LLC to service businesses and businesses in which all of the capital
will be provided by active, owners. Both Nevada and Wyoming impose these require-
ments. It is hard to understand why they have done so.
The act which makes no sense, however, is Colorado. It requires contemporaneous,
unanimous consent to continuation or substitution and, like Nevada and Wyoming, will
be appropriate mainly for service businesses and businesses in which active owners pro-
vide the capital. However, Colorado also requires that the business be managed by man-
agers. Such a requirement is only appropriate, if ever, when a business has inactive
investors. One is left to wonder what Colorado had in mind when they adopted these
inconsistent provisions.
373. These provisions are unfathomable. It seems clear that contemporaneous,
unanimous consent is necessary under the statutes. Otherwise the consent evidenced by a
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members to establish the type of relationship appropriate and desira-
ble to their business by passing statutes imposing an unwaivable re-
quirement of contemporaneous unanimous consent to substitutions is
unforgivable. Certainly, if state interests are not frustrated by trans-
fers with contemporaneous consent, there is no reason to think that
they would be frustrated by allowing the consent to be given in
advance.
When partners can and do create the right to substitution without
the need for contemporaneous unanimous consent, the right could be
made absolute or conditional on subsequent events, including con-
temporaneous majority consent. If the right is made absolute, the
organization will have free transferability under the 1960 Regula-
tions as well.3 74 This will not be a problem if continuity of life and
centralized management have been avoided. On the other hand, if at
least contemporaneous majority consent is required for substitution,
there should be no free transferability under the 1960
Regulations.37
Requiring only majority consent will be a more acceptable ar-
rangement for businesses that desire free transferability, but it will
not be entirely satisfactory. If greater transferability is desired, it
may be that a member who is denied consent to transfer can be
given certain rights that arise upon the refusal to consent. For exam-
ple, following the refusal to consent, it might be possible to give any
such members the right to put their interests to the LLC at a price
equal to the consideration in the proposed transfer. In such event,
while the necessity of consent to a transfer remains, the contingent
provision in the articles of organization would suffice. On the other hand, if contempora-
neous consent is required, what reason is there to require that the members have previ-
ously agreed that they could subsequently agree to a substitution? The dual requirement
is particularly silly if the partners can amend their articles of organization at any time.
One supposes that the failure to include the provision in the articles will simply necessi-
tate that the members first agree that they can agree to a transfer, then amend the
articles, then agree to the transfer.
An alternative thought which the drafters may have contemplated is that the provision
in the articles goes to the ability to assign the right to receive distributions, whereas the
contemporaneous consent goes to the right of the assignee to become a substituted mem-
ber. The problem with such a theory is that any statute which attempts to remove a
person's right to assign future payments, particularly if the rule would extend to involun-
tary assignments, would have to be much clearer. If this was the purpose, it probably has
not been achieved.
See also Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, art. 2, §§ 1-141 (to be
codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.011(5)) (requiring contemporaneous consent to a
transfer but permitting the parties to contract in advance to give such consent).
374. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (as amended in 1983).
375. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, § 4.06.
right creates the economic incentive for the other members to give
consent.
It should be noted that this arrangement is really no different
from a right of first refusal in the LLC because the interest will in
all events be transferred either to the LLC or the proposed trans-
feree. This may be enough to create free transferability under the
1960 Regulations. 6 While the presence of the other characteristics
depend upon very technical considerations, free transferability under
the 1960 Regulations appears to be a more substantive inquiry. If a
right creates free transferability as the equivalent of merely a right
of first refusal, it is possible that some other contingent right could
be substituted to assure that consent would not be unreasonably
withheld while not creating a situation which is equivalent to a right
of first refusal.
4. Summary
Given an ideal LLC act, it appears that the LLC could be used in
a fashion that permits the principal corporate attributes to be cre-
ated for business purposes without subjecting the LLC to corporate
income taxation. As such, it should provide a solution to the choice
of entity dilemma. Of course, LLCs are not yet a solution to the
choice of entity dilemma. LLCs have only been authorized in eight
states, and there are substantial ambiguities in the statutes adopted
in those states that make uncertain just what can be accomplished
under those Acts. However, it does appear that LLCs will become
much more common, and it is likely that over time uniformity and
clarity of these laws will increase. Further, given that the impetus
for the significant level of legislative activity is the promise of Reve-
nue Ruling 88-76, the trend in future legislation will no doubt be to
press further toward statutes that facilitate the attainment of this
end, such as the ideal act suggested herein.
While the current LLC acts may not be ideal, most will provide
possible solutions to the choice of entity dilemma. It will take time to
understand what is and is not possible under the various acts.
It cannot yet be known how the Service will respond to aggressive
efforts to use an LLC to create corporate relationships which rely
heavily on technical aspects of the 1960 Regulations in order to
avoid corporate tax. As a theoretical matter, the reaction should be
that it is not right and makes no sense. As a practical matter, the
reaction should be that it works under the 1960 Regulations, and if
376. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (as amended in 1983). While the regula-
tions refer to a right of substitution subject to a right of first refusal (a modified form of
free transferability), modified free transferability has the same significance as the un-
modified variety. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
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law is to be brought in line with theory, it must occur by a change in
the regulations.
The LLC solution to the choice of entity dilemma will not come
without some complexity. How great the complexity depends on the
particular act under which it is formed. However, as with other busi-
ness organizations, the complexity should diminish as practitioners
develop and become comfortable with forms that accomplish the
ends sought.
C. Choice of the Limited Partnerships Form
1. Suggested Use
The combined impact of the clarification of the role of limited lia-
bility under the 1960 Regulations and the move generally to free
owners from personal liability for the obligations of an unincorpo-
rated business (at least absent a reasonable belief of the creditor that
the limited partner is a general partner) suggests that a limited part-
nership with a corporate general partner also can now be utilized to
solve the choice of entity dilemma in a significantly increased range
of circumstances.
A limited partnership with a limited partner controlled corporate
general partner has become a very simple and effective means to ac-
complishing the corporate relationship without corporate tax. The
suggestion is that this result can be achieved by the use of a limited
partnership' with a single corporate general partner owned propor-
tionately by the limited partners. Under this suggestion, the limited
partners will not be given the right to substitute another in their
place.
2. Federal Tax Treatment of the Suggested Use
The first question is whether this suggested form will be taxed as a
partnership. The clear answer under the 1960 Regulations is that it
will. The organization will possess the corporate characteristics
under the 1960 Regulations of limited liability 17 and centralized
management a.3 7 However, the fact that the dissolution, withdrawal,
or bankruptcy of the corporate general partner will potentially dis-
solve the limited partnership will prevent the corporate attribute of
377. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). See also supra text
accompanying notes 227-29.
378. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983). See also supra text
accompanying notes 204-12.
continuity of life from being present for tax purposes.37 9 Similarly,
the fact that the limited partners will have no right to substitute an
assignee in their place without the consent of the other partners will
prevent the organization from having the corporate attribute of free
transferability for tax purposes. 380 Because the organization will pos-
sess only two of the four corporate characteristics, it will be treated
as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.38'
Older authorities suggest an alternative basis for arguing that cor-
porate tax should be imposed in this context. The argument is that
when substantial identity exists between the owners of the limited
partnership interests and the stock of the corporate general partner,
then the existence of the limited partnership should simply be ig-
nored and the limited partnership interests treated as simply pre-
ferred stock of the corporation.3 82 However, any such argument is in
conflict with Bollinger,383 the 1960 Regulations, Larson,384 and the
Service's acquiescence in Larson.
If the basis of this argument is that the corporation is actually the
party in interest, the argument has been directly rejected by Bollin-
ger.38 5 If the argument is viewed as an effort to tax the true sub-
stance of the relationship, it is in conflict with the 1960 Regulations
and Larson. It is unquestionably true that very similar rights can be
created through limited partnership interests or preferred stock. This
is true whether the limited partners own the general partner or not.
While the two could be fashioned so as to accomplish the same re-
sult, it is no more true to state that the limited partnership interests
are preferred stock than it would be to suggest that preferred stock
is really a partnership interest. The problem is that state law autho-
rizes two different relationships that may have little substantive dis-
tinction. This is precisely the reason associations are taxable as
corporations. Moreover, determining whether the relationships cre-
ated under state law should result in corporate taxation is exactly
the issue which the 1960 Regulations address. Thus, Larson clearly
and unequivocally mandates that corporate taxation be imposed only
379. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(3), (a)(5) (as amended in 1983). See also
supra text accompanying notes 213-26.
380. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1983). See also supra text
accompanying notes 230-39.
381. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983). See also supra text
accompanying notes 188-200.
382. See Jones v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981).
383. Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988). See also supra note 309 and
accompanying text.
384. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). See also supra note 198
and accompanying text.
385. See George W. Heaton, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 2197 (1989). See also supra note
311 and accompanying text.
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if the organization is properly characterized as an association under
the 1960 Regulations.386
3. Corporate Equivalence of the Suggested Use
a. In General
The second major question is whether the suggested limited part-
nership arrangement will provide the owners with the principal bene-
fits of incorporation for state law purposes. The conclusion should
clearly be that it does.
If the business were to incorporate, it would have management
centralized in a board of directors elected by the shareholders. In the
proposed partnership arrangement, the business is owned by the lim-
ited partnership but only the general partner has the right to manage
the business. 87 The general partner is in turn a corporation in which
the management is centralized in a board of directors elected by the
shareholders. In that the shares of the corporate general partner are
owned by the limited partners in proportion to their ownership of the
limited partnership, the management and control of the business is
entirely unaffected by the fact that a limited partnership has been
used in lieu of mere incorporation.
Had the business merely been incorporated, the organization
would continue until the shareholders elected to dissolve or other cir-
cumstances arose that caused an involuntary dissolution of the cor-
poration. Because the limited partnership will generally be dissolved
only by the withdrawal, bankruptcy, or dissolution of the corporate
general partner,388 which will occur under precisely the same cir-
cumstances that would have resulted in a dissolution of the corpora-
tion had the business merely incorporated, it is clear that the
continuity of the life of the limited partnership will be exactly that
of an incorporated business. Indeed, the ability to create and admit a
new general partner will give the limited partnership an opportunity
to provide even greater continuity. 389
Had the business merely been incorporated, the shareholders
would be free to transfer their shares subject only to applicable se-
curities laws and any agreements that they enter into. In the sug-
gested partnership arrangement, the owners will still be free to
386. Larson, 66 T.C. at 185-86. See also Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448.
387. See RULPA § 403(a).
388. See RULPA § 801(4).
389. Id.
transfer their stock in the corporate general partner to a like extent.
The limited partners will also be free to assign the economic interest
in the partnership. 390 The only thing the partners may not do is sub-
stitute another person in their place without consent of the other
partners.31 However, through a combined sale of the stock and the
assignment of partnership interests, the partners can transfer all
ownership rights to as great an extent as if the business had simply
incorporated. Further, because the purchaser would have all substan-
tial rights, there would be no reason for partners not to consent to
transfer if the assignee so desired. 92
Had the business incorporated, no owner would be liable for the
obligations of the business unless they had agreed to such liability,
they had used the corporation to commit a fraud on the creditors, or
the protection against liability would work a manifest injustice.3 3 In
the suggested partnership form, the general partner is liable for the
obligations of the business, but because the general partner is itself a
corporation, the ultimate owners will not be liable except under the
same standards that they would have been liable had they merely
adopted the corporate form.
b. Piercing the General Partner's Corporate Veil
A concern could legitimately arise as to whether the protection
against liability of the limited partnership arrangement is as effective
as would be achieved with incorporation or the use of a limited lia-
bility company. The source of concern should not arise, in most
states, under limited partnership acts. As discussed above, at least in
those thirty-seven jurisdictions which have adopted provisions at
least as restrictive as the 1985 amended version of RULPA section
303, there should no longer be any significant concern that the activ-
ities of the limited partners in the management and control of the
business will result in personal liability.39 4 Any increased concern
should be only that courts might be willing to pierce the corporate
veil when the corporate general partner is thinly capitalized and is
390. See RULPA § 702.
391. See RULPA § 704. The partners would generally not want to agree in ad-
vance to eliminate this limitation on substitution because this limitation is what prevents
free transferability from existing for tax purposes. If the partners wish, they could lessen
the consent necessary to majority consent.
392. If the right of substitution were to require majority consent, the fact that
there is no reason not to consent should be adequate assurance that substitution will
always be allowed.
393. See generally Krendl & Krendl, supra note 80 (discussing the general stan-
dards employed by the courts in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 279-86.
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owned proportionately by the limited partners.3 15
In considering this issue, it is important to bear in mind that the
use of a limited partnership with a limited partner owned corporate
general partner has been expressly sanctioned by the RULPA. Thus,
the structure, in and of itself, cannot be viewed as accomplishing any
illicit or illegal purpose. Further, the fact that the business could
have been incorporated or, in several states, formed as an LLC indi-
cates that there is no longer any policy for imposing liability on ac-
tive owners. However, the corporate veil should not be permitted to
protect shareholders from the consequences of their fraud or to per-
mit a result that is manifestly unjust. Regardless of the form of or-
ganization used, the method of attaining protection against personal
liability should be qualified by these concepts.
The suggested arrangement should not result in any greater risk of
piercing the corporate veil because of fraud. The form of organiza-
tion does not, in and of itself, give rise to any fraud that could not as
easily or as often occur in the corporate context independent of the
existence of a partnership. The only increased concern that could
arise from the use of a thinly capitalized corporate general partner
should stem from the question of whether honoring the corporate veil
will work a manifest injustice. Generally, thin capitalization of the
organization, while not alone enough to lead courts to pierce the cor-
porate veil, is clearly the threshold issue that commands the greatest
attention.396
In determining whether the owners in the suggested form of or-
ganization are susceptible to greater liabilities because of inadequate
capitalization of the corporate general partner, it is not appropriate
to look only to the assets of the corporate general partner. The ques-
tion should be whether the business was adequately capitalized, and
in that inquiry, reference should be to the assets of both the partner-
ship and the general partner. Were the business simply incorporated,
or an LLC used, the creditors would generally be able to reach the
assets of the business and no further. If the suggested partnership
arrangement is used, the creditor will still be able to reach the same
assets, that being all of the assets of the business. Stated another
way, if the partnership form is used but the assets of the business are
otherwise the same, the choice of the form of organization has not in
395. But see Krendl & Krendl, supra note 80, at 14 (stating that only the Califor-
nia courts pierce the corporate veil solely as a result of thin capitalization).
396. See generally Krendl & Krendl, supra note 80.
any way contributed to greater injustice to creditors. Simply, the ob-
ligor is the partnership rather than the corporation. Because the use
of the suggested form does not diminish the assets available to credi-
tors, it is difficult to see that it should in any way increase the likeli-
hood of piercing the corporate veil. The potential for liability is
increased by the suggested form only if it is assumed that the courts
will not understand that the form of organization suggested has not,
of itself, resulted in creating any greater disadvantage to the
creditors.
Attempting to take a pragmatic view, it must be admitted that if a
court desires to find assets with which to compensate a creditor, the
use of a thinly capitalized corporate general partner may provide the
excuse. However, under like circumstances it seems highly improba-
ble that a court desiring to compensate creditors would be unable to
find an excuse to reach the same end had the business simply been
incorporated. Stated another way, if the court perceives a manifest
injustice, the court will likely find liability regardless of the means
employed by the owners to avoid the liability.
To continue in a pragmatic vein, it is difficult to see how the form
of organization could affect liability to consensual creditors. If per-
sons extend credit to an organization having knowledge of the ar-
rangements and the opportunity to inquire into the credit worthiness
of the partnership and the general partner, it is hard to see that
there is a substantial risk such persons would later be able to pierce
the corporate veil without some showing of wrongful conduct on the
part of the partners. Thus, the practical risk is really that a non-
consensual creditor (e.g., a tort claimant) will seek to pierce the cor-
porate veil in order to seek satisfaction of claims. The risk of per-
sonal liability to such persons should be greatly reduced simply by
causing the corporate general partner to purchase insurance that is
appropriate to the size and scope of the business. It is difficult to
argue that there is manifest injustice in not piercing the corporate
veil based solely on thin capitalization if the capitalization is aug-
mented by appropriate levels of insurance. 39 7 Certainly, any court
that would pierce the corporate veil notwithstanding adequate capi-
talization of the partnership and appropriate levels of general part-
ner insurance would not have been deterred from this result if the
business had simply incorporated.
397. Insurance is necessary notwithstanding concerns about piercing the corporate
veil because no form of organization will protect an active owner who has committed a
tortious act. The business liability for tortious acts is vicarious. It arises when an agent of
the business has committed a tortious act within the scope of their employment. The fact
that the business has vicarious liability does not protect the individual wrongdoer from
liability, it simply provides the injured party with another defendant against whom to
seek satisfaction of any judgment.
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c. Complexity of Suggested Use
Given that the use of limited partnerships should, in most states,
permit the parties to establish a relationship that is virtually indistin-
guishable from the corporate form (but that is not subject to corpo-
rate taxation), the only other legitimate objection to the use of this
form might be that it will entail greater complexity and more oner-
ous documentation. Hopefully the bar has not reached the point that
the complexity of the law forestalls the use of a better form. How-
ever, if business finds the form inordinantly complex or burdensome,
this would be a legitimate objection.
It seems that the suggested form should not entail any signifi-
cantly more onerous documentation or create significant confusion
for the owners. Of course, the corporate documentation that would
have been required had the limited partnership option not been se-
lected will still be required. A limited partnership agreement and a
certificate of limited partnership will also be necessary. 398 However,
the limited partnership agreement should, in most cases, be of the
simplest order. The only matter that should be dealt with in the lim-
ited partnership agreement is the sharing of profits, losses, and dis-
tributions. These provisions need not be any more complicated and
should not differ from those which would have been required if the
business had simply incorporated. To illustrate, if the corporation
would otherwise have been formed with a single class of stock, the
partnership agreement should simply provide for the partnership in-
terests to be represented by units and for all profits, losses, and dis-
tributions to be allocated or made in proportion to the units. As the
alternative corporate relationship that would have been adopted be-
comes more complicated, the complexity of the limited partnership
form is similarly increased. However, the complexity is the same re-
gardless of which form is adopted. Instead of establishing a preferred
class of stock, the same rights and preferences will attach to units of
limited partnership interest. The same language is appropriate re-
gardless of the document into which it is inserted.
From the point of view of the business owner, the added complex-
ity is that the same relationship is created with the same terminology
but in two documents. The fact that checks to the owners will be in
398. The certificate of limited partnership should not be a problem because the
RULPA, since 1985, requires very little substance to be contained in the certificate. See
RULPA § 201. Most states have now adopted RULPA (1985). See supra note 286.
their capacity as limited partners, not as shareholders, does not ne-
cessitate any different conduct or the use of any different bank ac-
count. Only the accountants and attorneys need to remember that
the checks are going to the owners in their capacity as shareholders.
On the other hand, the management of the business will be precisely
the same. Under either option, the owners are acting as employees,
agents, officers, directors, and shareholders of the corporation. So far
as management is concerned, the owners should essentially ignore
the existence of the limited partnership, the only exception being
that they should sign documents and print up letterhead in the name
of the partnership.
Of course, if the parties wish to take advantage of the inherent
flexibility of partnerships in order to obtain benefits that would not
have been available had the corporate form been employed, addi-
tional complexity will arise. This added complexity is not caused by
the form of organization chosen, but is made possible by that form.
d. Summary
In summary, as with LLCs, it now appears that limited partnerships
can be used in a fashion that will duplicate the corporate relation-
ship in all principal respects without also subjecting the business to
corporate tax. The primary restraint on the use of this form is a
concern that courts might more readily pierce the corporate veil in
such a case, even though there is no theoretical justification for any
different treatment.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION
If LLCs and limited partnerships now offer the possibility of cre-
ating corporate relationships without subjecting the business to cor-
porate income taxation, the conclusion that necessarily follows is
that corporate income taxation has become an entirely voluntary ob-
ligation for all nonpublic businesses. In a sense this has always been
true. It is certainly true for any business which qualifies for the sub-
chapter S election. It has also been true for anyone willing to forego
the benefits of the corporate form. What has changed is that avoid-
ance of corporate tax no longer requires either qualifying under sub-
chapter S or foregoing the principal benefits of the corporate
relationship.
Recognizing that corporate taxation has or is quickly becoming a
voluntary obligation, it is time that Congress address the issue. Con-
gress has two basic alternatives: either it should make the election
not to pay corporate income tax expressly available under the Code
without regard to the type of entity employed, or it should eliminate
the developing election. Whatever Congress' response, it should come
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promptly.
If corporate income taxation is to be elective, there can be no de-
bate that the proper means for providing this election is by amend-
ment of the Code. Such a change would be easily accomplished
merely by amending section 7701(a)(2) to exclude from the defini-
tion of a corporation any organization electing to be treated as a
partnership. On the other hand, permitting the election to develop
along its current course will result in significant unfairness, lack of
uniformity, uncertainty, and inefficiency.
Detailing all of the problems that attend the current means by
which an elective corporate tax system is developing seems unneces-
sary. An election not to pay corporate tax ought to be a federal tax
election, adopted after due consideration in Congress and uniformly
available to all businesses. By making the election dependent on
state legislative efforts, the election is not uniform nationally. Fur-
ther, the election is not realistically available to already established
businesses organized at a time before this election became
possible. 399
A very great objection to continuing the current means to the
adoption of an elective corporate tax is the tremendous inefficiency
of this course. While Congress could provide the election with little
change to statutes, the current course will require, ultimately, legis-
lation in all fifty states. In adopting business legislation, the states
should be concerned with the proper regulation of the relationship of
business to the state and to its creditors and with the relationship
between the owners. Its effort should be to deal with these relation-
ships in clear and unequivocal terms. However, because the state leg-
islation must endeavor to permit businesses to establish relationships
that wind their way through the highly technical, mostly nonsensical
1960 Regulations, these legitimate state concerns give way. The re-
sult is the adoption of statutes that are uncertain and ambiguous and
that endeavor to permit and foster relationships which may not be
directly established by the legislation.
The inefficiency of the current course is not limited to the state
legislatures. The burden of the present course will rest most directly
and onerously on the courts and on businesses that will be forced to
wrestle daily with the effects of new and uncertain legislation and
399. Conversion from a corporation to a noncorporate form would entail the recog-
nition of gain, whether the corporation is an S corporation or a regular corporation. See
I.R.C. §§ 331, 336 (1986).
with how such legislation will be treated under the 1960 Regula-
tions. Ultimately, the uncertainty and ambiguity of the present
course will produce the downfall of more than one business that has
gone too far or attempted too much. There is also little doubt that
the bar will expend substantial resources coming to terms with the
new solutions to the choice of entity dilemma.
Probably the most objectionable fact of all is that the states, the
courts, businesses, and the bar may well be running the Red Queen's
Race4 0 with the Service. The Service has long been dissatisfied with
the consequences of the 1960 Regulations. This dissatisfaction has
been reflected in efforts to impose more onerous standards than those
present in the 1960 Regulations, both in litigation and in adopting
ruling standards. The dissatisfaction is further evidenced by the fact
that the Service only recently completed more than ten years of
study on the role which limited liability should play in entity charac-
terization. That the substantial expenditure of effort by the states,
the courts, businesses, and the bar could be quickly brought to
nought by a change in the 1960 Regulations is troubling. That the
Service could accomplish largely the same result under a new read-
ing of the 1960 Regulations or a change in ruling policy, in each
case combined with the threat of litigation which business can ill-
afford, is simply unacceptable.
If corporate tax is to be elective, it should be made expressly so
under the Code, and the legislation accomplishing this result should
occur quickly to avoid the escalating costs associated with the con-
tinuance of the .current course.
Quite obviously, adoption of a voluntary corporate tax system
should occur only after Congress has reached the political and eco-
nomic decision that a voluntary system is appropriate. On the other
hand, if a voluntary system is not appropriate, there is even greater
reason to insist that Congress act to achieve that end. Proceeding
quickly is necessary not only to protect whatever revenue might oth-
erwise be lost, but to minimize the expenditures of the states, the
courts, businesses, and the bar to attain an end which Congress will
eventually prohibit.
Should Congress decide to continue a mandatory tax on the in-
come of nonpublic companies, it will find that there are no simple
400. This term was used by Martin Ginsberg in the course of discussions about the
1986 proposal to amend I.R.C. § 382. The precise reference of this allusion is unknown
though it rings mightily of Lewis Carroll. It nevertheless so elegantly conjures up the
image of a race in which the finish line changes each and every time it is approached as
to make its use irresistible. It is truly an apt description of efforts to address the choice of
entity dilemma if the Service is left with the ability to control entity characterization
through novel interpretations of the 1960 Regulations or, worse, through a raised eye-
brow announced in a revenue procedure that simply ignores the unambiguous provisions
of the 1960 Regulations.
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means to such end. The difficulty is that there is no necessarily in-
herent basis for distinguishing between corporate and noncorporate
forms. The problem faced is similar to that addressed in 1987 when
Congress felt it necessary to impose corporate taxation on all public
companies. With respect to such companies, Congress did not at-
tempt to redefine the term "corporation." Instead, Congress came to
the conclusion that it was proper to impose the corporate income tax
on any publicly traded business regardless of the nature of the or-
ganization used. In a real sense, Congress recognized that entity
characterization should have little to do with the tax burden of pub-
licly traded companies and therefore drew a new line. Precisely the
same issue is arising again. Entity characterization simply does not
serve to adequately distinguish companies that should pay corporate
tax from those who need not do so. Unfortunately, there is no single
factor which can serve as a line of demarcation for private
companies.
Congress could choose to require that the 1960 Regulations be re-
vised so as to determine the presence of the attributes in a more
realistic fashion. It could additionally give disproportionate weight to
the various factors. It is certainly possible for Congress to revise or
direct the revision of the 1960 Regulations in a manner that would
be more substantive. For example, a better system might include the
following concepts. First, limited liability, determined in a realistic
fashion, could be made a condition to the imposition of corporate
tax. Second, if limited liability and a potentially perpetual existence
were both present, corporate tax would be imposed. Third, if con-
tinuity of life is not present in any realistic fashion, corporate tax
could still be imposed if the organization has both centralized man-
agement and free transferability. Finally, if either free transferabil-
ity or centralized management, but not both, are combined with
limited liability, other factors could be made relevant, including the
extent to which arrangements exist that suggest that the other corpo-
rate factors will be achieved by arrangements of the parties.
It seems clear that any system devised should be relatively certain.
Taxpayers must be put in a position that they can reasonably predict
the tax consequences of their activities. Further, the question is not
one that can be left to the courts to address on a case-by-case basis.
Certainly, the Service should not be left with discretion to determine
who should or should not pay corporate tax. The difficulty then be-
comes that any reasonably definite rules for entity characterization
will be little more than a challenge to the bar and to business to find
the forms that will again address the choice of entity dilemma. Be-
yond the difficulty of finding a means to properly classify organiza-
tions as corporations for tax purposes, there is the further question of
just why some of these characteristics should be relevant. It is diffi-
cult to find a cogent explanation for why the ability to make trans-
fers or the creation of a representational management structure
should result in the imposition of a more onerous tax. If two facto-
ries stand side-by-side and produce the same product and eventually
the same income, how does the fact that the owners of one can trans-
fer their interests freely while the owners of the other must get the
consent of the other owners justify the imposition of a different tax
burden?
The real difficulty in this area stems from the fact that the corpo-
rate income tax is justifiable only by a conclusion that certain busi-
ness profits ought to be taxed more onerously than other types of
income, and the effort to impose this more onerous tax by reference
to the nature of the entity in which they are earned will always re-
sult in the failure to reach the proper tax base. The only question is
whether to error on the side of over or under inclusion. In all
probability, the errors will probably occur on both sides.
Possibly it is time to recognize that the corporate tax is not the
only means available for imposition of a more onerous tax on certain
business profits. The most obvious alternative is to simply identify
the profits to be taxed more onerously and impose a surtax on them.
The same result could be achieved by an increase in the basic rate of
tax, but then 'giving a preference to other types of income similar to
the maximum tax system that recently existed for earned income.40 1
Preferred income could obviously include income from the perform-
ance of services, dividends from businesses which are paying corpo-
rate tax, interest income, and any other income which Congress
determines to prefer. With such arrangements for a surtax of busi-
ness profits, the corporate tax, at least for non-public companies,
could then be either abolished or made voluntary.
CONCLUSION
Recent developments in both tax law and state law indicate that
forms of organization are rapidly developing which permit the corpo-
rate relationship to be created without corporate taxation. Given
these developments, it is incumbent on Congress to act promptly to
either expressly permit a voluntary corporate tax system or to avoid
it.
401. See I.R.C. § 1348 (1969), repealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-34, Title I, § 101(c)(1), 95 Stat. 183 (1981).
